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SYRIAN REFUGEES’ ACCOUNT OF LIFE IN DENMARK 
 
This doctoral dissertation examines the lived experiences of refuge in Denmark from the 
perspectives of Syrian refugees. Situated within feminist political geography, it moves 
beyond examining geopolitics merely from the perspective of the law, the state, and 
policy makers. Instead, it seeks to grasp the ways in which geopolitics are encountered, 
experienced, and negotiated on the ground – by the people who are most affected by state 
policies and practices. It draws on more than ten months of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Denmark with Syrian refugees, including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and 
participant observations, as well as interviews with state and non-state actors providing 
assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan. This dissertation brings insights from feminist 
political geography into conversation with those from critical refugee studies, border 
studies, geographies of law, and postcolonial studies in order to unsettle core ideas and 
terms of reference surrounding what refuge is and how it is practiced.  
This dissertation makes three distinct but closely related arguments. First, 
focusing on family reunification of refugees and how this form of protection became a 
target in the Danish state’s efforts to prevent refugee immigration, I argue that the 
geopolitics of refuge needs to be examined in a way that includes but also moves beyond 
the actual territorial border line as well as the legal border (i.e. the moment a person 
obtains protection and legal status). Second, through an examination of Syrian refugees’ 
everyday encounters with the Danish state, I draw attention to the disjunctures between 
idealized notions of refuge with its ostensible ‘humanitarian’ ethos and the practical 
articulations of refuge as manifested in the everyday lived experiences of refugees. This 
is what I term lived refuge. I argue, however, that the dissonances between idealized and 
actually existing refuge point to the persistent presence of governance within refuge, 
rather than a lack or an absence of ‘true’ humanitarianism - i.e. a promise of freedom, 
betterment, and prospect that did not fully materialize. Instead, the state practices, which 
refugees are subject to within refuge, are enabled and normalized through the 
asymmetrical relationships between the state and the refugee. Third, calling attention to 
how Syrian refugees experience, articulate and locate war, I trouble prevailing 
     
 
geographical imaginations of “Europe” and Denmark as spaces of peace, safety, and 
prosperity. Drawing on Syrians’ experiences of war, I argue that attending to everyday 
experiences of war in refuge prompts a re-articulation of where war is, what counts as 
war, and who decides. 
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UNSETTLING REFUGE IN DENMARK 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I unsettle political refuge in its modern liberal meaning. Drawing on 
Syrian refugees’ lived experiences of refuge in Denmark, I show how refuge is not space 
outside or beyond the geopolitics of migration and violence. More specifically, I explore 
how a refugee protection status/category actively contributes to the separation of 
displaced families across borders, how refuge becomes a site of dense governmental 
practices, and how experiences of war are very much part of refuge. Importantly, I trace 
how Syrian refugees experience, negotiate, and make sense of these practices and the 
politics that they enact. 
Situated within Denmark and Jordan, this dissertation focuses on Syrian forced 
migrants’ encounters with Western states’ migration management practices. For the past 
sixty years, Jordan has functioned as a transit country for various groups of forced 
migrants en route to Europe and elsewhere (Chatelard 2003; Chatty and Finlayson 2010). 
The country’s economy has benefited significantly from the influx of forced migrants due 
to a large amount of development assistance from Western countries. Yet, the wellbeing 
and protection of the 1.4 million Syrians currently residing in Jordan are fragile. While 
Jordan has historically provided refugee protection on ad hoc basis, the country is not a 
signatory of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. It lacks asylum legislation, 
and regards non-Palestinian forced migrants as ‘temporary guests’ rather than as 
‘refugees’ (Mason 2011). Non-Palestinian forced migrants are subject to the country’s 
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legislation applicable to foreigners. Further, according to the 1998 Memorandum of 
Understanding, a non-binding agreement between Jordan and UNHCR (Zaiotti 2006), 
Jordan is considered a transit country and UNHCR is responsible for the protection of 
forced migrants, adjudicating refugee claims, and facilitating third-country resettlement 
(Ward 2014). As a result, forced migrants’ protection and access to refugee status depend 
on international and humanitarian organizations. European countries have increasingly 
put economic and political pressure on Jordan to control and limit the flows of forced 
migrants bound for Europe. Jordan, accordingly, is an important node in the international 
refugee regime.  
Denmark is a prime site to study the relationship between Western migration 
management and the lived experiences of forced migrants. Among European countries, 
Denmark has been a pioneer of strict immigration law and asylum policy. In the early 
1980s, Danish politicians mainly perceived asylum seekers as a vulnerable group of 
people who needed assistance, protection, and legal rights. Yet, toward to end of the 
1980s, this political attitude gradually started to change as the number of spontaneous 
asylum seekers increased and migrants began to enter Denmark on their own rather than 
through the UN refugee resettlement program. In response to this increasing asylum 
population, right wing politicians turned immigration into a controversial topic within 
both the Danish Parliament and society at large. Gradually, asylum seekers and refugees 
were perceived as a threat to the Danish sovereignty, society, and culture. 
Denmark’s current Immigration and Integration Acts are results of the past 30 
years’ intense political debates and more than 160 legal amendments. Danish politicians 
have sought stem the flow of asylum seekers by creating a more restrictive asylum policy 
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and optimizing the asylum system. The legal changes have, among others, included the 
repeal of the de-facto refugee category and asylum seekers’ right to family reunification 
and implementation of new practices such as a cash allowance, a contract system, 
biometric data collection, and motivation measures (economic penalties and solitary 
confinement) to ensure asylum seekers’ cooperation with state officials (Vitus and 
Nielsen 2011). These practices remain in force.  
Similar to other European countries, Denmark has experienced a substantial 
increase of Syrian as well as other forced migrants seeking asylum in Denmark between 
2014 and 2016, a period that is often talked about as the “European refugee crisis” 
(Collyer and King 2016; Dempsey and McDowell 2019). In September 2015, the Danish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Kristian Jensen, presented the Danish 
government’s proposal of how to solve the so-called refugee crisis, stating:  
We are in the midst of a historical crisis. It calls for a bold response and for 
everyone in the EU to contribute to lifting this task. In presenting the 
package today, we are sending a clear message that Denmark is ready to 
take on extra responsibility in solving the extraordinary migration crisis 
that Europe is facing. We are faced with an overwhelming and complex 
challenge. We need to address the challenge both domestically and 
internationally. With our package, we are boosting our already strong 
efforts in support of the refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, we are 
strengthening the integration of the refugees who come to Denmark, and 
we are contributing to mitigating the current migration pressure in Europe 
(Jensen 2015).  
 
At the same time, as the Danish government supported a range of organizations and 
programs in Syria and the neighboring countries, it also passed more than 100 
amendments to the Danish Immigration Act (Udlændingelov) and the Danish Integration 
Act (Integrationslov) respectively (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2019). Several 
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of the legal changes have received international attentions, such as the Danish state’s 
decision to seize assets from refugees (Taylor 2015a). Others amendments and policies 
were adapted by other European countries, such as the suspension of family reunification 
(see Chapter Three), illustrating how Denmark continued to act as a trendsetter for the 
European Union’s asylum policy (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Whyte 2011). The majority of 
these amendments sought to deter future forced migrants from seeking refuge in 
Denmark. This deterrence policy became particularly apparent in the fall of 2015, when 
the Danish government placed an advertisement in a number of newspapers in Lebanon, 
listing a number of reasons why Denmark is an undesirable destination for refugees 
(Taylor 2015b).  
Deterrence and securitization are intended to make Denmark a less attractive 
asylum destination, reduce the number of asylum seekers, and ensure that the asylum 
seekers who are granted asylum will assimilate into the Danish society. While many of 
these amendments did not directly target Syrian refugees, they were often rationalized 
and legitimized through references specifically to the Syrian Civil War and the increasing 
number of Syrian refugees on the move (in Syria's neighboring countries). Thus, in 
addition to the many legal changes, my informants’ experiences of refuge were also 
shaped by the fact that Syrians became the articulated target of Danish anti-immigrant 
discourses and legislation.  
Taken together, Jordan and Denmark provide important insights into the actions 
of states spearheading and implementing migration management policies and practices, 
and into the evolving connections between them. 
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This dissertation draws on in-depth fieldwork conducted in Denmark and Jordan 
between October 2015 and July 2017. In Denmark, I carried out archival research, seven 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from Danish Red Cross, Action Aid, the 
Danish Refugee Council, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 40 semi-
structured interviews and six focus groups with Syrian refugees who had obtained 
refugee protection in Denmark. As part of this research, I also volunteered in three 
different community centers assisting asylum seekers, refugees, and other migrants in 
need. In Jordan, I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with Danish state 
representatives as well as program coordinators, case workers, and staff members from a 
range of humanitarian organizations, which had received a form of funding or financial 
support from the Danish state. In this dissertation, the interviews and focus groups with 
Syrian refugees as well as my observations through my work at the three community 
centers are at the center of my analysis. The interviews conducted with 34 humanitarian 
organizations, state and non-state actors in Denmark and Jordan as well as the archival 
research on the transnational linkages between Denmark and the Middle East serve to 
provide background information on formal processes and transnational connections.  
Situated within feminist political geography, my work does not insist on merely 
examining the geopolitics of migration from the perspective of the law, the state, and 
policy makers. Instead, I seek to grasp the ways in which geopolitics of migration are 
encountered, experienced, and negotiated on the ground – by the people who are most 
affected by these state policies and practices. This follows from key thinkers in the field 
of feminist political geography. For instance, as Alison Mountz (2010, 35) has argued, 
“Written policies . . . tell only partial stories – idealized versions of what might be or 
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what should happen.” In extending this insight further, I show that written policies may 
not only tell us partial stories but, indeed, ones that hide and flatten more than they 
reveal. This dissertation brings these crucial insights from feminist political geography 
into conversation with related discussions in critical refugee studies – more specifically 
its important efforts to unsettle core ideas of the refugee and the very category of refuge. 
In this dissertation, I make three distinct yet interrelated arguments. First, I 
critically examine refuge as it is provided by a signatory state. Rather than looking at 
refuge as a place of freedom and as the radical antithesis of violence, I show how Syrian 
refugees’ experiences of lived refuge renders this space a site of dense governmental 
practices that deliberately target and dehumanize refugees. The government of refuge 
takes place through a number of distinct governmental technologies and strategies 
spanning from mundane bureaucratic decisions to legal changes and categories as well as 
disciplinary administrative practices surrounding the provision of assistance. While 
interrogating refuge is an important move in its own right that recovers the many 
obscured and intimate consequences of state practices, it also has other significances as 
well. As I show, the government of refuge does not simply make refugee lives difficult or 
even unlivable; it also has profound roles in producing subjects. My second argument 
concerns refuge and its relationship to questions of spatiality. More specifically, 
grappling with the experiences of lived refuge troubles conventional boundaries between 
war/not war and raises new questions about the multiple ways in which Denmark and 
Syria have been and are connected before and after the so-called ‘Syrian refugee crisis’. I 
argue that refuge and war do not exist in any rigid spatial or temporal contradistinction; 
rather the two are intimately linked and woven together through time and space.  
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Third, I argue that engagement with the rich texture of Syrian refugees’ accounts 
of everyday lives allows us to reflect on the politics and geopolitics of so-called 
migration management in new ways. Here, I suggest that the sovereign decision to grant 
refuge must be resituated not merely as a singular event but as a series of routinized 
discretionary decisions. I further show how attending to Syrian refugees’ experience of 
refuge in all of its violent and subjectifying impulses ultimately helps to reclaim the 
refugee subject, not merely as passive and grateful, but as a narrator and a political 
subject that speaks back and find ways to exercise politics in terms of survival and 
making do. A crucial corollary of all these arguments is to challenge the liberal promise 
of refuge. The point here is to make sense of refuge in its lived forms, rather than as an 
absence, lack, or failure to live up to its idealized essence. 
For the remainder of this introductory chapter, I discuss the idea of modern 
refugee protection and summarize the literature I use to conceptualize the geopolitics of 
migration, the lived experience of refuge, and war. I will discuss each body of literature 
and my contribution to them in more depth in each empirical chapter. Following this 
summary, I provide a brief description of each chapter and a roadmap for the dissertation. 
 
Refuge: a Geopolitical Practice 
In its most basic sense, refuge denotes a place of relief, safety, and security. Originating 
from the Old French word “refuge” meaning “hiding place” (Oxford English Dictionary), 
the term refuge commonly refers to a physical place that provides safety or a shelter from 
danger, trouble, and hardship. A refuge can be a building, a safe house, a church, a city, 
or a country – all places in which the person taking refuge feels a sense of relief and 
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security from the danger s/he has fled from. In this dissertation, however, I am 
specifically concerned with refuge as it is provided for and legally defined by sovereign 
nation-states signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
1967 Protocol (hereafter “1951 Convention”). Following this, I understand refuge as a 
geopolitical practice of providing protection to forced migrants fleeing violence and 
persecution. 
Throughout history, people in various forms of danger have sought refuge in 
religious institutions, city states, and countries. Yet, it was not until the twentieth century 
that refugee populations became significant in numbers due to various wars and 
genocides (Darling 2017) and became marked by the international community as a 
“problem” to be managed (Soguk 1999). Today, the vast majority of the world’s refugees 
experience long-term exile in countries nearby to their countries of origin, sometimes for 
decades and without foreseeable end. Many of these refugees live in refugee camps, 
cities, and informal settlements without access to the entitlements outlined by the 1951 
Convention (Hyndman and Giles 2016), a life marked by liminality (Ramadan 2013) and 
waiting (Brun 2015). Yet, some refugees are able to gain access to Convention Refugee 
status or other legal protection statuses in other/third safe countries either through 
international resettlement programs or through successfully obtaining asylum. Refuge in 
countries signatory to the 1951 Convention – most located in the global North – is 
assumed in humanitarian, political, and scholarly dialogues to be a “durable solution” to 
the refugee problem (Ramsay 2019), offer a “better life” (Horst 2006), and entail some 




Political refuge is a product of the international post-war state system and 
associated liberal ideas about freedom, liberty, and state sovereignty. Created in the 
aftermath of World War II, the 1951 Convention provided the first basic legal definition 
of the refugee as an out-of-place victim; who has crossed international borders and 
unable to obtain protection and rights from his/her country of origin. In order to solve the 
‘refugee problem’ – their displacement and their statelessness – the 1951 Convention 
further defines the sovereign nation-state as the ultimate provider of refuge and 
protection, as it holds the capacity to restore the citizen-state bond and re-establish the 
national order of things (Malkki 1996).  
However, while the 1951 Convention provides a legal framework for signatory 
states’ obligations towards refugees, the individual signatory state holds much power 
with regard to interpreting the 1951 Convention in terms of who qualifies as a refugee 
(Ashutosh and Mountz 2012; Gorman 2017) and how to treat asylum seekers and 
accepted refugees (Coddington 2018). It is up to the individual sovereign nation-states to 
decide how they are going to interpret and implement the obligations outlined by the 
1951 Convention. That is, varying interpretations of the 1951 Convention together with 
national policies and everyday state practices mark the condition of refuge. Furthermore, 
as Kate Coddington (2018, 331) explains, “landscapes of protection (…) [also] include 
the affective climates that infuse refugees’ lives with precariousness from negative media 
coverage, hostile rumour or exploitation”. As such, providing state protection and refuge 
is not just a humanitarian act but also “a moment when the sovereign state reasserts its 
monopoly over matters of security” (Espiritu 2014, 175).  
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Refuge is rooted in notions of hospitality. Granting a refugee – a stranger – refuge 
and refugee protection is often framed through the language of state “hospitality”. 
Following article 14 of the United Nation Human Rights Declaration of 1948, “everyone 
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”, the 1951 
Convention prohibits states from penalizing refugees for unauthorized entry into a state 
when the purpose of his/her entry is to claim asylum. As such, states are obligated to 
welcome refugees seeking protection and provide her/him with basic human rights. By 
allowing a refugee – a stranger – to stay within the territory of the state and be included 
into the political community (through legal refugee status), the sovereign state - as the 
host - provides not only hospitality to the refugee - the guest - but also gives the refugee 
that which he/she is understood to be lacking; state protection and rights. However, 
drawing on Derrida, Mimi Thi Nguyen (2012, 71) argues that in the context of providing 
refuge, hospitality:  
is certainly, necessarily, a right, a duty, an obligation, the greeting of the 
foreign other as a friend but on the condition that the host (…) the one 
who receives, lodges or gives asylum remains the patron, the master of the 
household, on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his own 
home, that he looks after himself and sees to and considers all that 
concerns him as thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the 
household.  
 
Thus, while signatory states have the duty to provide refuge, this hospitality is also that 
which enables the state to assert its control over the stranger, the refugee.  
The prospect of obtaining refuge is often associated with the promise of freedom, 
future, and betterment (Ramsay 2019). Apart from protecting the most basic and 
fundamental of human rights, the ‘right to life’, the 1951 Convention also seeks to protect 
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liberal freedom, human dignity, and equality of all mankind (Long 2013). The 1951 
Convention defines political, cultural, and social identities and freedoms as potential 
causes of persecution and thus in need of also being protected in refuge. The 1951 
Convention, as Long (2013) reminds us, “presents a particular liberal-democratic 
understanding of political community and popular sovereignty as the forum through 
which to express – and through expression protection – human dignity and human 
freedoms” (Long 2013, 16). As such, the 1951 Convention provisions that signatory 
states protect a person who, as a result of his or her membership of a particular group, is 
unable to access meaningful citizenship and its associated rights, while at the same time 
grant this individual entitlements – such as civil and political rights – on the same terms 
as nationals and other non-citizens. Thus, according to the 1951 Convention, refuge 
encompasses a form of protection that not only provides a space of safety but also 
enables those who meet the refugee definition to live a life with dignity and a sense of 
normality and stability (Ogg 2016). In this sense, refuge is often imagined by refugees, 
humanitarian organizations, policy makers, as well as scholars to signal an end of 
instability, uncertainty, and fear of persecution and mark the start of betterment and 
prospect. As such, within this liberal democratic framework, refuge is supposed to be a 
place where refugees have the freedom to build new lives, plan for the future, acquire 
education, and gain employment experiences (Hyndman and Giles 2016).  
 
Securitization of Migration  
States have long sought to control migration and migrants (Coleman 2012; Kanstroom 
2010). However, since the end of the 1980s, Western states and the media increasingly 
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perceive ‘uncontrolled’ flows of migrants as a security threat national security and 
territorial integrity (Bigo 2002; Karyotis 2007; Khosravi 2010; Nicholls 2013; Walters 
2010). “Illegal”, “bogus refugees”, non-legitimate refugees, and potential ‘terrorists’ are 
all terms used by the media, politicians, and anti-immigrant groups in their effort to argue 
that unauthorized migrants and spontaneous asylum seekers variably pose a threat to the 
nation-state’s welfare system and sovereignty (Neumayer 2005; Pratt and Valverde 2002; 
Zetter 2007). While unwanted migrants who take action and move to countries located in 
the global North are represented as potential threats to the welfare state and national 
security in Europe, Australia, and the United States and Canada (Huysmans 2000), 
refugees, often in protracted displacement in refugee camps in the global South and 
silenced, helpless, and passive objects of management policies, technologies, and 
practices (Hyndman and Giles 2011; Malkki 1995). This political process of framing a 
particular group of people or an activity as an object of security has been captured with 
the term “securitization” (Buzan, et al. 1997).  
In Europe, the securitization of migration began with the Schengen Agreement in 
the early 1990s. Since then, the EU’s internal borders have largely “disappeared” in favor 
of the so-called Fortress Europe, which set out to harmonize immigration and border 
control for signatory states (Leitner 1997). Today, Fortress Europe is a highly securitized 
migration apparatus, which attempts to monitor, control, and regulate migrants through 
technologies such as biometric registration, I-Map, FRONTEX1, the Dublin Agreement, 
and EURODAC (Feldman 2011). The disappearance of internal borders has led to 
increased concerns among European countries regarding their individual lack of national 
                                                 
1 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union 
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control and sovereignty over immigration and border security (Feldman 2011; Salter 
2004; Wren 2001). These concerns have pushed towards a strengthening of EU’s external 
borders (Bialasiewicz 2012) – a strengthening that so far has included various programs 
and agreements with countries bordering EU in order to control, police, and stop 
immigration before migrants reach the actual border of the European Union, thereby 
externalized EU borders (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2010). As a consequence, migrants 
increasingly find themselves in special holding centers for processing asylum 
applications outside the EU’s borders (Andrijasevic 2010), or in detention centers in 
remote and non-sovereign territories, as “[e]nforcement practices grow more 
transnational, and the relationship between migrants, refugees, and nation-states grows 
more ambiguous” (Mountz 2010, 145; also see Andrijasevic 2010; Hyndman and Mountz 
2008). Accordingly, new spaces of strategic exclusion have emerged. Thus, the 
securitization of migration marks not only a shift in how states perceive migrants but also 
how they treat migrants (Mountz et al. 2013). 
 
Border Control and Immigration Enforcement  
Geographers and other scholars have made important contribution to the literature on the 
securitization of migration, focusing on the ways in which securitization of migration has 
brought about a wide range of new practices, technologies, and institutions of migration 
management. These include the temporal and spatial expansion of border control 
(Coleman and Kocher 2011), new technologies of biometric surveillance (Amoore 2006), 
the growth of detention and deportation (Bloch and Schuster 2005; Genova and Peutz 
2010; Mountz et al. 2013), frequent transfers of detainees (Gill 2009), and self-reporting 
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by asylum seekers (Conlon 2010). Scholars have further documented how these new 
practices and institutions influence migrants’ lives in terms of protracted waiting and 
legal ambiguity (Conlon 2011; Hyndman and Giles 2011; Mountz 2011), mobility 
(Ashutosh and Mountz 2012; Coleman 2007), citizenship (Luibheid 2013; Staeheli et al. 
2012), and family detention (Martin 2011). These studies offer important insights into 
how sovereign power and migration management practices act upon, over, and through 
migrants.  
While the majority of the literature on securitization of migration shows how the 
state sees and treats forced migrants, it says little about how forced migrants see and 
experience the state. There is a need to examine forced migrants’ experiences and the 
subjectivities that emerge in their encounters with the international refugee regime and 
migration management practices in order to not silence migrants and overlook their 
potential political subjectivities and actions. 
This dissertation’s focus Syrian refugees’ experiences allows me to uncover the 
transnational unevenness and connectedness of migration management as it is 
materialized through migrants’ bodies, experiences and struggles as they become 
refugees. It offers important insights into the lived realities produced through 
immigration enforcement. In addition, a focus on migrant experiences holds the potential 
to address how geopolitical relations of power are constituted, the dissertation also 
reflects on how they are challenged and remade. In doing so, this dissertation contributes 
to feminist geographers’ efforts to tease out how migrants themselves experience, 
embody, or even challenge this changing geopolitical landscape of migration 
management (Hiemstra 2012, 2014; Nagel and Staeheli 2008; Noxolo 2014; Peutz 2010). 
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A Feminist Geopolitics of Forced Migration and Refuge 
Feminist geographers have made important contributions to the literature on the 
geopolitics of migration. Broadening the traditional geopolitical analysis beyond the 
nation-state to include a range of actors and spaces, feminist geographers have shown 
how power acts spatially in the world to control, regulate, confine, intercept, racialize, 
criminalize, and gender migration and migrants. As part of broader moves to de-center 
the state and dominant voices in geopolitics (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2001b; 
Secor 2001), feminist geographers have importantly moved their analytical focus from 
the borders to border-crossers even whilst continuing to foreground the violence that 
borders exercise (Hyndman 2012; also see Conlon 2011; Collyer and King 2015; Mountz 
2011). Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the interrogation of geopolitics of migration often 
becomes less central in these analyses once the migrant, including refugees and asylum 
seekers, has obtained legal status in the country of resettlement or asylum. For instance, 
feminist geographers concerned with processes of bordering and migration management 
have mainly focused on migrants whose legal status is still to be determined, liminal, and 
precarious. As a result, this body of literature has primarily focused on the geopolitics of 
(forced) migration in terms of access (inclusion/exclusion) and treatment of asylum 
seekers waiting for their case to be determined, rejected asylum seekers awaiting removal 
deportation, or undocumented migrants. This, of course, remains a fundamental question 
with enormous political stakes, particularly given the wide ranging efforts by states 
around the world to limit or entirely preclude the making of refugee claims.  
However, with few exceptions, this body of literature has left the concept of 
refuge itself fairly un-interrogated. Refuge as a space and site of geopolitics as well as the 
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lived experience of refuge in signatory countries have remained under-explored by 
feminist geographers, despite some notable exceptions (Hyndman and Giles 2016). This 
oversight has significant analytical and political consequences. If we do not consider 
refugees’ lives in refuge as part of the geopolitics of migration, we run the risk of 
reproducing the liberal narrative of refuge in countries signatory to the 1951 Convention 
as a “durable solution” to the refugee problem (Ramsay 2019).  
 
Re-conceptualizing the refugee 
Recent work with the field of critical refugee studies has begun to interrogate rescue, 
refuge, and resettlement and map the interlinkages between war, violence, and refuge. 
Importantly, critical refugees studies has re-conceptualized the ‘refugee’ as “a site of 
social and political critique” and “a social actor whose life, when traced, illuminates the 
interconnections of colonization, war, and global social change” (Espiritu 2014, 11; also 
see Espiritu 2006), rather than “an object to be studied, a problem to be solved, or a legal 
classification to be dissected” (Tang 2015, 5). Through this re-conceptualization, this 
body of literature has begun to expose the hidden violence behind the humanitarian term 
“refuge” and examine the roles that “the refugee subject” play in wider state politics and 
narratives about war and refuge (Espiritu 2014; Nguyen 2012; Tang 2015). Rather than 
locating the “problem” of refugees in the body and minds of the refugees themselves, 
critical refugee studies seeks to address the geopolitical conditions and legacy of war and 
social upheaval (Espiritu 2006; Trinh 2010; Um 2015). In doing so, this body of work 
traces the connections and relationship between war, colonialism, race, violence, and 
forced displacement.  
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In this dissertation, I bring insights from critical refugee studies together with 
literature on transnationalism and time-space (Chapter Three), humanitarian government 
and subjectivity (Chapter Four), and geographies of war (Chapter Five). I argue that we 
need to continue following forced migrants and extend our geopolitical analysis beyond 
the point of access/admission to sovereign territory. Rather than taking refuge as an 
already-given and unproblematic term denoting an abstract and well defined space or 
territory, I argue that a closer reading of refuge reveals processes, relationships, and 
experiences of power, violence, and politics. I seek to unsettle any assumptions that 
obtaining refuge in Denmark - in “the West” or “global north” - entails an end or solution 
to displacement and some kind of transition from a less safe space to a safe space, from a 
less modern place to modernity. 
 
Embodiment 
This research uses embodiment to uncover the processes, relationships, and experiences 
of Syrian forced migrants. As an analytic tool, embodiment challenges the traditional 
geopolitical gaze (one without women and other marginalized voices) by shifting the 
focus onto people and how they experience state policies (Hiemstra 2012). Embodiment 
shows how concepts and ways of being are taken up and employed by people (Dowler 
and Sharp 2001). Feminist geographers have argued that the body is a powerful site and 
scale for examining migration (Pratt 2004) because it calls attention to such embodied 
subjectivities as ‘immigrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘illegal’, and ‘failed asylum seeker’ and to the 
role migrant bodies plays in the production of space and place (McDowell 1999). Further, 
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the scale of the body illustrates the differentiated dimensions of migration along the lines 
of social differences such as gender, race, nation, sexuality, and religion (Silvey 2004).  
In studies on migration, geographers have deployed embodiment to examine 
refugee displacement (Hyndman 2000), the power of states to manage transnational 
migration (Mountz 2004), the effects of immigration enforcement policies (Hiemstra 
2012), and the violence enacted on migrant bodies by bordering practices (Mountz and 
Loyd 2014). Embodiment as an analytic approach puts: 
forth a complex reading of power in and through bodies that refuses dualistic, 
structure/agency polarizations, and insists that migration be viewed through 
embodied cultural struggles of both migrants themselves and the forces that 
control their mobility” (Silvey 2004, 142).  
 
Building on these insights, this dissertation examines how refugees embody various 
subjectivities, mundane practices, and struggles as they negotiate the state, practices of 
migration management, and rework the geopolitical powers within it. More specifically, I 
seek to bring this work on embodiment into conversation with literature on political 
subjectivity. 
 
Political Subjectivity and Subaltern Geopolitics 
Even though new state practices of migration management strive to control, exclude, and 
de-politicize forced migrants, it would be a mistake to conclude that forced migrants are 
“abject subjectivities, discarded and jettisoned from political life” (Nyers 2004, 207; also 
see Häkli and Kallio 2013; Häkli, et al. 2017). It is therefore important to examine not 
only how forced migrants’ everyday life is influenced by new state practices, but to also 
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examine how forced migrants themselves experience state practices (Waite et al. 2014), 
and how forced migrants contest and challenge these practices (Gill et al. 2014; Millner 
2011). Such an analysis of forced migrants’ embodied experiences of everyday life is 
necessary in order to focus on “the migrant self as constituted through a range of 
intersecting, sometimes competing, forces and processes, and as playing agentic roles in 
these processes” (Silvey 2004, 499). It provides insights that challenge the assumption 
that forced migrants are vulnerable, passive, de-politicized subjects.  
The politicization of a subject takes place in the moment when a subject speaks 
against injustice and challenges the status quo of dominant order. “Becoming political is 
that moment when the naturalness of the dominant virtues is called into question and their 
arbitrariness revealed” (Isin 2002, 275). Far from the docile subject that the Danish state 
practices seek to produce, I argue that refugees constitute themselves as political subjects 
through forms of everyday resilience, re-working, and resistance (Katz 2004). They enact 
alternative subjectivities. Often the moment of becoming political or the performance of 
political subjectivities is connected to demonstrations and other direct forms of political 
resistance (Isin and Nielsen 2008; Sziarto and Leitner 2010). Yet, by only searching for 
moments of overt political resistance, we fail to consider how marginalized groups 
including forced migrants are able to engage in other practices through which they 
become themselves political (Chatterjee 2011).  
Subaltern geopolitics (Jazeel 2014; Sharp 2011) provides a crucial framework for 
theorizing forced migrants’ political subjectivities because it moves beyond traditional 
geopolitical binaries of political domination and resistance. Drawing on postcolonial 
notions of power (cf. bell 1990), subaltern geopolitics opens up possibilities for political 
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subjectivities that are neither dominant nor resistant, neither fully ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’ 
the existing order. Subaltern geopolitics calls for a political geography that engages with 
a number of different voices and actions – particularly those that have remained obscure 
within conventional geopolitics. The actors, often rendered invisible within dominant 
geopolitics, enact political subjectivities that cannot be articulated as or reduced to 
resistance but rather rework the geopolitical (Harker 2011; Smith 2011). In highlighting 
these nuances, subaltern geopolitics usefully expands the scope of what counts as 
political subjectivities and offers alternative ways of imagining and doing geopolitics 
(Koopman 2011; Sharp 2011; 2013).  
Building on these insights, this dissertation examines how Syrian refugees 
embody various subjectivities, mundane practices, and struggles as they negotiate the 
state, practices of migration management, and rework the geopolitical powers within it. 
Refugees’ embodiment does not exist on a different scale disjointed from the state or the 
nation (Secor 2001). Rather, I understand migration management and forced migrants’ 
embodied experiences as entangled in the same process (Sharp 2007) – the process of 
securitization of migration. Thus, this dissertation contributes a geographical account of 
the embodiment of forced migration and refuge to the existing literature on securitization 






Roadmap of dissertation 
CHAPTER TWO: Feminist Geographical Research in Denmark and Jordan: Research 
Sites and Methodologies 
In this chapter, I provide a description of the two field sites - Jordan and Denmark - 
where I conducted my research that this dissertation is based on. I situate my research 
within the displacement caused by the Syrian Civil War and the Danish state’s response 
to forced migration both domestically and internationally. I then describe the research 
methodologies that I used to collect data: archival research, interviews, and focus groups. 
Within this description, I reflect on how I approached these methods and the challenges 
of gaining access and working across multiple cultural and linguistic contexts.  
 
CHAPTER THREE: Challenging Forced Transnationalism: Syrians’ Struggles for 
Family Reunification in Denmark 
In this chapter, I focus on the protracted separation of displaced families and Syrians’ 
efforts to reunite in Denmark. More specifically, I focus on §7.3 a temporary legal 
protection instituted by the Danish state in 2015. On paper, §7.3 might appear as a 
refugee protection category that enables a refugee to gain state protection and a residence 
permit, yet in practice Syrians’ accounts illustrate how it permeates and disrupts their 
family and intimate personal relations across borders. Chapter Three grapples with §7.3’s 
severe – yet hard to discern – consequences for Syrian families subject to it. This chapter 
contributes to political geographers’ long-standing efforts to trace the geographies of 
border work by examining Syrian refugees’ embodied experiences of §7.3, as it separates 
their families by keeping them geographically dispersed. I bring together insights from 
feminist geographical literature on time-space, socio-legal scholarship on the temporality 
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of law, and literature on political subjectivity to illustrate how the family becomes a site 
of political struggle. I argue that the geopolitics of refuge needs to be examined in a way 
that includes but also moves beyond the actual territorial border line as well as the legal 
border (the moment a person obtains protection and legal status). 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: Lived Refuge: The government of refuge in Denmark 
Through an engagement with Syrian refugees’ accounts of everyday life in Denmark, 
Chapter Four locates the routine and bureaucratic practices at work in lived refuge. This 
term specifically foregrounds the disjunctures between idealized notions of refuge with 
its ostensible ‘humanitarian’ ethos and the practical articulations of refuge as manifested 
in the everyday lived experiences of actual refugees struggling to remake their lives. 
Drawing on findings from focus group discussions with Syrian refugees, I examine lived 
refuge through Syrians’ experiences of a number of training programs, workfare regimes 
and other legally-mandated programs that refugees in Denmark are obliged to undertake. 
Bringing together insights from the field of critical refugee studies, work on 
“humanitarian government” (Fassin 2012), as well as theorization of subjection, I argue 
that that the sovereign decision to grant a person refuge is an ongoing practice of 
subjection, which structures the experience of lived refuge.  
 
CHAPTER 5: War and Refuge: Syrian Refugees’ Journey for Safety 
This chapter offers a feminist analysis of war. Geographers have made great efforts to 
theorize the geographies of war and state violence, illustrating how war is understood to 
take place everywhere, elsewhere, at home, and within algorithms and practices of 
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policing. This chapter builds on the literature by tracing how war is encountered and 
negotiated by refugees within and across geographical sites. Drawing on interviews and 
focus group discussions with Syrian refugees in Denmark, I examine Syrian refugees’ 
experiences and articulation of war; the war of death in Syria and a war in Denmark, 
which Syrians called ḥarb nafsīa (َحْرب نفسية). While ḥarb nafsīa cannot be easily 
translated into English, the term refers to a war on and against the soul and the existence 
of a person. I argue that the experience of war does not end when Syrians are able to 
escape the territory of Syria. Rather, the violence and trauma of war are experienced in 
intimate ways, appear in unexpected places, and morph into what my informants call 
ḥarb nafsīa. In doing so, this chapter contributes to feminist geographers’ theorizations of 
war. I seek to further this literature by using ḥarb nafsīa to question the location of war 
and unsettle the dominant narrative of Europe as a place of peace. 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I summarize this dissertation’s key findings and arguments. I reflect 
on the need to unsettle refuge as it is provided by signatory states as well as on the stakes 










FEMINIST GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH IN DENMAKR AND JORDAN: 
RESEARCH SITES AND METHODOLOGIES 
Introduction 
This dissertation draws on data collected through extensive fieldwork conducted in 
Denmark and Jordan from October 2015 through July 2017. This dissertation project was 
designed to answer the following two research questions: 
RQ1:  How is the refugee regime constituted across transnational space?  
RQ2:  How do Syrian forced migrants experience the refugee regime across their 
migration trajectory and once they arrive in Denmark? 
Situated within feminist methodology, I sought to answer these two questions by 
combining a set of qualitative methods: archival research, semi-structured interviews, and 
focus groups. I collected archival data at the Danish National Archive (Rigsarkivet) and 
through online databases, I conducted 34 semi-structured interviews with state- and non-
state actors in Denmark and Jordan, and I carried out 40 in-depth interviews and six focus 
groups with Syrian refugees, who had obtained refugee protection status in Denmark. 
During my fieldwork in Denmark, I also volunteered at three different community centers 
that offer a range of assistance and support to asylum seekers, officially recognized 
refugees, and other migrants.  
In this chapter, I begin by briefly situating my research within the context of the 
Syrian Civil War and the resulting displacement of Syrians across international borders. I 
then consider the Danish state’s response to Syrian refugees, including humanitarian 
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efforts in Jordan and legislative changes and immigration enforcement practices enacted 
in Denmark. I then describe the research design for this project, including the timeline 
and the different research methods that I used, and I reflect on how I approached these 
methods. I end this chapter by reflecting on conducting research with Syrian refugees, a 
refugee population that has received a great deal of attention from researchers, 
journalists, and politicians as a result of the complicated geopolitical situation in Syria 
and the so-called refugee ‘crisis’ in Europe. As part of this reflection, I describe the 
challenges of conducting a transnational research project that spans across multiple 
countries, languages, and cultures.   
 
The Syrian Civil War and the Danish state’s response to Syrian refugees  
As the Arab Spring and mass demonstrations spread across North Africa and the Middle 
East, many commentators thought that Syria – a “kingdom of silence” – would be 
immune to this movement calling for political change (Pearlman 2018). However, in 
March 2011, the Syrian security forces arrested a group of children in the city of Deraa, 
accusing them of painting anti-regime graffiti on a school wall in the city. The arrest, 
combined with local officials’ unwillingness to release the children, sparked a series of 
protests and demonstrations. Just one week after the first protest in Deraa, tens of 
thousands of Syrians joined demonstrations across the country, calling for reform and 
demanding that the regime be overthrown (Lynch 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami 
2018). As it is now well documented, Bashar al-Asad regime’s response to these 
uprisings as well as the various opposition groups formed in the aftermath, have been and 
continue to be indiscriminate and brutal, which have led to charges of gross human rights 
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violations and war crimes (Dakhli 2013). In addition to the widespread atrocities 
committed against the civilian population by Syrian state authorities, there have been 
reports of many other atrocities committed by other militant groups in Syria and its 
border regions.  
The Syrian Civil War shaped, altered, and continues to affect Syrians’ lives. 
Several of the Syrians who I engaged with for this research took part in these early 
protests, hoping that a different and less repressive Syria might be possible. Many 
explained to me that Syrians did not come to Europe because they were “hungry”, stating 
instead that they sought refuge on purely political (rather than material) grounds. Many of 
them have lost their homes, family members, and friends in the war. Syrians also 
described how the Syrian Civil War continues to mark their lives as their family members 
and friends who remain in Syria face varying degrees of depravation and threats of 
violence. In Chapter Five, I examine how war is present in Syrian refugees’ daily lives in 
Denmark and explore the interconnectedness between war and refuge. 
As a result of the Syrian Civil War, an estimated 6.2 million Syrians have been 
displaced internally and more than 6.3 million Syrians have fled the country in search of 
refuge in countries neighboring Syria and elsewhere (UNHCR 2018). In Jordan, more 
than 660,000 Syrian refugees have registered with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter “UNHCR”) (UNHCR 2019). Yet, the total number 
of Syrians in Jordan is estimated to be 1.4 million (Jordan Times 2015). The wellbeing 
and protection of Syrians currently residing in Jordan and other neighboring countries, 
such as Turkey and Lebanon, is fragile. While Jordan has historically provided refugee 
protection on an ad hoc basis, the country is not a signatory of the 1951 United Nations 
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Refugee Convention and it lacks asylum legislation (Chatelard 2003). Its government 
regards non-Palestinian refugees as ‘temporary guests’ rather than as ‘refugees’ (Mason 
2011). Non-Palestinian refugees are subject to the country’s legislation applicable to 
foreigners. Further, according to the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding, a non-binding 
agreement between Jordan and UNHCR (Zaiotti 2006), Jordan is considered a ‘transit 
country’ and UNHCR is responsible for the protection of refugees, adjudicating refugee 
claims, and facilitating third-country resettlement (Ward 2014). As a result, Syrian 
refugees’ protection and access to refugee status in Jordan and other counties in the 
Middle East depends on the work of international and humanitarian organizations (Chatty 
2016; Culcasi 2019). 
Similar to other European countries, the Danish state has undertaken humanitarian 
and development interventions in Jordan2 as it has sought to contain Syrian refugees in 
countries in close geographic proximity to Syria (Lenner and Turner 2019). While the 
Danish state has funded programs in Jordan and other neighboring countries including 
Turkey and Lebanon since the Syrian Civil War broke out, this migration management 
strategy became much more explicit in the summer of 2015 as (Syrian) refugees arrived 
at the Danish border in greater numbers than in previous years (see table 2.1 below). In 
this context, Danish politicians began to advocate for policy approaches that would allow 
Denmark to ‘help’ refugees in the so-called ‘neighboring areas’, rather than within 
                                                 
2 These interventions have taken place through various funding schemes, include contributions to the 
Jordan Humanitarian Fund (JHF) a multi-donor country based pooled fund established in 2014 and 
managed by OCHA, humanitarian framework agreements with the Danish Refugee Council, Save the 
Children Denmark, the Danish Red Cross, UNHCR, and UNICEF, and funding of specific projects such as 
Caritas health care program in Mafraq in Northern Jordan. In addition, the Danish Ministry of foreign 
Affairs has taken the lead on the EU Regional Development and Protection Programme for refugees and 
host communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, a program funded by the European Union, Denmark, 
Ireland, The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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Danish territory through the Danish asylum system. Politicians argued that a policy 
targeting the neighboring areas would allow the Danish state to assist more forced 
migrants as well as the (allegedly) most vulnerable refugees, discouraging Syrians from 
making the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea (Regeringen 2015). In short, 
intervening in the ‘neighboring areas’ was described by politicians as a better value for 
Denmark’s limited funds.  
 
Syrian refugees in Denmark 
Despite intentional efforts to contain forced migrants in what Hyndman (2010) has 
described as an external location ‘over there’, Syrian refugees arrived to Denmark to 
make asylum claims, often after a long, costly, and dangerous journey crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea or the Aegean Sea. Through the 2000s, Syrians increasingly arrived to 
Denmark to claim asylum, yet in small numbers; approximately 30-60 applicants each 
year. As a result of the Syrian Civil War, the number of Syrians seeking asylum in 
Denmark increased to 429 applications in 2011 (Udlændingestyrelsen 2012) and 
continued to increase each year until peaking in 2015 (see table 2.1). In 2016, the number 
of Syrians applying for asylum in Denmark dropped to just 1,253 and continued to drop 
steadily throughout 2017 (Udlændingestyrelsen 2017), primarily because of the 2016 
migrant control deal between European states and the Turkish government (European 





Table 2.1: Number of Syrian refugees claiming asylum in Denmark 
Nationality 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Syrians 429 822 1710 7087 8608 1253 863 20772 
Total number of 
people seeking 
asylum 
5115 3806 7557 14792 21316 6266 3500 62352 
(Udlændingestyrelsen 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) 
Table 2.2: Number of Syrians obtaining refugee protection status 
Nationality 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Syrians 457 752 1382 4126 5995 5286 1030 19028 
Total number of people 
obtaining refugee 
protection status 
2057 2460 3806 6031 10783 7444 2706 35287 
(Udlændingestyrelsen 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) 
Table 2.3: Family reunification approved 
Nationality 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Syrian Partner  22 64 128 494 2023 870 395 3996 
Syrian Children 35 114 237 946 4593 2065 1062 9052 
Total number of Syrians 57 178 493 1440 6616 2935 1457 13176 
Total number of family 
reunification cases 2902 3170 5112 5727 11645 7679 7015 43250 
(Udlændingestyrelsen 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) 
 
The three tables above illustrate both a rapid increase and subsequent decrease of Syrians 
arriving in Denmark in the last decade. Yet, they tell us little about how Syrian refugees 
became a target group used to legitimize the Danish state’s broader efforts to limit and 
deter refugee migration.  
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The Danish State’s efforts to limit and prevent refugee migration 
The majority of Syrians arriving to Denmark shortly after the Syrian Civil War broke out 
in March 2011 found themselves in a state of legal limbo. In April 2011, the Danish 
Refugee Appeals Board suspended all deportations to Syria due to growing instability, 
yet Danish authorities did not automatically grant refuge to Syrians. Rather, the Danish 
authorities postponed all rulings in asylum cases where the applicant could not be 
immediately granted asylum; for example, in cases where the applicant had difficulty 
proving that s/he was individually persecuted in Syria (Flygtningenævnet 2012). During 
this time, many Syrians had their asylum case postponed and were unable to establish 
themselves in Denmark because they did not hold a residence permit. At the same time, 
they were prevented from leaving Denmark because their case was on hold and they were 
required to live in one of the Danish asylum centers. As a result, several Syrian refugees, 
particularly Syrian Kurds, went on hunger strikes and organized other demonstrations 
(Jørgensen 2012). In September 2013, after reviewing new background material, the 
Danish Refugee Appeals Board found that the conditions in particular areas of Syria were 
so dangerous and unstable that it called for a change of practice regarding the process of 
granting refugee protection to Syrians (Flygtningenævnet 2014). Thus, more than two 
years after the start of the Syrian Civil War the majority of Syrians finally began to obtain 
asylum much more successfully.  
However, the Danish state continued its longstanding efforts to limit Syrian and 
other refugees’ access to legal protection in Denmark. As the number of refugees and 
other migrants began to increase in the fall of 2014, the government introduced a new 
refugee protection status to the Danish Immigration Act, §7.3: a general temporary 
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refugee protection status. This status grants recipients a 1-year temporary residence 
permit, which can be extended for up to one or two years at a time if the Danish 
Immigration Service determines that the applicant still has a demonstrable need for 
protection. Additionally, §7.3 enables Denmark to suspend the recipient’s right to family 
reunification for the first three years. In short, §7.3 provides a more precarious and 
potentially short-term protection than §7.1: Convention Status and §7.2: Individual 
Protection Status because it is a temporary status.  
Table 2.4 displays the percentage of Syrian forced migrants who received 
protection under three different protection statuses between 2014 and 2017. This table 
documents a shift in which refugee protection status that the majority of Syrian refugees 
are granted. In 2014, 70% of Syrians who obtained asylum in Denmark were granted 
asylum according to §7.1: Convention Status, and only 28% were granted asylum 
according to §7.3. In 2017, these two numbers were more or less reversed.  
Table 2.4: Distribution of protection statuses for Syrian refugees 
Protection Status 2014 2015 2016 2017 
§7.1: Convention Status 70% 66% 45% 27% 
§7.2: General Protection Status 2% 1% 1% 1% 
§7.3: Individual Temporary Protection Status 28% 33% 54% 72% 
(Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2018: 7) 
 
Thus, table 2.4 captures how there has been a shift from mainly granting Syrians asylum 
according to §7.1 to now §7.3. Short term, this shift has consequences for Syrian 
refugees’ access to family reunification and higher education. Long term, Syrian refugees 
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who have obtained protection according to §7.3 risk having their refugee protection status 
revoked. For this group of refugees, the question of revoking a person’s protection status 
is no longer a matter of ascertaining whether or not the individual person’s fear of 
persecution remains valid. It is instead a matter of whether or not Denmark deems the 
area or country where the person originates from to be ‘safe’. Thus, §7.3 provides a more 
precarious and potentially short-term protection, and in turn actively alters the very 
meaning of refuge.  
I mentioned the institution of §7.3 here because while §7.3 might seem like an 
abstract legal statute that is not officially reserved for Syrian refugees, in practice §7.3 
has primarily been applied to Syrians. In Chapter Three, I discuss §7.3 in much greater 
detail and examine how it influences Syrian refugees and their families.   
The institution of §7.3 was the first of a series of radical changes carried out by 
the Danish state. In 2015, the mainstream media reported on the so-called refugee ‘crisis’ 
daily and politicians began to argue that the number of refugees seeking asylum in 
Denmark was historically high. Both right and left wing politicians claimed that this 
influx of refugees was an extraordinary situation in need of an extraordinary solution 
because the sheer numbers of forced migrants were said to be putting unprecedented 
pressure on Denmark and thereby threatening the social cohesion of the Danish society as 
a whole (Udlændinge-, Integrations-, og Boligmin. 2015).  
In the summer of 2015, the newly elected right-wing government took office and 
as part of its deliberate efforts to stop refugees and other migrants from coming to 
Denmark, it introduced a wide-ranging asylum policy package that included 35 
amendments to the Danish Immigrant Act and the Danish Integration Act. For instance, 
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Bill 87 quickly became known as the “jewelry bill” because one of the amendments in 
the bill allowed the Danish police to carry out search-and-seize cash and other valuables 
from forced migrants seeking asylum in Denmark (Taylor 2015a). While this amendment 
was a high profile change, other amendments have received far less attention from both 
Danish and international media. Since the right-wing government took office in 2015, it 
has passed more than 100 amendments to the Danish Immigration Act and the Danish 
Integration Act, many of which were hastily pushed through (Udlændinge- og 
Integrationsministeriet 2019). While I do not have the space to go into greater detail 
about each of these amendments here, in a variety of ways and to varying degrees these 
amendments seek to limit and deter refugee migration. The Danish government’s anti-
immigrant discourse and efforts to radically change refugee protection in Denmark – 
what the government themselves call a “paradigm shift” – have shaped and continue to 
affect Syrians’ lived experiences of refuge and access to protection in Denmark.  
 
Refuge in Denmark 
While Syrians refugees who obtain refugee protection in Denmark have secured 
themselves from overt threats from the Syrian police, military, and other militant groups 
operating in Syria, their legal status as refugees does not automatically offer Syrians 
permanent refuge. Rather, in contrast to, for example, refugees who automatically 
become permanent residents upon resettlement in Canada (Hyndman and Giles 2016), 
refugees in Denmark receive a temporary residence permit that is valid for one or two 
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years depending on their individual refugee protection status.3 At the time I conducted 
this research, the individual refugee had to apply for an extension before the permit 
expired in order to renew it. Failure to do so could result in loss of status and expulsion at 
worst.4 After eight years of legal residency in Denmark, a refugee may apply for 
permanent residence status. To successfully do so, s/he must fulfill a number of 
requirements regarding Danish language skills and employment and have no criminal 
record. The temporary nature of their legal refugee status marks Syrians and other 
refugees’ lives as they worry about whether their residence permit will be renewed and 
find ways to cope with the uncertainty of securing permanent residence.     
Syrians’ experience of refuge in Denmark is also shaped by their socio-political 
status as “newly arrived refugees under the Integration Act” (nyankommen flygtning 
under integrationsloven). The Danish Integration Act stipulates that refugees are required 
to live for five years in the municipality assigned to them. This policy means that 
refugees are dispersed to municipalities throughout the country and are often forced to 
live in a town or a neighborhood with a predominantly white population. Consequently, 
refugees have no choice about where to live and their locations are assigned without 
consideration of the locations of refugees’ relatives, friends, access to social networks, 
shopping facilities, public transportation, schools, and day-care institutions (Larsen 
2011). In addition, refugees are obligated to sign a declaration pledging their commitment 
                                                 
3 According to the Danish Immigration Act, a person applying for asylum in Denmark can be granted one 
of the following refugee protection statuses: Art. 7.1: Convention Status (2 year temporary residence 
permit), Art. 7.2: Individual Temporary Protection Status (1 year temporary residence permit), Art. 7.3: 
General Temporary Protection Status (1 year temporary residence permit, without right to family 
reunification for the first three year and no right to free higher education).  
4 This has recently been changed, residence permit for certain groups are now automatically renewed if the 
state decided that there is grounds for renewal. 
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to integration and active citizenship as well as an integration contract that stipulates their 
participation in a 5-year mandatory integration program, which consists of a 
comprehensive civic and Danish language training courses, job training, and internship. 
During this five year-period or until they obtain full-time employment, refugees are 
entitled to receive an integration allowance (integrationsydelse), a lower amount of aid 
than ordinary social welfare benefits (kontanthjælp). The integration allowance is 
conditional, meaning that a refugee only receives the full amount of the integration 
allowance if s/he complies with the rules and obligations stipulated in their integration 
contract. For example, if a refugee fails to show up to a language class without a 
legitimate excuse, the municipality can make a reduction in her/his integration allowance. 
On the face of it, this integration policy might seem like an act of welfare and care that 
aims to better assist refugees as they ‘integrate’ into Danish society (Fernandes 2015). As 
I illustrate in Chapter Four, however, this policy structures refugees’ daily lives in 
intimate ways and reproduces the “refugee condition” (Nguyen 2012). 
 
Feminist Geographical Research 
This dissertation is situated within my commitment to feminist research (Jones et al. 
1997; Moss 2002). While feminist scholars continue to emphasize that there is no distinct 
or single feminist epistemology or feminist politics (Gilbert 1994; Moss 2002), feminist 
methodological strategies “have emerged out of and reflect women’s ways of knowing 
within the context of patriarchy” (Nast 1994, 60). Claiming that women and other 
marginalized groups’ experiences and ways of knowing matter, feminist research 
challenges the political basis of knowledge and takes seriously the relationship between 
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the researcher and participants as a site of knowledge production imbued with existing 
power relations (Hyndman 2001a; Nast 1994; Rose 1997). As such, the knowledge 
obtained through research is always partial, incomplete, biased, and situated (Haraway 
1988).  
Taking these core insights as its analytical starting point, my work insists on 
moving beyond merely examining the geopolitics of migration from the perspective of 
the law, the state, and policy makers. I seek to grasp how geopolitics of migration are 
encountered, experienced, and negotiated on the ground – by the people who are most 
affected by these state policies and practices. Importantly, the aim of this research is not 
simply to ‘give voice’ to refugees, who are often marginalized, ignored, silenced, or 
victimized in discussions of migration management and forced migration. I argue that 
simply ‘giving voice’ through representing the experiences of Syrian refugees runs the 
risk of further victimizing and de-individualizing them (Pratt 2012). Building on feminist 
methodologies, I understand “the refugee” as a knowledge producer, who articulates, 
contests, and alters ways of knowing (Espiritu and Duong 2018). Here, I draw on the 
critical refugee studies’ reconceptualization of “the refugee” as “a critical idea” and “a 
social actor whose life, when traced, illuminates the interconnections of colonization, 
war, and global social change” (Espiritu 2014, 11). I argue that a focus on refugees’ 
knowledges and lived experiences provides insights into the sites where power is 
reproduced, negotiated, and reworked. This approach allows us to expose the hidden 
political forces of war and migration management that structure refugees’ lives. Finally, a 
focus on refugees’ knowledges might also disrupt dominant and often idealized stories 




i) Research Timeline 
In October 2015, I moved from Lexington, Kentucky to Copenhagen, Denmark. From 
October 2015 to April 2016, I undertook the first phase of this dissertation research, 
which included archival research at the Danish National Archives and seven semi-
structured interviews with representatives from the Danish Red Cross, Action Aid, the 
Danish Refugee Council, and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, I 
reconnected with immigration lawyers and advocates through volunteering at a 
community center in Copenhagen, where I had conducted my Master’s research, and 
worked to establish contact with the Syrian community in Denmark. 
  In May 2016, I relocated from Copenhagen to Amman, Jordan to begin the 
second phase of this research. There, I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with 
program coordinators and staff members from international and humanitarian 
organizations, including DANIDA, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Danish Red 
Cross, ActionAid, the Danish Arab Partnership Program (DAPP), the Danish Institute 
Against Torture, the European Union’s Regional Development and Protection 
Programme (RDPP), Save the Children, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF. 
Furthermore, I made visits to a community center in Amman run by an international 
humanitarian organization and I participated in the DAPP’s ‘synergy meetings’ as well as 
biweekly meetings with the livelihood working group at UNCHR main office in Amman. 
In October 2016, I moved back to Copenhagen to conduct interviews and focus 
groups with Syrian refugees who had been granted asylum in Denmark. I started 
volunteering at two other community centers, one located in Copenhagen and one located 
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on a small Danish island. Volunteering at these two centers proved helpful in terms of 
getting access to Syrian refugees. I will explain my work at these two centers in greater 
depth below. During this third phase, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 40 
Syrian refugees.  
In March 2017, I returned to Amman for six weeks to conduct follow-up 
interviews with program coordinators of DRC, Danish Red Cross, DAPP, IOM, UNHCR, 
UNICEF, ICRC, and the Jordan INGO forum. From May 2017 through July 2017, I 
finished my research in Denmark where I conducted six focus groups with a total of 21 
Syrian refugees. During this final phase, I continued my volunteer work at the three 
different community centers.  
 
ii) Research Methods 
Archival Research  
The aim of the archival research was first, to examine the historical relations between 
Jordan and Denmark and second, to trace the legal changes made to the Danish 
Immigration Act. This data allowed me to historically situate the Danish state’s current 
interventions in Jordan as a means to address the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ facing Europe 
broadly and Denmark in particular. Archival research also allowed me to investigate how 
legal and policy documents shape the production of particular forms of knowledge and 
discourse (Schwartz and Cook 2002). I mainly conducted archival research at the Danish 
National Archives, at the library of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 
and through the online database www.retsinformation.dk. The archival data consists of 
bilateral agreements between Denmark and Jordan, exchanges related to these 
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agreements, the Danish International Development Assistance’s (DANIDA) Annual 
Funding Reports, institutional contracts between the Danish state and humanitarian 
organizations, and the Danish Immigration Act, the Danish Integration Act (2011-2017) 
and related policy documents.  
The archival research has enabled me to identify the organizations receiving funding 
from the Danish state and the humanitarian interventions these organizations are carrying 
out in Jordan. With this data, I have furthermore been able to map the historical linkages 
between Denmark and Jordan in order to historicize contemporary forms of engagement. 
 
Semi-structured Interviews with State- and Non-state actors in Denmark and Jordan 
The aim of conducting interviews with representatives from humanitarian organizations 
and state actors in Denmark and Jordan was to gain knowledge about how humanitarian 
organizations and state institutions collaborate across national borders and the ways in 
which the ‘refugees crisis’ is affecting the character of their work. In Denmark, I 
conducted seven semi-structured interviews with regional office managers and 
representatives from Danish Red Cross, Action Aid, the Danish Refugee Council, and the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Jordan, I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews 
with program coordinators and staff members from international and humanitarian 
organizations, including DANIDA, the Danish Refugee Council, the Danish Red Cross, 
ActionAid, the Danish Arab Partnership Program, the Danish Institute Against Torture, 
the European Union’s Regional Development and Protection Programme, Save the 
Children, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF. The interviews were conducted in 
English or Danish depending on the preference of the person being interviewed. Each 
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interview was at least an hour in length and I have since transcribed these interviews. 
Based on the knowledge gained from the first set of interviews, I modified the interview 
guide to further explore the interactions between the humanitarian organizations and the 
donor community. The aim was to get more detailed knowledge about how refugee 
management is constituted through an interplay of forces; the movement of ideas, rules, 
money, and technologies between places and actors.  
Gaining access to relevant informants in the humanitarian sector has involved a 
range of hurdles including mapping relevant organizations and actors and finding 
opportunities to experience the day-to-day bureaucratic texture of transnational 
humanitarian work. As my project focused on how the Danish state seeks to intervene in 
Jordan in order to prevent refugees from reaching Danish territory, I have mainly focused 
on organizations that have received funding from the Danish state or are related to 
Denmark in some way. I used various sources to make this determination, including the 
state-budgets for the Danish ministry of Foreign Affairs, the website openaid.um.dk, and 
the Jordan Response Plan Financial Tracking. This necessary selectivity, however, made 
me feel that I was missing out on parts of the humanitarian conversation in Jordan. While 
interviews proved extremely useful for gaining expert knowledge about specific 
humanitarian practices and the collaboration between non-state and state agencies, I felt 
that I did not get sufficient texture out of the interviews about the nature of day-to-day 
practices of transnational humanitarian work and previous and current challenges about 
operating in Jordan. To address this gap, I broadened my scope to capture more fine-
grained knowledge about the field by participating in meetings organized by the 
UNHCR, such as the Livelihood Working Group meeting and the Basic Needs Working 
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group meeting. I also sat in on the monthly synergy meeting hosted by the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ technical advisor of the Danish Arab Partnership 
Programme. Through these meetings I was able to gain knowledge about present issues, 
the role of UNHCR and the Government of Jordan, and the more mundane humanitarian 
practices and knowhow, which my informants most often did not mention in interviews 
because it seemed insignificant. Furthermore, during these meetings I met new potential 
interview subjects and was able to maintain interactions with people who I had already 
interacted with. Thus, I was able to maintain an informal contact and build trust with 
people within the humanitarian community by becoming a more familiar face.    
 
Semi-structured Interviews with Syrian Refugees in Denmark 
In order to better understand how Syrian refugees experience migration management and 
refugee protection as an everyday lived reality, I used semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 40 Syrians who have been 
granted refugee protection in Denmark. The interviews were conducted in Danish, 
English, or Arabic depending on the interviewee’s preference and language skills. The 
interviews conducted in Arabic were carried out with the help of an Arabic-speaking 
interpreter, which I will discuss in more detail below. Each interview was between one 
and three hours in length. 17 of the interviewees were women and 23 were men. The ages 
of interviewees ranged from 19 to 65. While participants identify with different ethnic 
and religious groups including Kurd, Arab, stateless Palestinian, Alevis, and Sunni 
Muslims, they were all born in Syria and considered themselves Syrians too. At the time 
of this research, all participants had been granted asylum, received refugee protection 
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status, and moved to the municipality where they had been assigned to live during the 5-
year mandatory integration program. The majority of the participants depended 
financially on the integration allowance, which refugees are entitled to until they obtain 
full-time employment.   
During the process of conducting these interviews, I modified the interview guide 
in order to address additional questions. Based on my archival research of the Danish 
Immigration Act and attention to the legal changes made in response to the so-called 
European migration crisis, I decided to conduct interviews with Syrians who had received 
the new 1-year temporary protection status (see Chapter Three). Compared to the other 
interviews, in these interviews I focused more on how this status influences Syrians’ 
everyday life and connections to family members in Syria.  
 
Focus Groups 
The aim of the focus groups was to gain information about the migration journey. I 
conducted six focus group interviews with 21 Syrians who had arrived in Denmark to 
claim asylum between 2011 and 2016. Together with my research assistant, I conducted 
these focus group discussions in a private place that was convenient to all participants. 
All focus groups were conducted in Arabic and later transcribed and translated into 
English. Focus groups lasted for two to four hours. Each focus group was comprised of 
three to five participants who knew each other beforehand. Two focus groups were mixed 
gender, while the other four focus groups were either all male (n=2) or female (n=2).  
The ages of participants ranged from 21 to 55. Similar to the informants who 
participated in the interviews, the focus group participants identify with different ethnic 
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and religious groups including Kurds, Arabs, stateless Palestinians, Alevis, and Sunni 
Muslims. Participants were all born in Syria and considered themselves to be Syrians. All 
focus participants had obtained asylum, received refugee protection status, and moved to 
the municipality where they had been assigned to live during the 5-year mandatory 
integration program. The majority of them depended financially on the integration 
allowance.    
I had originally designed these focus group discussions to take place through the 
format of participatory mapping workshops. Yet, after conducting a number of interviews 
of Syrians living in Denmark, I realized that it would be difficult to carry out these 
workshops because some participants had been reluctant to share detailed information 
about their journey from Syria to Denmark for a number of reasons including concerns 
about how this information might affect their attempts to gain legal status in Denmark as 
well as fear of reprisal against loved ones remaining in Syria or third countries, among 
other concerns. Thus, I decided to conduct focus groups where the participants would be 
given the opportunity to talk about their journey, yet without mentioning specific places 
or people and instead allowing them to talk about relations and embodied experiences.   
 
Informant Recruitment and Volunteer Work 
While I had already established some contacts with Syrian refugees in Denmark through 
my Master’s research, I anticipated the recruitment of Syrian informants to be relatively 
difficult because of my positionality as a white Danish researcher affiliated with a 
university in the United States. Yet, I accounted for this in the research design of this 
project, primarily through volunteer work and establishing longer-term relationships with 
informants.   
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Due to the heightened political significance of the perceived refugee ‘crisis’ in 
Europe and elsewhere, there has been a spike in interest in related issues among 
journalists and social scientists. This seems to have resulted in a ‘fatigue’ towards 
researchers and journalists among Syrians living in Denmark (and elsewhere) (Pascucci 
2017), meaning that Syrians were less likely to be interested in sharing their stories and 
experience and sometimes less than enthusiastic or even skeptical when they did agree to 
participate. When I approached Syrians to ask if they would participate in an interview 
they often asked how they and Syrian refugees in general would benefit from this 
research and if this research would actually change anything or if it would just be another 
moment where they were asked to share their story without any benefits to themselves, 
their families, or even to their communities at large. Furthermore, Syrians were very 
reluctant to refer me to other Syrians they knew.  
I addressed this issue, in part, by investing much of my time volunteering at three 
community centers for asylum seekers, officially recognized refugees, and other 
migrants. These three centers offer various services, including language training, legal 
counseling, child care, social activities, and cultural events. The first community center 
mainly offers services to asylum seekers whose cases are under consideration or who 
have been rejected asylum. As a volunteer, I was part of the socio-legal support group 
assisting asylum seekers with questions regarding their asylum case. In this capacity, I 
also participated in the weekly Women’s Club, which focuses specifically on issues 
related to being female in the Danish asylum system. This work proved helpful in 
connecting me to immigrant lawyers and advocates as well as getting in-depth knowledge 
about the Danish Immigration Act and the Danish asylum system. Yet, only few Syrian 
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refugees came to this community center. Therefore, I began to consider other ways of 
connecting with Syrian refugees in Denmark.  
The second community center is a newly established center mainly for refugees 
who have been assigned to live in Copenhagen. I joined the center in November 2016 and 
spend 3-5 days a week there. As volunteer, I taught a weekly Danish language class and 
as part of the socio-legal counseling group, I assisted Syrians and other refugees with 
legal questions and bureaucratic issues, such as translating Danish documents regarding 
their asylum case and integration program, assisted people in requesting child benefits, 
renewing residence permits, applying for passports, filing applications for family 
reunification, and filing complaints over the ruling of their cases. Through this work, I 
was able to build connections, trust, and even some close personal relationships with 
Syrians and other refugees while at the same time ‘give back’ to the community by 
assisting them with gaining proficiency in Danish and navigating the Danish legal 
system. Furthermore, through this engagement I gained useful information about Syrian 
refugees’ daily challenges, fears, and experiences with starting new lives in Denmark. 
For instance, as one of my participants often reminded me: “I feel like a little child here 
in Denmark, Malene. I have to learn everything again”. The information and knowledge I 
gained through being consistently present in this community center has been invaluable. 
It has both informed the course of my research and crucially deepened my understanding 
of how Syrian refugees navigate migration management practices in multiple ways, 
whilst they cope with everyday obstacles as well as different degrees of loss, depravation, 
and trauma.  
46 
 
The third community center was established in the late 1980s and is located on a 
small island. I joined this community center in December in 2016 were I assisted 
refugees with socio-legal issues two days a week. While my work at this community 
center involved that I travel to this island every week, I got deeper insight into the lives of 
Syrian refugees who have been relocated to a small, more rural area of Denmark. 
Through my involvement at this community center I was able to conduct 17 interviews 
and one focus group discussion with Syrians living on this island.   
During my time at these three community centers, I kept a detailed research 
journal of my daily activities and interactions. Taken together, this ethnographic research 
gave me direct insights into the texture of Syrian refugees’ lived realities. All informants 
who have participated in this research have been given a pseudonym and any identifying 
details have been removed in order to preserve anonymity.  
 
Language, Cultural Knowledge, and Positionality 
All Syrian refugees who participated in this study had some familiarity with the Danish 
language because they were or had been enrolled in mandatory Danish language classes 
as part of the integration program. Yet, not all participants were able to speak Danish or 
English with proficiency to carry on a full conversation. Furthermore, in order to capture 
their lived experiences, I found it important that my informants were able to express 
themselves in a language that was most familiar too them, namely Arabic. Thus, the 
majority of the interviews were conducted in Arabic with the help of an interpreter. For 
the focus groups, I decided to conduct these in Arabic in order to let the conversation 
flow more easily.  
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My Arabic language skills and knowledge about Syrian culture developed over 
the course of the research and while interpretation was essential in the beginning of the 
research by the end of the research, the interpreter only translated the most important 
points during our interviews. This allowed the interviews to flow more easily without 
being interrupted by translation. After each interview, the interpreter and I would go over 
the interview and the interview situation. We discussed some of the main points that the 
interviewee had brought up, Arabic expressions, and cultural references that I was not 
familiar with. We also talked about things that remained in silence and the atmosphere of 
the interview situation, such as frustrations, hesitations, silences, irony, laughter, 
interruptions, and non-verbal communication. Working with an interpreter has been 
extremely helpful in order for me to gain a better understanding of the Syrian culture and 
the Syrian dialect. Throughout the analysis and writing process, I have continued to work 
with the interpreter as questions about the material have come up, such as specific 
references, terms, sentences, and phrases.  
While participants would mainly express themselves in Arabic throughout the 
interviews and focus group discussions, sometimes participants would use Danish words 
such as “kommune” (municipality), “praktik” (internship), and “kontrakt” (contract). 
Some of these words are particular to the Danish language and therefore cannot easily be 
translated into Arabic, or simply do not exist in the Arabic language and cultural context. 
Other times, participants would deliberately turn to me and express themselves in Danish, 
using Danish words or a short sentence. Often this took place at moments in the interview 
when the informant wanted to highlight a particular point or main idea. Participants knew 
that what they said in Arabic would be mediated through the interpreter. Thus, 
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participants’ decision to use Danish words or express themselves in Danish illustrates 
both how they emphasized a particular point while at the same time negotiated my 
positionality (Tang 2015). 
My positionality as a white female Danish researcher with knowledge about the 
Danish legal and bureaucratic system also influenced the interviews and to lesser extent 
the focus group discussions. This knowledge was helpful in terms of building 
relationships with Syrians who used the community centers and enabled me to “give 
back” to the community. Yet, it might also have influenced what my informants were 
willing to share with me, as I could be “read” as someone too close to the Danish state. 
During the interviews I conducted with Syrians who I did not know very well, they made 
sure to state how thankful they were to Denmark and the Danish people for granting them 
refuge in Denmark, illustrating how they sought to negotiate my position as a Danish 
citizen. Yet, it also illustrates the general reluctance of my Syrian interlocutors to speak 
about the state and politics overtly (Pearlman 2016; Wedeen 1998, 2013).   
The interpreter’s presence added a complex dimension to the focus group 
discussions and interview sessions. The interpreter was of Syrian origin, and had come to 
Europe right before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war to attend university. While the 
interpreter’s knowledge of Syria and Syrian culture allowed me to gain a better 
understanding cultural elements specifically to Syria and the dialect, I am sure that 
having another (unfamiliar) Syrian man in the room ultimately influenced what 
participants were willing to share. For instance, a few interviewees declined to have the 
interview recorded. Because of Syrians’ experiences of living under a repressive rule 
with an extensive surveillance apparatus, I had expected that it might be difficult for 
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some informants to fully trust the interpreter (and myself). Yet, at the same time, the 
interpreter was able to make jokes and share familiar anecdotes about life in Syria, which 
seemed to make the interviewees comfortable.  
In this dissertation, I follow the transliteration guide of the International Journal 
of Middle East Studies for Arabic words and phrases. For Arabic names of individuals, I 
use the phonetic pronunciation, which is more accessible to an English-speaking 
audience. 
 
Analysis of Primary and Secondary Data 
To manage and structure the different data sets produced through this research project 
(field notes, archival data, interview and focus group transcripts, and narratives) I have 
used the software program MAXQDA. I have in vivo coded the data with the research 
questions in mind as well as using codes derived from reading relevant literature, and 
information gained from the archival material (Schilling 2006). In coding the interviews 
with state- and non-state actors involved in responding to Syrian refugees, I have used 
terms such as political partnership, negotiations, development, financial burden, 
responsibility, security, cooperation, management and welfare (RQ1). For the interviews 
and focus groups that I conducted with Syrian refugees, I have used codes such as worry, 
insecurity, uncertainty, waiting, hope, as well as family, work, education, aspirations, 
struggles, home, politics, activism, and ties/contacts to Syria (via social media, family, 
and through organizations) to capture the complexity of Syrian refugees’ lives and well-
being (RQ2). These words and phrases have then been used to evaluate and develop a set 
of thematic concepts (Cope 2010). As expected, the process of coding has not been linear 
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(Schilling 2006); through the process of coding, analyzing the data, and writing up the 
findings, I have continued to re-consider the codes and themes and re-organize them as 
repeating ideas.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of my field sites and outlined the 
methodologies that I have employed in order to carry out the research for this 
dissertation. I was privileged to be able to spend almost two years in the field. Like for 
many other researchers, the field for me is a complicated thing (Hyndman 2001a; Katz 
1994; Smith 2016). This research project has sought to better understand the relationships 
between Western migration management and forced migrants, who have been displaced 
by war. As such, it is a transnational project, meaning that the relevant ‘field’ is not 
reducible to a collection of geographical sites in Denmark and Jordan but is rather an 
uncertain and complex set of dispersed actors and relations that exist through various 
dis/connections across time and space. In keeping with my core commitment to 
conducting feminist geographical research, being in ‘the field’ included the moments 
when I got new insights into otherwise obscure processes (knowledges, emotions, and 
people’s transnational lives, etc.) by getting closer to them, literally and figuratively. So 
while my fieldwork was located in Denmark (a place that I was very familiar with 
because I was born there) and Jordan (a place that I was much less familiar with and 
continue to learn about), my research was more so than anything else defined by a group 
of people I engaged with – Syrian refugees – whose country of origin I have never visited 
and know only through their accounts and other media. As such, as I worked in the field, 
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I occupied competing roles as an ‘insider’, an ‘outsider’, and maybe everything in-
between (Cuomo and Massaro 2016; Miraftab 2004; Mullings 1999) depending on whose 
standpoint you consider. 
In order to conduct in-depth research in and across these places and with these 
people, the two years of fieldwork was crucial because it allowed me to have 
conversations with Syrian refugees on a daily basis and over an extend period of time. 
Through my weekly work in the three community centers in Denmark, I was able to build 
relationships and get insights into the complexities and contradictions that shape forced 
migrants’ lives as they were entangled in war, violence, and state practices. I was able to 
witness how intrusive and violent the state can feel, even when it is ‘acting’ in the name 
of aid, assistance, care, and ‘humanity’. At the same time, I witnessed on a daily basis 
how Syrian refugees coped with and re-worked their everyday lived realities and 
struggles, by helping and caring for each other, continuing cultural practices and 
traditions, sharing meals, smoking shisha in the park, and much more. Some of these 
everyday ways of living can be hard to access through interviews and conversations, but 
also hard to convey in writing because they are so corporeal and embodied that it can be 
difficult to find the right words with which to describe them. Yet, this ongoing challenge 
represents a fundamentally central generative aspect of doing my research in a way that is 











CHALLENGING FORCED TRANSNATIONALISM: 
SYRIANS’ STRUGGLES FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN DENMARK 
 
Introduction 
After an aerial strike destroyed Farah and Ahmed’s home, they decided that it was time 
for their family to leave Syria. They sold their belongings and borrowed additional 
money, but found that they still did not have sufficient funds for the whole family to 
leave together. Farah and Ahmed therefore decided that Farah would take their youngest 
and oldest daughters with her as she made her way to Europe, while Ahmed and their 
middle son and daughter would remain in Syria. Once Farah reached a place of safety, 
they hoped that the family would be able to reconnect through family reunification. As 
Farah explained to me in an interview: 
So the initial plan was because we did not have enough money and if I 
stayed in Syria, I could not work and leave my children [at home], and the 
situation could get difficult at any moment, Da’esh [ISIS] might come to 
us, Jabhat al Nusra might come to us. I, a woman alone, cannot stay, 
because they take the women. We decided to go to the village and sell 
everything we had, and we borrowed money. I should make two children 
leave and leave (without my husband) and then do family reunification so 
that he and our two other children could come. He could escape to 
Turkey… he could work, he could leave the children with somebody and 
work, he could manage. And I left to come here. And I would do the 
papers for family reunification. 
 
While Farah was eventually granted asylum in Denmark, her dreams of quickly reuniting 
with her family were quashed. Rather than permanent asylum, Farah was granted 
temporary protection status according to §7.3 of the Danish Immigration Act 
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(Udlændingeloven) that provides a 1-year (renewable) residence permit, yet suspends an 
applicant’s right to family reunification for the first three years of holding this status5.  
In this chapter, I focus on the protracted separation of Syrian families and the 
ways in which ‘the family’ became a site of political struggle and mobilization. Family 
reunification is one of the most enshrined principles of the international refugee 
protection regime because separation is a frequent consequence of displacement. The 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter “1951 
Convention”) recognizes the significance of the right to family life for refugees, with its 
recommendation for “considering that the unity of the family, the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society, is an essential right of the refugee” (UN General 
Assembly 1951, 146). Similarly, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides the right to respect for everyone’s private and family life (Council of Europe 
1950, 10). Yet, with the introduction of §7.3, the Danish state began to challenge and 
undermine this principle.  
Mobilizing discourses of crisis surrounding the Syrian Civil War and the burden 
of the increasing number of refugees seeking asylum in Denmark, the Danish government 
proposed §7.3 to the Danish parliament in November 2014. In her introduction to the bill, 
then minister of justice, Mette Frederiksen, explained that while the government sought 
to observe the country’s international obligations towards refugees, Denmark did not 
have the capacity to offer refuge to all the refugees in need of protection. The Danish 
government argued that the increasing number of Syrian refugees and other forced 
                                                 
5 §7.3 of the Danish Immigration Act is a temporary refugee protection status that grants the recipient a 1-
year temporary residence permit. This residence permit can be extended for up to one or two years at a time 
if the Danish state determines that the recipient still has a demonstrable need for protection 
(Udlændingeloven 2016, §7.3). 
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migrants arriving to Denmark was of such character that it was a burden to the Danish 
welfare state and a threat to the social cohesion of the Danish society as well as a threat to 
successful integration of accepted refugees (Jurstitsministeren 2014). The Danish 
government sought to address this so-called threat by instituting §7.3 to the Danish 
Immigration Act, which instituted a temporary protection status, made it easier for the 
Danish state to deport (Syrian) refugees once the war became less violent or had come to 
an end, and limited refugee immigration through suspending family reunification. 
The Danish government recognized that it was obligated to protect refugees’ right 
to private family life as outlined by the 1951 Convention and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Yet, the Danish government referred to the European Convention on 
Human Rights Article 8, subsection 2 that states: “There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right to respect private and family life except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of Europe 1950: 11). In doing 
so, the Danish government argued that it was legitimate to suspend refugees’ right to 
family reunification in order to protect the Danish state. Thus, the Danish government 
legitimized and instituted §7.3 in the name of national security.  
However, in this chapter, I illustrate how §7.3 has severe -- yet hard to discern -- 
consequences for Syrian families who are subject to it. More specifically, I argue that the 
Danish state instituted §7.3 as a mechanism to control accepted refugees (subject to this 
status) and to prevent immigration of forced migrants through family reunification. On 
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paper §7.3 might appear as a refugee protection category that enables a refugee to gain 
state protection and a residence permit, yet in practice Syrians’ accounts illustrate how it 
permeates and disrupts their family and intimate personal relations across borders. The 
everyday practices that Syrians keep up and take on in order to maintain intimate 
relations generate new ways of practicing family life. Yet, over time it becomes difficult 
to sustain these practices and Syrians use different strategies to maintain hope and reunite 
with their loved ones. Thus, while §7.3 actively prolongs family separation, I show how 
Syrians’ desires and demands for the right to (physically) live together as a family prompt 
them to mobilize and find ways to challenge the Danish state’s decision to suspend their 
right to family reunification.  
This chapter contributes to political geographers’ long-standing efforts to trace the 
geographies of border work by examining Syrian refugees’ embodied experiences of 
§7.3, as it separates their families across borders. I bring together insights from feminist 
geographical literature on time-space with socio-legal scholarship on the temporality of 
law to illustrate how processes of bordering are manifest in refuge itself. More 
specifically, when a person is granted refuge one might assume based on international 
conventions that this person would be entitled to family reunification. As such, their 
spatial location in “refuge” would grant them the ability to bring loved ones through 
family reunification into this space. Yet, as I show this is an access point through which 
legal protection is precluded not simply through spatial bordering but through a legal 
form of bordering that governs refugees through temporality. The point here is not to 
provide another case study of a “new” border mechanism. Rather, I seek to challenge the 
implicit “methodological nationalism” (Amelina et al. 2014) that takes place by assuming 
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that the geopolitics of refuge is reducible to the sovereign decision to grant or not grant 
refuge to a forced migrant. As such, I argue that the geopolitics of refuge needs to be 
examined in a way that includes but also moves beyond the actual territorial border line 
as well as the legal border (the moment a person obtains protection and legal status).  
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I briefly examine 
geographers’ contribution to literature on bordering and provide a review of feminist 
geographical literature on time-space and socio-legal scholarship on the temporality of 
law. I then move on to illustrate how §7.3 of the Danish Immigration Act can be 
considered a border mechanism and describe its uneven consequence across nationality, 
gender, and age. I proceed by examining the ways in which Syrian families experience, 
negotiate, and make sense of this temporary protection status (§7.3) and being separated 
from their family. In conclusion, I discuss the importance of paying attention to both 
spatiality and temporality as we continue to examine how (forced) migrants encounter 
and negotiate processes and practices of bordering.  
 
Geographies of Border Work, Forced Transnationality and Time-Space  
The institution of §7.3 is not itself entirely novel; it fits within the larger landscape of 
border control and immigration enforcement practices implemented by Western states in 
the name of protecting the territorial integrity, health, and well-being of the nation 
(Walters 2010; Williams 2017). Geographers have traced how Western states have 
produced ever more complex strategies and practices that cut across multiple spaces, 
places and scales, making processes of bordering ever more diffuse, polymorphic, and 
increasingly de-territorialized (Burridge et al. 2017; Johnson et al. 2011; Raeymaekers 
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2014). While border enforcement efforts have intensified at the actual territorial margins 
of nation-states (Brown 2010; Jones 2009; Nevins 2001), Western states are also 
expanding strategies of migration management to sites both beyond the nation-state 
(Bialasiewicz 2012; Casas-Cortes et al. 2013, 2015; Hyndman and Mountz 2008) and 
within the interior (Coleman and Kocher 2011; van Baar 2017). Immigration detention, 
deportation, and temporary hotspots control have become fundamental to strategies of 
Westerns states in their attempts to contain and control migrants’ movements, remove 
unwanted migrants, and deter future migrants (Burridge et al. 2017; Hiemstra 2012; 
Mountz et al. 2013; Nethery and Silverman 2015; Tazzioli 2018; Tazzioli and Garelli 
2018). 
The unit of the family remains a key site through which the management and 
control of migrants takes place (Harker and Martin 2012). Migrants’ sexuality, 
reproductive bodies, and genetic ties have become a point of focus in immigration 
enforcement and regulatory practices (Conlon 2010; Helén 2014; Luibhéid 2004) that 
states use to limit family migration. In the United States, for example, immigration 
authorities have identified family migration as a threat to national security (Martin 2012), 
resulting in the increasing tendency to explicitly focus on detaining entire families 
(Williams 2017). In Europe, several countries now require proof of immigrants’ 
biological ties to their children or other family members in order for family reunification 
to take place, using DNA testing and genetic profiling (Helén 2014). Biological ties play 
an important role in the state’s decision-making on inclusion and exclusion, while also 
reproducing the family as a biological nuclear family model and based on (Western) 
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norms about what a ‘normal’ family is. Thus, the family is becoming a site at which 
border control and migration management strategies are lived and materialized. 
Processes of bordering and states’ attempts to control the movement of migrants 
produce transnational spaces (Collyer and King 2015). While the literature on 
transnational migration has paid little attention to the state, often by design, as it has 
focused on writing against or beyond the state (Schiller 2005), geographers have insisted 
on the importance of examining the role of the state as states control transnational 
activities (Hyndman 2012). Drawing on Spark (2005) and Ho (2011), Collyer and King 
(2015, 186) argue that “the state inevitably tries to reterritorialize transnational and 
diasporic spaces” as it continually seeks to re-establish its own existence. Focusing 
specifically on refugees’ transnational practices and ruptures, Nolin (2006, 183) states 
that “[r]efugees and (im)migrants are ‘bound’ by the political, social, and national 
contexts of both (if not more) countries (…)”, and she further argues that states “are of 
immense importance in perpetuating ruptures rather than facilitating transnational flow 
[of refugees]”. In a slightly different context, Golash-Boza (2014) has illustrated how 
Jamaican deportees rely on transnational ties as a way to cope with their financial and 
emotional struggles. Building on the work of Golash-Boza (2015) and Zilberg (2011), 
Ybarra and Peña (2017) have further shown how deportation – understood as forced 
migration – can affect and alter the life of entire families, not just the individual deportee. 
Thus, while states exclude groups of migrants through mechanisms of bordering such as 
deportation (Golash-Boza 2014; Kanstroom 2012; Ybarra and Peña 2017) – and I would 
add suspension of family reunification – excluded and forced migrants, in turn, engage in 
transnational practices as coping and survival strategies, what Golash-Boza (2014) has 
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called “forced transnationalism”. Yet, these transnational ties and activities also remind 
forced migrants of their exclusion and alienation (Golash-Boza 2014).   
This chapter contributes to the growing body of research on the migrant 
experience as one increasingly characterized by uncertainty, precarity, and waiting 
(Bailey et al. 2002; Brun 2015; Conlon 2011; Hyndman and Giles 2016; Seitz 2017). 
Legal geographers and other scholars have argued that although space remains a centrally 
important focal point of analysis and theorization, it is important to consider the ways in 
which governing processes operate through various temporalities (Braverman et al. 2015; 
Mawani 2014; Valverde 2015). More, specifically, if we take Massey’s (2005) impulse to 
undertake spatial analysis through examining it in relation to time – rather than as distinct 
and separate from it – aspects of state and geopolitical power become visible and 
apprehensible in new and productive ways. As will become clear below, the question 
“where to begin” cannot be answered through an exclusive focus on either space or time. 
When we attend to legal changes in refugee protection spatially (for instance protracted 
family separation across borders), we find out that the primary way in which this 
apparent spatial intervention is experienced is through references to time. Similarly, by 
paying attention to the ways in which legal protection is administered temporally (for 
instance by making refugee protection temporary and provisional) we see how the spatial 
separation of families becomes legally temporary, yet experienced by Syrian families as 
never ending and indeed disruptive of the family united as such. Thus, legal interventions 
like §7.3, which are necessarily spatial and temporal both in their operational logics and 
consequences, represent forms of bordering that do more than simply keep forced 
migrants outside of the remit of Europe. Together this body of work illustrates the 
60 
 
importance of analyzing time-space of border-work in relation to forced migrants’ 
experiences of and engagement with (forced) transnational activities, ties, and ruptures.  
 
Refugee Protection as a Bordering Mechanism 
Refugees, who are granted protection according to §7.3, obtain a form of refugee 
protection and a legal residence permit. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
§7.3 of the Danish Immigration Act defines a temporary protection status that grants 
recipients a 1-year temporary residence permit. This status can be extended for up to one 
or two years at a time if the Danish Immigration Service determines that the applicant 
still has a demonstrable need for protection. Additionally, §7.3 enables Denmark to 
suspend the recipient’s right to family reunification for the first three years6.  
I argue that §7.3 needs to be understood as a mechanism through which the state 
exercises power over authorized forced migrants within Danish territory but also beyond 
its remit and specifically through family ties. First and foremost, §7.3 importantly grants 
a refugee legal protection and provides the accepted refugee with a residence permit, 
which enables the refugee to legally stay in Denmark, even if just temporarily. However, 
in contrast to the two other protection statuses outlined in the Danish Immigration Act 
(§7.1: Convention Status and §7.2: Individual Protection Status), §7.3 works to exclude 
refugee family members who normally would have been able to access the space of 
refuge through family reunification. As such, §7.3 prevents the family from being 
                                                 
6 When §7.3 was first implemented to the Danish Immigration Act in March 2015, the right to family 
reunification was suspended for the first year of holding this status. Yet, in January 2016, the newly elected 
right-wing government with the support of the majority of the parliament extended this suspension of 
family reunification from one to three years, when it passed Bill 87 (Udlændinge-, Integrations-, og 
Boligmin., j-nr. 2015-1767 2016). This amendment made to §7.3 was retroactive so it applied to refugees 
who had made an asylum claim even before the amendment was passed.  
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reunited and violates the spirit of the international conventions (as explained in the 
introduction). In this sense, §7.3 is a form of spatial bordering as it excludes a group of 
forced migrants who traditionally would have been able to access the Danish territory 
through family ties. Importantly, it does so through the inclusion of a refugee who has 
successfully obtained refuge through an asylum claim.   
§7.3 governs refugee families through time. There seems to be an assumption 
within the legal and political documents relating to §7.3 that the family unit will remain 
during the time the right to family reunification is suspended (three years). However, as I 
will illustrate below, if we pay attention to the lived experience of displaced family who 
are separated we come to see how the time of separation – both the actual time but also 
the uncertainty for individual families who actually do not know the exact date for when 
they will be able to reunited7 – fractures families. Thus, §7.3 governs refugees both 
spatially and temporally.      
In principle §7.3 is an abstract legal statute that applies in the same way to 
everyone. However, in practice, it is important to pay attention to how §7.3 works 
unevenly across gender, age, and nationality. First, while §7.3 is not officially a category 
reserved for Syrian refugees, in practice it has primarily been applied to Syrians, as table 
3.1 illustrates.  
 
 
                                                 
7 According to the Danish Immigration Act, a refugee who has been granted protection according to §7.3 
has the right to apply for family reunification two months before the three year suspension period ends. 
Yet, the average time for processing a family reunification application was ten months at the time I 
conducted this research.  
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Table 3.1: Number of refugees granted refugee protection according to §7.3, 
distributed by nationality 
Nationality 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Syria 869 2159 473 3465 
Stateless* 194 293 87 574 
Somalia 5 19 0 24 
Iraq** 0 4 0 4 
Yemen** 0 0 2 2 
Total 1068 2475 526 4069 
* Includes stateless Palestinians from Syria 
** Minor children from Iraq and Yemen who have arrived in Denmark together with their mother who is 
either a Syrian citizen or a stateless person from Syria. 
This table shows the number of refugees who have been granted refugee protection status according to 
§7.3, in the period February 20, 2015 – July 31, 2017. (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2018, 5). 
 
Second, as table 3.2 shows, a higher percentage of Syrian women (43%) have been 
granted asylum according to §7.3 than Syrian men (13%). This is because it can be a lot 
easier for Syrian men to document evidence of individual persecution or fear thereof, 
than it is for women. For instance, it is now well documented by international country 
reports that Syrian men between the ages of 18 and 43 are at risk of being called to 
perform military service and fight in the ongoing war. As a result, this group of Syrians 
will more or less automatically be granted asylum according to §7.1: Convention Status. 
Syrian women (and men under the age of 18 and over 43) will be granted protection 





Table 3.2: Number of Syrian refugees granted refugee protection according to §7.3, 
distributed by gender and age  
Gender and Age Number Percentage 
Adult women 1481 43% 
Adult men 463 13% 
Children who arrived in Denmark with a parent 1296 37% 
Unaccompanied minor: female* 52 2% 
Unaccompanied minor: male* 173 5% 
Total 3465 100% 
* Includes children who were unaccompanied at the time of the ruling of their asylum case. 
(Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2018, 6). 
 
This gendered dimension of §7.3 has serious implications for refugees’ rights and access 
to family life. For instance, in Farah and Ahmed’s case, if Ahmed had left Syria instead 
of Farah and sought asylum in Denmark, he would very likely have obtained protection 
according to §7.1: Convention status. This is because he as a Syrian man in his thirties is 
facing the threat of having to serve in the Syrian military, which the Danish state 
considers an individual threat of persecution. Accordingly, Ahmed and his family would 
have been able to maintain their right to family reunification. This example of Ahmed 
and Farah’s family illustrates that while a person’s protection status is granted based on 
the person’s individual case, the different types of protection statuses affect more than the 
individual refugee because they determine which families may be able to reunite.  
As a mechanism of bordering, §7.3 limits immigration by preventing family 
reunification and is applied unevenly across nationality, gender, and age, but its impacts 
stretch well beyond the territory of Denmark. As I show below, Syrian families’ lived 
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experiences of §7.3 reveal their struggles to maintain family life and intimacy across 
transnational space, which create new problems as time passes. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I discuss how Syrian families experience and negotiate §7.3. The semi-structured 
interviews with Syrian refugees and ethnographic observations, which I made through my 
volunteer-work at the three different community centers, form the basis of my analysis. 
While I did not ask my informants specifically about their specific refugee protection 
status, some of them provided the information when they recounted the moment they 
received refugee protection. On other occasions, the protection status came up during our 
conversations about family reunification (see Chapter Two). More than half of the 
Syrians I interviewed had dealt with issues related to family reunification. Some of my 
informants had arrived in Denmark through family reunifications or had successfully 
been able to bring their family members to Denmark through family reunification, while 
others were still waiting for a ruling of their family reunification case or had been 
rejected for family reunification due to their refugee protection status. I bring the findings 
from the interviews together with my observations at the three community centers, where 
I among other things assisted Syrians and other forced migrants with legal questions and 
bureaucratic issues specifically related to their refugee protection status, and filed 
applications for family reunification and complaints over the rulings on their asylum case 
(see Chapter Two). This ethnographic work provided me with detailed insights into how 
§7.3 and the separation of family influenced Syrian refugees’ everyday life, as they 
longed for loved ones, did their best to maintain contact with family members, and 




Fractured Lives: Living with Forced Transnationalism Creating Virtual Spaces  
As Syrian families in Denmark negotiate their lives under §7.3 they found new ways to 
care and maintain family life at a distance, developing forms of what Parreñas (2005, 
319) has called “transnational intimacy”. For many of the Syrians I engaged with, the 
Internet and smartphone applications (apps) such as WhatsApp, Viber, or Messenger, 
allowed them to maintain relationships with family members and friends back home in 
Syria or in other parts of the world. For instance, Hasan, who was newly married when he 
left his home in the northern part of Syria, used WhatsApp to maintain daily 
communication with his wife Le. Through text, images, and emojis, Hasan and Le 
expressed love, affection, and longing across borders, time, and transnational space. It 
was a way through which the two newlyweds could hold on to each other while separated 
physically across borders.  
Likewise, Sami, a 55-year old Palestinian man from Damascus who had arrived in 
Denmark with his 18-year old son called, his wife and two children through Facebook 
Messenger daily. Sometimes, Sami would insist that I participate in these video calls so 
that his family and I could get to know each other. These video calls and the interactions 
they made possible represent a way through which Sami was able to open the door to his 
family, his home, and provide a sense of hospitality. Like other Syrians who I engaged 
with daily at the community centers, Sami sought to make a home in Denmark. Yet, he 
felt unable to complete such home-making until his wife and two children would join him 
and his 18-year old son in Denmark. As such, the virtual space created through these 
video calls was in some way a temporary virtual ‘home’ in-between and across borders 
that allowed for ‘guests’ (like me) and held the family together.     
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Smartphone applications like WhatsApp helped Syrian families mitigate 
electricity outages and unstable Internet connections caused by bombings and battles in 
Syria. WhatsApp allowed for asynchronous recording and transmitting of voice 
messages. Hasan and Le, similar to other Syrian families, sometimes resorted to 
recording and sending a verbal message through WhatsApp rather than making a direct 
call or send a text message, a method that was also particularly useful for illiterate family 
members and smaller children. This technique allowed Le to receive a message from 
Hasan as soon as she was able to reconnect to the internet and she would then reciprocate 
by sending a recorded message back. Receiving these messages took at best just a few 
minutes and at worst several days. Despite unreliable internet connections and electricity 
outages, Syrian families found ways to use smartphone applications and social media that 
enabled them to create virtual transnational spaces of care and intimacy. 
Through apps and the virtual spaces they provide, Syrians families were able to 
stay connected and continue their life as a family, although in asynchronous ways 
because Syrian families were physically separated for the time being yet connected 
through transnational activities. Yet, these communication strategies never fully 
alleviated the realities of displacement and separation and the anxieties that came with 
them. For instance, Farah explained to me that despite her best efforts to sustain her 
relationship with Ahmed and their children under these circumstances, the physical 
separation left her with uncertainty, in part because she never knew if the lack of 
response to a message was a matter of a power outage or due to more bombing and 
shelling. As Farah stated “it is either me worried [about him] or him worried [about me]”. 
Thus, Syrian families’ engagement with transnational activities as a strategy to maintain 
67 
 
family life bear some resemblance to those of deportees who retain transnational ties with 
family and friends in their former host country for both financial and emotional support 
(Golash-Boza 2014). Yet, Syrian families’ transnational ties and activities are different 
because they are marked by war and displacement. For Farah this meant that she was 
often worried about Ahmed and their two children, particularly when she was unable to 
get in contract with Ahmed. For Sami, his transnational ties to his family in Damascus 
was a desire and waiting for a future home in Denmark where he and his family can 
physically live together, rather than a diasporic yearning (Burman 2002) for a home in 
Syria or a former home in a host country (Golash-Boza 2014). Thus, Syrian families’ 
daily video calls, text messages, emojis, and voice messages, I argue, can be understood 
as active strategies through which Syrians maintain their family and intimate relations for 
the time being with the hope and expectation that the family will continue to exist once 
they are able to reunite in exile in the future.  
 
Fractures 
Temporal and spatial challenges of living under conditions of ‘forced transnationalism’ 
(Golash-Boza 2014) altered family life for Syrians in my study as the protracted 
separation began to fracture relationships between parents and children as well as 
between spouses. For Farah’s family, two years of separation had already taken a heavy 
toll. During our interview, Farah looked at her youngest daughter, Jamila, and said: 
“when I brought Jamila she was not able to walk yet. It was here [in Denmark] that 
Jamila started to walk, it was here that she started to speak”. Farah continued to explain 
that in phone conversations or when Jamila saw a picture of Ahmed: “she [Jamila] will 
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only call him by his first name, she does not call him baba [dad], she does not know her 
father”. While Farah knew that Jamila did not recognize her father because she was just a 
little child when they left Syria, it nevertheless pained her that Jamila was growing up 
without identifying Ahmed as her father.  
Farah found keeping the relationship with her other two children, Ranim and Ali, 
who remained in Syria, particularly complicated. With tears in her eyes, Farah explained 
to me that every time she looked at Jamila and Reem (who were playing doctor and 
patient on the couch), she was reminded of their two siblings, Ranim and Ali, who she 
had to leave behind in Syria. The war in Syria with its power outages and routine 
breakdowns of telecommunication networks made daily communication and interactions 
with Ranim and Ali difficult. In addition, Ranim had stopped talking to Farah in 
retaliation against her because Ranim thought her mother had abandoned her. 
Farah’s family life across transnational space shows that virtual space and its 
associated communication strategies do not fully mitigate the realities of physical 
separation. As Pratt (2012, 55) notes, “the forms of communication available to most 
mothers [and fathers] who attempt to care at distance – tape recordings, phone calls, 
letters, text messaging – are all of necessity disembodied, decontextualized, and partial”. 
The physical geographic distance between children and their parents brought with it 
growing and seemingly intractable feelings of emotional separation and alienation from 
one another. This in turn renders it impossible for both parents to play the roles in their 
children’s lives that they otherwise would. This illustrates how the intimacy and relations 
that Syrian families seek to retain across transnational space are challenged by both the 
spatial and psychical separation as well as through temporality. Working in tandem with 
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the spatial separation, the temporality of the separation is experienced by Syrians as they 
struggle to maintain “normal” family relations and roles.   
Farah’s marriage to Ahmed was under growing stress. While they had been 
inseparable in pre-war Syria, Farah lamented that: “Now sometimes months will pass 
without us [Farah and Ahmed] speaking to each other. Since we got married we had not 
left each other for more than an hour, now it is a matter of months that we do not speak 
with each other because there is no Internet”. Under these circumstances, sustaining their 
intimate bond became an ongoing struggle:  
Sometimes I do not feel like speaking because every time we want to talk, 
we talk about family reunification, when and what happened [so far]. I 
have run out of lies to tell. 
 
Farah lit a cigarette and continued:  
It affects us mentally, psychologically very much. (…) Imagine that my 
husband – we would not use offensive language with each other at all - 
imagine that now on the phone he could say one hundred bad words to 
me! Just because he thought that we came here, and there are no such 
laws. This is all lies and maneuvering on my part because I don’t blame 
him because he is being pressured.  
 
Farah left the room to check on Jamila and Reem, who seemed to be fighting next door. 
When she returned she said:  
And he says ‘do not blame me, it is just me burning to see you’.  
  
According to Farah, the separation caused by §7.3 had violently disrupted their (previous) 
ways of being together. In light of the stresses borne out of separation, Ahmed had started 
to verbally abuse Farah and she felt that she needed to lie to him in order to deflect his 
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anger. Farah’s example illustrates the challenges of sustaining some semblance of a 
family life across borders and demonstrates how forced transnationalism turns families 
and intimate relationships into sites of discord and alienation.  
§7.3 and its suspension of family reunification produce a form of forced 
transnationalism for refugees, Syrian families in particular. Scholars have noted that 
refugees often experience social relations as a disruption of communications and face-to-
face contacts (Nolin 2006), which in turn pulls apart idealized imaginaries of the 
household as a coherent entity (Ybarra and Peña 2017). Jamila’s lack of recognition of 
Ahmed as her father, Ranim’s refusal to speak to her mother, Ahmed’s “bad words”, and 
Farah’s lies are all examples how §7.3 works to undermine families and intimate ties. In 
doing so, §7.3 becomes a violent bordering practice that “cut[s] across conventional 
bounds of places and scales, connected by political relations that traverse the intimate and 
the geopolitical” (Pain and Staeheli 2014, 344), changing the lived experience of what it 
means to be a family in a protracted state of separation.  
 
Reassembling the family 
Many Syrians struggled to make sense of the suspension of family reunification that 
seems to erode and unsettle the idealized liberal promise of refugee protection. For 
instance, during our interview, Farah articulated the following: 
Europe whatever it does, I do not blame them, there was pressure of 
refugees. But what has become of humanity when they prevent family 
reunification. My husband is exposed to danger at any moment. In my 
country [Syria] he is exposed to danger, how is that humanity? They gave 




More than simply lamenting the erosion of liberal ideals, however, Syrian families also 
fought the forced transnationalism imposed by the suspension of family unification. 
Rather than being passive and just waiting to apply for family reunification after the three 
years, Syrian families sought legal recourse and found multiple, often creative, ways of 
physically re-assembling their families sooner than the three-year suspension period 
allowed. For instance, several Syrians sued the Danish state for their right to be with their 
loved ones. In the spring of 2016 a group of Syrians, who had all received asylum 
according to §7.3, sued the Danish government and the Minister for Immigration, 
Integration and Housing, Inger Støjberg (Hvilson 2016). Likewise, Mosalam, a 58-year 
old Syrian man, sued the Danish Refugee Appeals Board for their decision to reject his 
family reunification request (Frich 2017). In May 2017, the Danish High Court affirmed 
the Danish Refugee Appeals Board’s decision and ruled that the 3-year suspension of 
family reunification was not against the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Mosalam appealed that decision to the Danish Supreme Court (Singberg 2017), which in 
November 2017 supported the High Court’s ruling (Olsen 2017). Albeit unsuccessful in 
both cases, these lawsuits show that family unification is a strong motivator for Syrians 
living in Denmark, many of whom sought to shorten the time of living separated from 
their families under forced transnationalism.  
In addition to lawsuits, Syrian refugees also contested the Danish state’s ruling on 
their asylum cases by filing complaints to the Danish Immigration Service and the Danish 
Refugee Appeals Board. Nour, a 46-year old man from Damascus, decided to challenge 
the Danish state’s decision to grant him asylum according to §7.3 of the Danish 
Immigration Act, which  prevented him from reuniting with his wife and two children 
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who he had left behind in Syria. In February 2017, Nour consulted with an immigration 
lawyer and sought to have his protection status changed from §7.3 to either §7.1 or §7.2 
of the Danish Immigration Act in order to obtain the right to family reunification. In June 
2017, Nour received the good news that the Danish Refugee Appeals Board would hear 
his case and he was appointed a migration lawyer. The hearing was successful and 
Nour’s refugee protection status was changed to §7.1 
Nour’s story is not unusual. Between July 2015 and August 2017, the Danish 
Refugee Appeals Board processed 219 cases where Syrians filed a complaint against the 
Danish state's decision to grant them asylum according to §7.3. Out of the 219 cases, 46 
Syrians had their status changed to either refugee protection according §7.1 or §7.2 of the 
Danish Immigration Act, which does not suspend the right to family reunification 
(Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2018, 9). Together with these numbers, Nour’s 
story illustrates how Syrians are not just grateful for having received refugee protection 
in Denmark nor are they willing to wait three years until they can reunite with their 
families. Rather, Syrians’ concern for their family members in Syria as well as need and 
desire to physically live together as a family motivated Syrians to make rights claims and 
challenge the state’s decision to suspend family reunification; they insist “on their right to 
more” (Espiritu 2014, 14). As political subjects, Syrian refugees actively mobilize their 
legal right to file a complaint over the particular refugee protection status that they have 
been granted by the state as a strategy to reunite their family. Syrian refugees demand 
that the Danish state uses its sovereign power to reconsider and change its initial ruling of 
their asylum case so that they are no longer subject to the suspension of family 
reunification laid down by §7.3. Thus, rather than directly challenging and forcing the 
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Danish state to abolish the law, which enables the state to suspend their right to family 
reunification, Syrians’ political actions here take place within the realm of the law and 
the existing legal system.  
Desperate to end their separation and wanting to speed up their reunification with 
family members, some Syrians resorted to extralegal and somewhat dangerous means. 
For instance, Salam, who had left her three children behind in Syria with some relatives, 
filed a complaint to the Danish Refugee Appeals Board right after she received the ruling 
on her asylum case. Salam told to me that she had a good case from having her status 
changed because as she explained “I worked as a secretary for a minister. They [the 
Syrian government] considered me a dissident”. While Salam’s case was processing, she 
contacted people she knew in Syria who helped her bring her children from Syria to 
Denmark through informal channels. Consequently, her three children had to make the 
dangerous journey across the Aegean Sea and through Europe by various means of 
transportation and with the assistance of smugglers before they reached Denmark where 
they were able to reunite with their mother. Salam’s complaint was later successfully 
approved and her status was changed to asylum according to §7.1 of the Danish 
Immigration.  
Not all mothers were as brazen as Salam, however. Nor did they or their families 
have the same substantial financial means it takes to hire smugglers. Other Syrians 
simply sought to end the separation of their families more quickly by applying for family 
reunification before the 3-year suspension period ended8. According to the Ministry of 
                                                 
8 It is possible for Syrians as well as other recipients of §7.3 to apply for family reunification before the 3-
year suspension period ends because the Danish Immigration Service is required to process individual cases 
in order to establish whether or not Denmark violates international legal frameworks such as the European 
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Immigration and Integration, between February 2015 and July 31, 2017, 1,420 people 
who had been granted refugee protection according to §7.3 applied for family 
reunification even though their right had been suspended (Udlændinge- og 
Integrationsministeriet 2018, 14)9. Farah was one of these 1,420 people. After much 
consideration and several consultations with a legal counselor, Farah filed a family 
reunification application for her husband and two children in Syria in January 2017. 
While she was well aware that her family reunification case would likely be rejected, she 
hoped that filing this application might open up a possibility for the Danish state to grant 
them family reunification before the end of the three-year time period. As she explained 
“I manage to ignore them [the people who told her that her case is likely to be rejected], I 
live in a hope that there is an ‘Okay’ [approval of her family reunification case]”. By 
filing an application for family reunification, in other words, Farah was able to establish a 
hope that her family would be able to reunite soon, a hope that she could hold on to in 
difficult times.  
Farah further elaborated on the violent and dehumanizing consequences of the 
process of applying for family reunification. Here she focused on the anguish of the de 
facto state of limbo that §7.3 brought about based on the anxiety of anticipating the ruling 
on her pending family reunification case: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Convention of Human Rights and the Convention of the Rights of the Child, even if it ultimately suspends 
an individual’s right to family reunification. There are special circumstances, such as a child being sick or a 
spouse being dependent on the other spouse due to a disability, where the Danish state cannot suspend the 
right to family reunification. Thus, if a person who has been granted asylum according to §7.3 submits a 
family reunification application, the Danish Immigration Service will process the case in order to see if the 
case meets the exception made to the regulation of suspending family reunification. 
9 By July 31, 2017, the Danish Immigration Service had ruled on 480 of the 1420 cases. 112 of the 480 
cases obtained family reunification before the end of the three-year suspension period (Udlændinge- og 
Integrationsministeriet 2018, 16-17).  
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Imagine a woman sitting on pins and needles [waiting anxiously], there is 
the word YES and the word NO – to family reunification – still YES or 
NO. I try to distract myself. I would say yes, it is definitely going to 
happen. I try to pretend it is going to be okay. How would I accept a NO?!  
 
While fully aware of the acute possibility of a “NO”, i.e. having her application rejected, 
Farah emphasized to me that she would not be able to accept such an outcome. As she 
repeatedly emphasized, if the Danish state truly knew the specificities of her case and 
ongoing struggles to sustain her family as a family it would be impossible for them to 
issue a “NO!” According to Farah, rejecting her case would (hopefully) prove impossible 
because it would be so de-humanizing. Through these claims we can see Farah wrestled 
with complicated emotions, fighting for a way to maintain hope and optimism. 
Yet, filing the application represents more than just an attempt to maintain hope; 
it also became a way for Farah to illustrate to her family that she was committed to them. 
Before Farah filed the family reunification application, Ahmed had started to question her 
about their plan and whether or not she was, in fact, actually still interested in bringing 
them to Denmark. Farah said that Ahmed refused to acknowledge that a law like §7.3 
could exist. His suspicions caused many arguments between them and their 
communication became less frequent. Right before signing and sending the application 
documents to the Danish Immigration Service Farah took pictures of the application as 
proof for Ahmed and their four children that she was indeed doing everything in her 
power to fulfil their collective aspirations to be reunited in Denmark, hoping to rebuild 
their trust. Thus, Farah’s action of filing family reunification represents a way in which 
Farah was dealing with the forced transnationalism imposed on her and her family. It was 
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a way for Farah to not give up and let the Danish state destroy her family, Farah took 
action in order maintain hope and rebuild her family. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have focused on Syrian refugees’ experiences and strategies of coping 
with protracted separation of families across borders, caused by displacement and 
prolonged by the Danish state’s decision to suspend the right to family reunification. 
Drawing on Syrian refugees’ accounts, I have showed how Syrian families find new ways 
to maintain their family and intimate relations while also trying to reassemble their 
families before the end of the three-year suspension period. Drawing on these findings, I 
argue that §7.3 needs to be understood as a border mechanism, not only in the sense that 
it prevents family reunification (i.e. the immigration of family members) and physically 
inhibits families from being together but also in the sense that it fractures families (and 
sometimes destroys family relations) over time. Further, this approach makes visible the 
irreducible ways in which this bordering mechanism must be apprehended as 
simultaneously spatial and temporal. The ways in which family relations are fractured 
and possibly destroyed is not simply the outcome of physical separation. §7.3 states that 
the suspension of family reunification is three years, a time period that in theory is 
demarcated and can be measured in a very conventional sense of measuring time, 
counting days and years. In this sense, time is a condition precedent to a legal status, a 
legal mechanism through which the state is able to exclude refugee immigration 
(Kanstroom 2012; Valverde 2015). Yet, Syrian families’ experience of this time period is 
marked by uncertainty. While Syrian refugees do countdown to the day when their right 
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to family reunification is no longer suspended, there is no legal guarantee that they will 
be able to reunite with their loved ones once the suspension period is over. The state can 
at any point use its sovereign power to extend this time period, as it did when it expanded 
the time period from one to three years in 2016. Furthermore, as the time passes, children 
grow older, and the longing and worrying for family members’ safety and wellbeing get 
stronger, Syrian families’ find it increasingly difficult to maintain the family and intimate 
relations. Makers of time, such as daily routines, important religious and cultural 
celebrations, and annual birthdays and anniversaries, remind Syrian families of their 
physical separation. Thus, we might say that time ‘thickens’ (Valverde 2015, 10) and 
shapes the spatial separation of families.       
However, the law’s control over social life is never total. Syrian families engage 
in various strategies in order to limit this time of separation and re-assemble their families 
before the end of the three-year suspension period, illustrating how refugees, despite 
great uncertainties, “work toward particular kinds of futures” (Ramsay 2017, 519). Syrian 
families mobilize different strategies that both challenge and engage with the 
fundamental rule of law. The court cases and insistence on claiming a right to family 
reunification may be considered “acts of citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen 2008; Mitchell et 
al. 2015). But beyond such acts that fall fairly squarely into liberal democratic 
citizenship, Syrians’ multiple strategies are more closely aligned with what Partha 
Chatterjee (2004, 4, also see Chatterjee 2011) calls the “politics of the governed”. In 
thinking through the politics of the governed, Chatterjee (2011, 207) conceptualizes the 
subject of political practices “as concrete selves necessarily acting within multiple 
networks of collective obligations and solidarities to work out strategies of coping with, 
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resisting, or using to their advantage the vast array of technologies of power deployed by 
the modern state.” Chatterjee’s conceptualization of what it means to act as a political 
subject allows us to make sense of how Syrian families mobilize whatever technologies 
of power they have access to in making due and potentially seeking to rework the 
relations and subject positions that forms of violent statecraft seek to assign them. Hence, 
Syrian families take political actions, use legal avenues available to them, and mobilize 
informal networks in order to “deal with” (Harker 2011) and end the protracted 
separation of their families prolonged by the Danish state. As such, Syrian refugees 
perform and enact a form of political subjectivity that is not below, outside of, or beyond 
the state (Sharp 2013), but rather operates and mobilizes the means available within it.    
Syrians’ efforts to accelerate family reunification, I argue, need to be understood 
as efforts that challenge bordering practices like §7.3, which create forced 
transnationalism and work to sever intimate relationships. Syrians mobilize temporality 
to overcome space, and in trying to manipulate or change the temporalities of Danish 
asylum laws they seek to reclaim sovereignty over their lives and intimate relationships. 
In this sense, making due or getting by becomes itself the horizon of what is politically 
possible in many cases. I draw here on Berlant’s (2011, 262) conceptualization of 
political action “as the action of not being worn out by politics.” Syrian families’ 
attempts to end the separation of their families through various means and actions are 
themselves ways to deal and cope with the politics at play (the political practice of 
prolonging the separation of forced migrant families), even when they end up not being 
successful in the sense of ending family separation.  
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It is important to mention that Syrian families’ story of separation is in no way 
unusual or unique to Syrian refugees in Denmark. Countries across Europe, including 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland have 
followed Denmark’s lead in immigration enforcement, adopting new laws and policies 
that suspend forced migrants’ rights to family reunification (Council of Europe, 2017). 
As such, the Danish state is continuing to act as a trendsetter for asylum and refugee 




































LIVED REFUGE: THE GOVERNMENT OF REFUGE IN DENMARK 
 
We live in a tent, fastened by nails made of iron. 
Any gust of wind would shake it or might uproot it. 
You are afraid and cold. 
You will continue to be cold and worried. 
You cannot go out to get food to eat. 
The wind blows. 
It is freezing. 
You are afraid that the tent will collapse on you. 
 




I open with Salma’s description of refuge to illustrate the uncertainty and insecurity that 
Salma and other Syrian refugees experience - notably after obtaining asylum and refugee 
protection in Denmark. Together with her adult son, her daughter, and her three 
grandchildren, Salma fled from Syria to Turkey, crossed the Aegean Sea to Greece, and 
moved through multiple European countries before arriving in Denmark in the fall of 
2015. While they all survived the dangerous journey and obtained refugee protection 
status within less than a year, Salma experiences ‘refuge’ in Denmark neither as a 
permanent nor a secure condition. Rather, using the metaphor of the tent -- a familiar 
symbol of refugee displacement, temporary settlement, and humanitarian relief -- she 
describes refuge as a dwelling away from home, a place where you reside for the time 
being. It is a temporary and very fragile shelter (“any gust of wind would shake it or 
might uproot it”). Living with the constant threat (“wind blows”) that this place might be 
taken away from you, Salma further characterizes refuge as a place marked by continuing 
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insecurities and feelings of discomfort, unease, and worries. What is most significant in 
the context of this chapter, however, is how Salma’s description fundamentally troubles 
idealized geographical imaginations of refuge as a safe haven, a place of betterment, and 
a space for a stable future. 
In the previous chapter, I begun to unsettle refuge by analyzing the state of legal 
limbo and the protracted separation that fragments Syrian families. In this chapter, I 
continue to unsettle refuge, albeit in a different way. I focus on Syrian refugees’ 
experiences of what I call lived refuge. This term specifically foregrounds the disjuncture 
between idealized notions of refuge—with its ostensible ‘humanitarian’ ethos—and the 
practical administration refuge as manifested in the everyday lived experiences of actual 
refugees. I argue that these distinctions are not obvious simply by merely attending to the 
programs and policies themselves as articulated in legal statutes, policy documents, and 
official statements.  
Indeed, Syrian refugees’ embodied experiences of lived refuge in Denmark 
highlights the ways in which refuge is defined and shaped by a number of training 
programs, workfare regimes, and other legally-mandated programs that the Danish state 
requires of refugees in Denmark. Here I group these practices together under the banner 
of what I term “the government of refuge”. The analytic emphasis is on not merely 
showing how ostensibly humanitarian programs structure and affect refugees’ lives in 
intimate ways but also on showing how these programs (re)produce refugee subjectivity. 
The process of subjection is performative in the sense that it enacts and makes real the 
characteristics projected onto refugees. In this sense, it is not reducible to simple 
stigmatization in terms of labeling discursively, but rather a form of administration that 
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casts out refugees through practices and regimes. Attending to the government of refuge 
from the perspective of refugees shows how refugees rather than becoming ‘integrated’ 
as these policies purported to do, are instead rendered precarious and deprived of access 
to core rights that Danes and other residents are accorded. In doing so, this chapter takes 
up Yên Lê Espiritu’s (2014) call to critically interrogate the humanitarian term refuge and 
the forms of power embedded within it. It contributes to migration geography’s concern 
with how migrants’ subjectivities are (re)produced, negotiated, and mobilized (Leitner 
and Ehrkamp 2006; Häkli, et al. 2017; Silvey and Lawson 1999).  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by outlining a framework for 
conceptualizing the relationships between refuge, humanitarian government, and 
subjection. I then provide a brief description of the conditions that shape Syrian refugees’ 
lives in Denmark and the specific sets of data I draw on for this chapter. This discussion 
is followed by my analysis of Syrian refugees’ accounts of what I term lived refuge in 
order detail the government of refuge and its significance. Here I locate the government 
of refuge and its multiple state practices, which Syrian refugees are subject to, not as a 
lack or an absence of ‘true’ refuge, but as a structural part of contemporary lived refuge.  
 
Refugee Condition, Government, and Subjection  
Within the modern refugee protection system, refuge is a geopolitical practice of 
providing protection and a place of safety to forced migrants fleeing violence and 
persecution. The 1951 Convention stipulates signatory states’ legal obligations towards 
refugees, yet it is up to the individual signatory state to decide how it is going to interpret 
and implement these obligations, as I have explained in greater detail in Chapter One. 
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Furthermore, because the modern system of refuge relies on the act of “giving” (Nguyen 
2012), this sets up an inherently asymmetrical power relationship between the state and 
the refugee. As many other scholars have noted (Liu 2002; Soguk 1999), the provision of 
hospitality embedded within it establishes asymmetrical power relationships, a dynamic 
that the granting of refugee protection accentuates. Refuge is provided by the (more 
powerful) state to (the less powerful victim) the refugee; the one who is only recognized 
“in relation to those who have power over them” (Fassin 2012, 4). Because the state has 
to actively grant refuge to an individual in order for the individual to obtain the protection 
of the state, the asymmetrical relationship between the state and the refugee in the 
provision of this hospitality is not merely asymmetrical, however, but also discretionary -
- both in terms of who it is accorded to and how this protection is administered once 
legally granted.   
In order to address how refuge is administered in practice, I draw on Didier 
Fassin’s concept of “humanitarian government”. In Humanitarian Reason, Fassin (2012, 
2-5) defines the concept of humanitarian government as the set of measures and 
initiatives designed and brought into operation to manage, regulate, and aid the existence 
of human beings. According to Fassin, humanitarian government is neither limited to the 
work of humanitarian and non-governmental organizations nor is it limited to 
geographical locations in the so-called ‘Third World’. Rather, what makes humanitarian 
government humanitarian and what brings these initiatives and practices together is the 
fact that they are all rationalized and carried out “in the name of humanity” (Feldman and 
Ticktin 2010). The language of humanitarianism -- including the vocabulary of suffering, 
compassion, assistance, and ‘responsibility to protect’ -- “serves to qualify the issues 
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involved and to reason about choices made” (Fassin 2012, 2). Thus, the concept of 
humanitarian government ties together a range of different governmental practices and 
programs that may seem on the face of it to have little in common - from the regulations 
of poverty, to disaster management and responses to epidemics. Fassin’s broad definition 
of humanitarian government is useful in examining how refugees are managed and 
governed not only within refugee camps and informal urban settlements within or in 
close proximity to war and natural disasters (Biehl 2015; Darling 2009; Hyndman 2000; 
Hyndman and Giles 2016; Malkki 1995; Ramadan 2013), along the migration journey 
(Garelli and Tazzioli 2018; Vaughan-Williams 2015), or during asylum process (Conlon 
2010; Darling 2011; Jacobsen 2016), but also after refugees have been resettled or 
obtained refugee protection status in (signatory) countries, considered peaceful and far 
away from war and conflict.  
Espiritu notably charts how the category of the refugee comes with expectations 
of indebtedness, passivity, victimhood, and silence (2014; also see Malkki 1995). The 
‘refugee’ is (re)constructed as subject position that forced migrants have to “fit into” and 
preform within the policies and practices of the international refugee regime, in other 
words forms of subjection. Here, I understand the subjection in a Foucauldian sense, as a 
form of power that:  
applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others 
have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individual 




In this sense, the subjection of the ‘refugee subject’ takes place through a kind of power 
that both acts on ‘the refugee’ through techniques of control, domination, regulation, and 
dependence but also shapes the subject - his identity and self-knowledge. Scholars have 
used terms such as ‘refugeeness’ (Malkki 1992; Nyers 2006) and ‘refugee condition’ 
(Nguyen 2012) to describe the processes, practices, and techniques through which the 
‘refugee subject’ is (re)produced. For instance, through practices of categorizing, 
codifying, systematic naming, and ordering of so-called refugee illnesses, the refugee 
subject is (re)produced as a subject in need of help and interventions and the “problem” 
of refugees is located within the body of the refugee rather than within the geopolitics 
and institutional structures. As Mimi Thi Nguyen (2012, 55) explains “the condition of 
being a refugee is construed as a generalizable state of abnormality, shorthand for 
deprivation, deindividuation, and deficiency”. Furthermore, the ‘refugee condition’, in 
turn, acts as an explanation and justification for humanitarian or state intervention.  
However, refugees are not passive within this un-going process of subjection, 
rather refugees like all other subjects re-inscribe, reconfigure, and resist ‘the refugee 
subject’ as they move through and between political spaces (Foucault 1982; Grosz 1994). 
Scholars including geographers have explored the relationship between political agency 
and subjection of refugees in its various forms (Allan 2009; Fassin 2012; Häkli, et al. 
2017; Ticktin 2006; 2011), documenting the capacities of refugees to negotiate and 
mobilize their position both individually and collectively. For instance, Ilana Feldman 
(2012, 157) distinguishes between the politics of life (i.e. a politics that ascribes values to 
life) and the politics of living (i.e. the dynamics of being, what people do within the 
humanitarian space) in order to examine the ways in which refugees survive, claim, and 
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act within humanitarian operations. In a similar vein, Nell Gabiam (2016, 9) uses the 
concept “politics of suffering” to show how Palestinian refugees in Syria mobilize 
suffering as a kind of political tool through which to claim political legitimacy and rights. 
As such, refugees employ their political agency in ways that both reproduce and 
challenge existing relationships of power.  
While this chapter does show how Syrian refugees become subject to state 
practices that seeks to govern them, the point here is precisely not to locate the ‘problem’ 
of refuge(es) in the bodies and mind of the people who are categorized and legally 
classified as refugees (Espiritu 2014; Malkki 1995). Rather, the aim is to show how the 
government of refuge takes place through administering conditions that cast the (newly 
accepted) ‘refugee’ as an abnormal subject in need of assistance and state intervention 
and in turn (re)produces particular refugee subjectivities. In short, together this body of 
work illustrates that analyzing the ways in which refugees’ experience, negotiate, and 
make sense of lived refuge is central to understanding the processes of government of 
refuge, subjection, and resistance.  
 
Refuge in Denmark 
While Syrians and other refugees who obtain refugee protection in Denmark have gained 
safety from overt violence and threats by the Syrian police and military and other militant 
groups operating in Syria, their legal status as refugees does not automatically offer 
permanent refuge. In contrast to, for example, refugees in Canada who automatically 
become a permanent resident upon resettlement (Hyndman and Giles 2016), refugees in 
Denmark only receive a temporary residence permit, which is valid for one or two years 
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depending on their individual refugee protection status10. In order to renew the residence 
permit, the individual refugee has to apply for an extension before the permit expires, 
failure to do so can result in loss of status and expulsion at worst11. After eight years of 
legal residency in Denmark, a refugee may apply for permanent residence status. In order 
for such an application to be successful, refugees must meet a number of different 
requirements including demonstrating Danish language skills, employment, and the 
absence of a criminal record. The temporary nature of their legal refugee status marks 
Syrians and other refugees’ lives as they worry about whether or not their residence 
permit will be renewed and the very distant prospect of securing permanent residence.    
Syrians’ experience of refuge in Denmark is also shaped by their socio-political 
status as ‘newly arrived refugees under the Integration Act’ (nyankommen flygtning 
under integrationsloven). The Danish Integration Act stipulates that refugees are required 
to live for five years in the municipality they were assigned to by the state upon obtaining 
official refugee protection status in Denmark. This policy means that refugees are 
dispersed to municipalities throughout the country and often have to live in town or a 
neighborhood with a predominantly white population. That is, refugees have no choice 
about where to live in relation to relatives, friends, social networks, shopping facilities, 
public transportation, schools, and day-care institutions (Larsen 2011). In addition, 
refugees are obligated to sign a declaration pledging their commitment to integration and 
                                                 
10 According to the Danish Immigration Act, a person applying for asylum in Denmark can be granted one 
of the following refugee protection statuses: Art. 7.1: Convention Status (2 year temporary residence 
permit), Art. 7.2: Individual Temporary Protection Status (1 year temporary residence permit), Art. 7.3: 
General Temporary Protection Status (1 year temporary residence permit, without right to family 
reunification for the first three year and no right to free higher education).  
11 This has recently been changed, residence permit for certain groups are now automatically renewed if the 
state decided that there is grounds for renewal. 
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active citizenship. They have to enter into an integration contract that stipulates their 
participation in a 5-year mandatory integration program, consisting of a comprehensive 
civic- and Danish language-training courses, job-training, and internships. During this 
five year-period or until they obtain full-time employment, refugees are entitled to 
receive an integration allowance (integrationsydelse), which can be up to 50% lower than 
ordinary social welfare benefits (kontanthjælp). The integration allowance is conditional, 
meaning that a refugee only receives the full amount if she/he complies with the rules and 
obligations stipulated in their integration contract. For example, if a refugee fails to show 
up to a language class without a legitimate excuse, the municipality can reduce her/his 
integration allowance12. On the face of it, this integration policy might seem like an act of 
welfare and care that aims to better assist refugees in integrating into Danish society 
(Fernandes 2015). As I illustrate in this chapter, however, refugees experience this 
integration policy as invasive in their daily lives. 
The Syrians who participated in my research described how they felt life in refuge 
was structured and shaped by manifold rules, regulations, and requirements. In this 
chapter, I draw specifically on the data produced through the six focus group discussions 
that I conducted with 21 Syrian refugees (see Chapter Two). At the time of this research, 
all participants had been granted asylum, received refugee protection status, and moved 
to the municipality to which they had been assigned for the 5-year mandatory integration 
program. Out of the 21 participants, four had obtained full-time employment while the 
rest were still depending on the integration allowance. All participants were taking 
                                                 
12 There are no specific rules for the reduction of integration allowance, it is up to the individual 
municipality to decide how they are reducing the refugee’s integration allowance (Integrationsloven, 2017).  
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Danish language classes and had participated in one or multiple job-training programs. 
The focus group discussions revealed that these Syrians’ experiences of refuge in 
Denmark did not live up to the safe haven they had expected to find. During the focus 
groups, participants often highlighted their continued struggles to make a somewhat 
durable and meaningful life in Denmark. Drawing on these discussions, the remainder of 
this chapter focuses on what I call ‘the government of refuge’; a set of state practices, 
which structures Syrian refugees’ everyday lives in Denmark. I discuss these practices by 
dividing them into the three categories of ‘dispersal’, ‘financial coercion’, and 
‘workfare’.  
 
The government of Refugee Dispersal 
Obtaining asylum or refugee protection is often a major relief for refugees and forced 
migrants. Yet, the joy and relief of obtaining official status are often soon eclipsed by 
new challenges and anxieties associated with the governance practices that begin to 
regulate refugees’ lives thereafter. The first of these that I will attend to is the Danish 
policy of dispersal, which assigns new official recognized refugees a geographic location 
where they are mandated to live for the following five years13. While this policy 
                                                 
13 The dispersal policy regulates where newly accepted refugees are required to live. It stipulates that 
refugees are required to live in an assigned municipality for a five-year period. This dispersal practice is 
organized through a quota system, where each municipality receives a certain number of refugees every 
year depending on the total number of refugees who need a placement and size of the pre-existing ethnic 
minority population. For instance, for several years the quota for specific municipalities such as 
Copenhagen, Albertslund, and Høje-taastrup has been zero because the Danish state has identified that 
these municipalities have an existing high rate of ethnic minorities. This means that refugees cannot be 
placed in such municipalities. The aim of the dispersal policy and quota system is to distribute refugee 
evenly throughout the country in order to prevent refugees from ending up living in so-called urban ethnic 
‘ghettos’. The dispersal policy is often justified by politicians in terms of the need to geographically 
distribute the financial ‘burden’ of refugees (Wren 2003) as well as enabling refugees to get immersed in an 
ethnically Danish local community (Larsen 2011). As such, the dispersal policy is based on the assumption 
that living in a small ethnically Danish community will facilitate ‘integration’ and reduce the right of social 
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disperses refugees geographically, one of its principle consequences is a sense of 
physical containment. I here understand containment not in the sense of a form of spatial 
confinement analogous to detention but instead in terms of diversions and disruptions of 
refugees possibilities for physical movement (Tazzioli 2018) within Denmark. As such, I 
argue that dispersal of refugees in Denmark is a technique of governing that regulates 
where refugees can live and actively differentiates refugees from other residents as this 
policy is only applied to newly accepted refugees. 
My focus group participants usually talked about the day that they were officially 
granted refugee protection status in Denmark while making references to being governed 
and disciplined in various ways. Mahmoud’s story is one such example. After receiving 
several threats from the Syrian security forces, Mahmoud, a 45-year old married man 
with three teenage sons, left his family behind in Damascus to seek refuge in Europe. In 
the early days of January 2014, Mahmoud arrived to Denmark where he went through 
two 6-8 hour-long interviews with the Danish Immigration Service, lived in three 
different asylum centers, was not allowed to work, and depended entirely on his meagre 
cash allowance from the Danish state (Jacobsen 2016), while the Danish authorities 
considered his asylum case. After 10 months of waiting for his asylum case to be 
determined, in November 2014, Mahmoud received the good news that he had been 
granted refugee status in Denmark. It was a big relief for him to finally be granted 
refugee protection and be able to begin life in Denmark. Yet, the letter from the Danish 
Immigration Service, which stated that the Danish state had granted refugee protection to 
                                                                                                                                                 
and economic marginalization. However, research has shown that refugees’ lack of a social networks and 
access to other kinsmen can have serious implications for refugees’ ability to establish a new life (Larsen 
2011; Olwig 2011). The dispersal policy has been in place since 1999 when the Danish Integration Act 
(Integrationsloven) was first introduced.  
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Mahmoud, also stipulated conditions: according to the Danish Integration Act’s 
(Integrationsloven) Chapter Three “Housing of refugees” (boligplacering af flygtninge) - 
also known as dispersal policy (Larsen 2011) - Mahmoud was required to move from his 
current accommodation - an asylum center located close to the Danish-German border - 
to Vidi, a small Danish island, where he was to reside for the duration of the mandatory 
integration program. Mahmoud expressed surprise about this decision. In his second 
interview with the Danish Immigration Service, a caseworker had asked him if there was 
an area of Denmark where he would prefer to live. Mahmoud had informed this 
caseworker that he would like to live close to his nephew who was settled in northern 
Jutland. Yet, for reasons unknown, the Danish Immigration Service decided to require 
Mahmoud to reside on this small island of approximately 40,000 residents – a place that 
Mahmoud had never heard of until he received this letter. He believed that he was one of 
the first Syrian refugees to be re-located there.  
For Mahmoud, then, obtaining refuge in Denmark still did not bring him the 
freedom he had aspired to, at least not the freedom to move to a place of his own 
choosing that was closer to his only relative in Denmark. As a newly recognized refugee, 
Mahmoud was forced to reside in this area for the duration of the mandatory “integration 
program” – a period that was three years when Mahmoud initially received protection 
status, but which got extended retroactively to five years in July 1, 2016 (Udlændinge- og 
Integrationsministeriet 2016). In reflecting on his life on the island, Mahmoud noted that 




Mahmoud: I requested to live closer to my family, but ended up far away 
from them. It cost me a lot of money to visit them. I asked the 
municipality here if they could move me [to the municipality of his 
relative], they said that it is not possible because of the rules. I want to ask 
you a question: if I was Danish would I be able to move?  
Author: yes 
Mahmoud: why is it that we as refugees, we cannot move, we cannot 
breathe, we cannot… How is it acceptable? 
 
Mahmoud’s account of the dispersal policy illustrates how refuge is a site of governance; 
Mahmoud was not free to decide where he wanted to live. As such this policy notably 
constrained Mahmoud’s “freedom”, as he put it his ability to “breathe”. Mahmoud as 
well as other refugees emphasized that despite living in Denmark they did not experience 
the same freedoms that Danish residents and other migrants enjoyed. They were not free 
to move to a different community if they so desired and where they could work towards 
creating the life they had dreamed of. Thus, for some refugees, the dispersal program 
means that they have to live in an area that lacks social and family networks and support 
services, often vital to establish a life in refuge (Larsen 2011; Huizinga and van Hoven 
2018).  
While the dispersal policy necessarily constrains refugees’ freedom by mandating 
where they will live, the Syrians I spoke with frequently made note of the particular 
regions, towns, and cities where they were assigned, namely rural, isolated and 
economically depressed communities. In describing their everyday lives, these Syrian 
refugees referenced the challenges of living in these places as they struggled to find jobs. 
For instance, Yasin, who was in his early 30s, and Bashir and Ghazi, who were both in 
their 40s, had all been relocated to the small rural town of Ryhuse with approximately 
4,500 residents, a town marked by population decline and economic deprivation. While 
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the three men were all from Aleppo, they did not know each other before they got 
relocated to Ryhuse. In a focus group conversation, the three men talked about the 
difficulties of being forced to live in this community because of the remoteness of the 
town combined with the lack of employment opportunities:  
Yasin: there is no work! It is tiring; the refugee suffers from this issue, 
especially here in the isolated places. 
Ghazi: there is no work! One needs to go to the big cities like Odense, 
Århus, or Copenhagen to find work.  
 
Yasin, Bashir, and Ghazi all explained to me that they had never experienced being 
unemployed before coming to Denmark. Yasin was a trained electrician who had worked 
in Egypt and Libya before returning to Aleppo to open his own business, Bashir used to 
work as a salesman for a beverage company, while Ghazi had owned a grocery store. At 
the municipality’s job-center, Yasin, Bashir, and Ghazi had been told by their case 
worker to apply for full-time jobs and make sure to register the jobs they had applied for 
on their individual job-monitoring site, so that the municipality could insure that they 
were actively seeking jobs. The three men emphasized that they had done everything in 
their capacity to find a job in their local area, including participating in unpaid internships 
at the three different grocery stores (Netto, Spar, and Fakta) where their job was mainly 
to re-stock the store, collaborating with the job-center which includes participating in a 
monthly mandatory meeting with their casework, seminars about writing a good job 
application, job interviews, and how to find a job in Denmark, and organized tours to 
visiting companies, and sending out job applications on their own initiative to companies 
in the surrounding area for almost two years at the time I conducted this focus group. Yet, 
their efforts were in vain, leading Yasin and Ghazi to believe that there were simply no 
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jobs to be had in the area where they lived. They described their community as one that 
had suffered from a sharp population decline brought about by social and economic 
deprivation, disinvestment, and where the only employment opportunities were seasonal 
jobs in the tourist industry, which illustrates Wren’s (2003) findings about how dispersal 
programs often result in residential and social segregation of refugees into areas 
characterized by social and economic deprivation. 
Yasin, Ghazi, and Bashir were perplexed by the Danish state’s decision to re-
locate refugees to rural areas without employment opportunities:  
Yasin: They [the government] know that in these remote areas there is no 
work 
Ghazi: Why do they send us here?! 
 
Ghazi further explained how being forced to live in this town put him and other refugees 
in an impossible situation: “Frankly, I do not have the ability to go there [to the big 
cities]. To be honest, I do not have the financial ability to go to these areas. It is a catch-
22. If you go out you lose, if you stay you lose. What can you do?” Ghazi thereby 
referenced how although the dispersal policy did not necessarily prevent him from 
traveling geographically to find employment, the high costs of such travel in effect 
precluded him from being able to access potential job opportunities beyond his assigned 
town. Because he was not allowed to move to another place, he was stuck in this town, 
unable to change his situation and slowly sliding into poverty, something he had never 
previously experienced in Syria.  
Ghazi’s experiences highlight some of the inherent contradictions between the 
state’s aim to encourage refugees to seek jobs while at the same time preventing Ghazi 
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and others from moving to the larger urban areas where jobs were more easily available 
(Larsen 2011). In addition to reflecting on the absurdities of the dispersal policy and its 
overtly counter-productive nature, Syrians’ accounts of this policy also make visible 
another of its less obvious repercussions, namely how it began to constitute relations of 
dependency. It is worth emphasizing here how, through the dispersal policy, able-bodied 
former business-minded people (former business owners and a salesman) were rendered 
into the subjects most vilified by Danish right-wing political parties, namely the needy 
refugee subject who is becoming an undue ‘burden’ on the Danish welfare state. As the 
discussion among Ghazi, Yasin, and Bashir illustrates, they found themselves 
exasperated trying to actively prevent themselves from sliding into such positions.  
 
Financial Coercion 
For Syrian refugees, who participated in this study, feelings of fear, worry, and anxiety 
continued even after they obtained refugee protection. For instance, in a focus group 
conversation, Nidal, a 52-year old man who used to work as an Arabic language 
instructor in Damascus, insisted that I wrote down the following words: “psychological 
worry” and “anxiety”, as he began to narrate his experience with the integration 
allowance (integrationsydelse), a social welfare allowance specifically designed for 
refugees. Nidal and other refugees were entitled to receive this allowance until they 
obtained a full-time or livable-wage job. Yet, in order to receive this allowance, refugees 
had to fulfill the requirements of the mandatory integration program, outlined above. 
Nidal’s anxiety, he claimed, was a direct outgrowth of the conditional nature of this 
allowance: if he and other refugees failed to attend any of these ongoing requirements, 
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the municipality could respond with legal or financial sanctions, most often a reduction of 
their monthly integration allowance (see below).  
The economic insecurity brought about by the strings attached to the integration 
allowance system left other Syrian refugees similarly anxious, stressed, and worried.  In a 
focus group discussion with Maya, 20 year-old from Homs, Muna, 31 year-old university 
student from Damascus, Salma, in her mid-50s school teacher from Tartus, and Sara, 30 
year-old mother of three children from Hama, all four women talked about the many 
obligations related to the integration allowance and the integration program. Maya, 
Muna, Salma, and Sara shared their frustrations with the fact that they always had to be 
somewhere attending mandatory language classes, job training, internship, or a meeting 
with their caseworker, their integration mentor, their housing adviser, or the citizen 
service center.  
For instance, Maya, who worked 30 hours per week in a discount supermarket as 
part of a job training program while taking mandatory Danish language classes three 
evenings a week, said: “When I have a meeting, I get stressed. [I feel] fear and horror”. 
Maya continued to explain that she was actually more worried about missing a meeting 
with one of her caseworkers or mentors at the municipality regarding her integration 
program and allowance, than about what took place during the actual meeting itself. As a 
result, Maya found that receiving mail was stressful because it could be a letter from the 
municipality regarding a mandatory meeting. Maya explained “if I get mail, I start 
kissing the hands of this and that person, begging for their help”. This quote reflects 
Maya’s sense of desperation in both anticipating some new piece of bad news in the mail 
(a notification of a disciplinary action, an appointment, etc.) and the inability to even 
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fully grasp the meaning of these messages without assistance from others. While Maya’s 
Danish language skills were quite good, she still felt that she depended on the help of 
volunteers who assisted refugees with translating letters and other legal documents at the 
community center, to fully understand these letters (because they were most often written 
in Danish and a technical and judicial language) and insure that she was not going to miss 
a meeting.  
In addition to receiving mail, Maya explained how the fear and worry of missing 
a meeting also made her nervous about catching the correct train that would take her to 
the location of a meeting. Because if she did not catch the right train, she feared she 
would miss her meeting and thus have her allowance reduced. Maya further explained 
that she consequently had developed a habit of staring at the sign that indicated which 
train would arrive next. Yet, ironically sometimes she even missed the train because she 
was so occupied worrying about whether or not it was the correct train. As Maya 
explained how this state practice influenced her daily life, she stated:  
We worry and fear about that if we make a mistake will we get marked 
absent. So this thing [integration allowance system] affected me; their 
mails, their meetings. This is a thing that really affected me mentally. I 
cannot understand that I stay afraid and worried. Even if I take the right 
train I continue to be worried and afraid.  
 
Maya’s fear and stress caused by these meetings and the allowance system manifested 
itself in embodied ways. I observed this, for instance, when Maya asked me for help with 
translating letters for the municipality, Maya’s body was tense and her smile and kind 
way of being was be replaced by an nervous and concerned look.    
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Maya’s experience illustrates the ways in which Syrians experienced ‘the state’ 
daily through being subject to the conditions attached to the integration allowance. For 
Maya, Nidal, and other Syrian refugees, who depend on the integration allowance as their 
only income, the presence of state was materialized in intimate ways through the fear of 
missing a meeting, worries about catching the right train, and anxiety about 
understanding official letters – all related to the risk of having one’s integration 
allowance reduced. Thus, Syrian refugees encountered the Danish state daily in embodied 
and intimate ways that were often invisible to others, yet were experienced as ever-
present, cruel, and intrusive. Furthermore, Maya and Nidal’s experiences illustrate how 
forms of subjection underwritten by forms of mandated economic dependency multiply 
and morph into new subjectivities such as the constant feeling of anxiety and fear of 
having one’s meagre allowances cut further.  
Yet, Syrian refugees’ also mentioned how the integration allowance system was 
carried out in such a way that made them feel distrusted, particularly in the relation to the 
practice of whether or not the allowance should be cut. Sara, who was almost ten years 
older than Maya, called attention to the fact that in order for her and other refugees to be 
marked absent without having one’s allowance reduced they not only had to have a 
‘legitimate’ reason but also had to be able to document such legitimate reason, for 
example with an authorized note from a doctor. As a mother of three small children who 
were sick now and then as small children often are, Sara had become rather frustrated 




for example, if you have a baby and he gets sick, you see that he is ill but 
you don't need to take him to the doctor. But he is sick”. They [the 
municipality] say “bring me a report that he is sick”. How can you bring a 
report that he is sick when you did not take him to a doctor. This is 
difficult to understand! 
 
Sara further explained that when she tried to tell the caseworker that there was no need to 
take her child to the doctor because he was not sick enough or that by the time she was 
able to get an appointment with the doctor the child was well again, the caseworker said 
just responded: “NO, you should bring a report!” Salma, Maya, and Muna contributed to 
the conversation by stating that they felt that this was a sign of distrust: 
Salma: They don't believe us 
Sara: [They say]: “have you gone to the doctor? When will he give you 
the report?” Your absence is noted in your record and you cannot do 
anything! This is the struggle.  
Muna: They don't trust you, they discredit you. 
Maya: They do not believe us. 
 
Sara found this practice of showing documentation rather annoying and hard to make 
sense of; its rigidity and the requirement of going to a doctor even though there was not 
always a need to see a doctor. Within this system, Salma, Muna, Maya, and Sara found 
that their words were discredited as a way to establish the truth of their absence. Example 
after example had shown the four women as well as other refugees that those in power – 
the municipality – were able to withhold their integration allowance at will. If refugees 
did not provide the required documents their cash allowance would be reduced, no matter 
what their story was. As Sara explained, an official note was necessary in order to verify 
the validity of their account, illustrating the trend of growing suspicion, skepticism, and 
mistrust towards refugees (Fassin 2013). Not only did this unwarranted skepticism make 
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Sara, Salma, Muna, and Maya feel degraded, frustrated, and upset, it also illustrates, I 
argue, how the system works in intimate ways as it diminishes and discredits them as 
sources of knowledge. Thus, while the integration allowance system works to discipline 
the refugee, it also (re)produces a system through which the refugee subject is deprived 
of the ability to advocate for themselves even in the most basic of senses such as 
‘explaining’ their absences, illnesses and other basic needs like medical care.   
Yet, Syrian refugees by no means accepted these new subject positions passively 
or willingly. Rather, many of the Syrians I spoke with began to question whether or not 
this system of providing them aid (integration allowance) was indeed genuinely 
‘humanitarian’. Talking about the system, which was ostensibly supposed to support 
them – i.e. that it was even an act of aid or ‘humanitarianism’ – Syrians called attention 
to how the integration allowance system punished them financially and foreclosed any 
reasonable negotiations for exceptions to disciplinary sanctions to punish ‘bad’ behavior. 
For instance, Salma, who used to work as a school teacher in Syria yet struggled to find a 
job in Denmark, expressed how she found the integration allowance system unjust and 
incoherent:   
We don’t want their aid or assistance. This is not protection. Until now, 
we live under their injustice. If you are absent, your money (integration 
allowance) is cut (...). There are many things like this. That is why we 
WANT to work, in order to feel like we are real human beings. 
 
Salma here expressed her reticence to accept aid at all and how living under this system 
of “allowance” was fundamentally dehumanizing. Welfare program such as the 
integration allowance is often represented by mainstream media and political discourses 
as a noble act of welfare given by the state to assist a vulnerable population who is new to 
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the Danish society and labor market (Regeringen 2016). Yet, Salma here pointed out how 
she and other refugees found the integration system as a form of injustice, where they 
were being punished if they could not perform according to the rule. Salma further 
rejected the need for the state’s assistance and care, rejected the “gift of freedom” 
(Nguyen 2012). As long as they were subject to the rules and degradation of this system, 
Salma and other participants insisted, they were not “real human beings” in Salma’s 
rendering. 
In a similar vein, during our conversation about the integration allowance, Nidal 
recounted how he took a day off from the required activities without having a so-called 
legitimate excuse of absence: “I took a day off at my own free will in order to make 
myself feel that I am free”. Yet this indulgence of ‘freedom’ came at a cost. The next 
month the municipality deducted a sum of money from his integration allowance, which 
meant that Nidal struggled to get through the month financially. Nidal recognized that he 
had broken the rules of the allowance system. Yet, the sanction imposed on him for 
violating these rules led him to questioning the (liberal) normative underpinning of the 
system itself:  
I admit that I broke the law but […] should I get punished in this way? 
What has become of the humanitarian aspect? Is this person who is 
responsible for me [Nidal’s caseworker] supporting me or working against 
me? Even if I broke the law, where is humanity? 
  
Here, Nidal implicitly posed a central question that many of my informants similarly 
grappled with: was the withholding of the integration allowance an expression of true 
humanitarianism or its violation? While Nidal clearly subscribed to the idea of 
humanitarianism and self-identified as a refugee who deserved to be protected and treated 
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according to its principles, his experiences with the integration system brought 
‘humanitarianism’ and claims to ‘humanity’ into question.  
Nidal’s set of questions is an example of how Syrians do not just accept the rules 
and terms of the integration system but rather start to question the purpose and intentions 
of a system that claims to assist them. I suggest that through these questions, Nidal as 
well as Salma start to call into question “the given order of things” (Feldman 2012, 162) 
– the giving order of the integration system and how it operates – starting to produce a 




Syrian refugees routinely expressed deep wishes to become economically independent 
and thereby free themselves from the conditional integration allowance system outlined 
above. Many of the Syrian refugees, who I engaged with on a daily or weekly basis for 
this project were thus very happy when they were able to share with me that the 
municipality had declared them “jobparat” (job ready) and found them three-month 
internship placements. While these internships were unpaid, my informants told me that 
their caseworkers at the municipal job-center and their employers had stated clearly that 
if they did well, they would likely be able to obtain full-time employment at the end the 
internship-period. As such, caseworkers and employers told refugees that their current 
dependency on integration allowance was only temporary situation and that participating 




Syrian refugees’ experiences of unemployment were for the most part neither 
temporary nor exceptional situations. As the three-month unpaid internship came to an 
end, many of my informants expressed frustration that they did not get hired. Instead, 
they were told that either the company was no longer looking to hire more employees or 
that they did not quite possess the Danish language proficiency or skills required for the 
job. As Rami, who was in his mid-50s and eager to get a job so he could provide for his 
eight children, explained: “they said: ‘you still need a bit more training’”, recounting the 
numerous times employers and caseworkers had told him that he would not get hired. In a 
similar vein, Omar, who had worked for the postal service in Syria, explained that at first 
he had been very optimistic about the prospect of obtaining a job through the internship 
program. He had not said no to a single internship placement, he had worked hard at 
discount stores and cleaned hospitals in these placements. Omar felt that he had made 
several sacrifices including working night shifts, spending long work-days mainly on his 
feet, worked in cold storage rooms, and performing heavy lifting duties even though he 
was suffering from back pain and a chronic heart condition. As he emphasized to me, he 
had done his best to be what he thought made a good employee. Yet, after having 
participated in several internships that did never materialized in a job, Omar’s optimism, 
hope, and trust in this system began to steadily erode. When I asked Omar how these 
experiences made him feel, he said:  
I need to go and work for free! The refugee tolerates all of these pressures 
but nobody understands his situation. It is as if I hit you and after I hit you, 
I smile to you. Is this smile an honest smile or is it fake? I sometimes ask 




Omar thus described how he was frustrated with this mandatory internship program. 
Omar felt that he as well as other refugees were being taken advantage of by providing 
“free labor” to these companies without getting anything in return other than the meagre 
integration allowance, which they struggled to survive on. While Omar felt pressured to 
accept internship placement in undesirable jobs such as cleaning and work night shifts, he 
did not complain about the nature of the work itself. Indeed, early on in these roles he 
believed in the promise that such internships would lead to stable a job. As such Omar 
was disciplined into performing the role of the ‘good refugee’ (Nguyen 2012), requiring 
that he be thankful for internship placement in undesirable jobs and the opportunity to be 
offered a job, which never arrived. However, in his remark (“I hit you and after I hit you, 
I smile to you”) Omar additionally underscored the pain, humiliation, and sense of 
duplicity that came with providing one’s free labor to these companies when these 
internships never materialized. In questioning whether this smile was genuine or fake, 
Omar started to consider that the companies - where he had been an intern - might never 
have had any intention of hiring him in the first place; they just wanted his ‘free labor’, 
which came at virtually no wage costs to the companies participating in these internship 
programs. Thus while Omar played the role of the ‘good refugee’ as best he could his 
experience of the internship program as a form of disciplining and exploitation led him to 
question whether or not performing this subject position would ultimately chart a path 
forward.    
Like Rami and Omar, almost all of my informants recounted strikingly similar 
experiences of participating in several unpaid internships at different companies -- as they 
finish one they are assigned to the next -- only to be deemed ‘not quite ready’ for a full-
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time position but more than ready for another unpaid internship. With the completion of 
each of these unpaid internships, the municipality recurrently failed to place refugees in a 
job with any real prospect for full-time employment and merely re-located them to the 
next position of ‘free labor’. They openly charged that this reflected racism against them, 
particularly in light of observing Danes being hired to permanent jobs at the very 
companies that denied them employment. Rather than improving their chances of 
obtaining full-time employment by gaining new skills, each placement in an unpaid 
internship Syrians felt that they instead merely kept them in the captivity of the Danish 
welfare state and some lost faith in the internship altogether.  
Many of the Syrians who I engaged with, however, tried to avoid any 
confrontations with the municipality because it was in charge of their housing, controlled 
their cash allowance, and arranged internships. Furthermore, many did not feel 
comfortable criticizing the Danish state. For example, in response to Rami’s comment 
about the internship program mentioned above, Nizar stated: “I in my personal opinion, I 
owe it for the rest of my life. This country has done me a favor. I owe them [Denmark] 
because they let me in”. Nizar felt that he as a refugee was not in a position to complain 
or critique the Danish state and the internship program and he tried to reorient the focus 
group conversation with expressing his gratitude to Denmark. Similarly, many of the 
participants ensured me that they were very thankful to Denmark for having provided 
them refuge, illustrating how refugees knew quite well that they were expected to show 
gratitude (Nguyen 2012), rather than express demands for rights (Fassin 2012). 
Yet, not all the Syrian refugees, who I engaged with, remained silent or passive. 
While some remained hopeful that trainings, language courses, and other mandatory 
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programs would eventually lead to more stable employment, these recurring experiences 
of feeling deceived and let down by these false promises of betterment—always in sight 
but just out of reach—led many to be highly skeptical and cynical of Danish officials’ 
promises and intentions. After having participated in several unpaid internship without 
seeing any sign of full-time employment, Rami was determined to call out the injustice of 
this system: 
I said this to the jobcentre: “you are sending slaves to companies without 
monitoring, you are just sitting at your offices”. I said to him [the 
jobcentre representative]: “why are you making the language an excuse?” 
There are people who slit their own throats working [dedicating 
themselves fully to the internship], it is true that they do not know the 
language very well but they are killing themselves with work, and they are 
working, and in the end you make the language your excuse! 
  
Rami here stepped out of the role of the refugee who is supposed to be passive, 
permissive, and grateful, as he contested the idea that the job training through internships 
is an act of assistance provided by the state to help them become part of the Danish labor 
market. In doing so, Rami also explicitly called out how Syrians’ language barriers were 
being weaponized against them as a convenient “excuse” to continue exploiting their 
labor for free and without ever granting employment. In this sense, Rami reflected on the 
widely-commented on “double-bind” of Danish so-called “integration” programs: “‘You 
are not ready to become integrated until you are like us, and you will not prove that you 
are like us until you are integrated’” (Sjørslev 2011, 83; also see Rytter 2018). 
While Rami’s transgression did not prove any material beneficial, he had begun to 
address the injustice of the system, illustrating how he and others were very aware that 
the promise of a job through the internship program as a false promise. To Rami, it was 
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abundantly clear that he would not obtain a full-time job through this system not matter 
how hard he worked because the companies never had any intentions of hiring him and 
other refugees. As his account illustrates, Rami had seen example after example of how 
he and other Syrian refugees had worked really hard, done everything they could to be a 
good employee, or to use Rami’s own words “there are people who slit their own throats 
working”, only to be told once again that they are not quite ready or qualified for a full-
time job. Deliberately using the word “slaves”, Rami indicated how he felt that this 
system was taking advantage of his and other refugees’ labor.  
The internship program was framed by the Danish government, the 
municipalities, the caseworkers, and the employers as way to help Syrians and other 
refugees enter the Danish labor market and achieve economic independence as quickly as 
possible (Regeringen 2016). However, as Syrian refugees’ experiences illustrate these 
workfare initiatives where not without violence. Similar to other workfare schemes, the 
internship program allowed employers to exploit Syrian refugees. Workfare, as Burnett 
and Whyte (2017, 63) explain “contains within it the seeds of an abuse of power – the 
power to force people to work harder”. In the case of the internship program designed for 
refugees in Denmark, the employers were able to exploit 1) the fear of having the 
integration allowance sanction if a refugee did not comply with the rules and 2) refugees’ 
hope of obtaining a full-time job after the internship ended. Similar to other workfare 
schemes, the violence at play within the internship program was violence not as 
‘exceptional’ or ‘unusual’ events but ordinary and mundane processes that Syrians 
experienced daily through feelings of humiliation, exploitation and vilification.  
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If we conceptualize “conditions” as “the very geographies of being” as per Laurie 
and Shaw (2018, 8) then this enables us to grapple with both “the existential resources 
that nourish and sustain, but also harm and violate”. Indeed, as I have shown above, the 
government of refuge shapes the underlying conditions that characterize everyday lives 
of refugees, exerts disciplinary mechanism through practices that might otherwise be 
defined as nourishing and life-giving. These conditions work both by limiting refugee 
potentialities to build lives and families, seek employment, and cope with the ongoing 
connections to military violence in Syria. But it also functions to limit these potentialities 
through subjecting Syrian refugees into performing roles and occupying the positions 
most commonly mobilized to stigmatize and dehumanize refugees in the increasingly and 
ever more naked forms of resurgent xenophobia across Europe.  
To be sure, some Syrians did find full-time employment but not necessarily 
through the job-training programs or with the help of the jobcenter. For example, several 
participants living the more rural areas of Denmark sought to free themselves from this 
regime of workfare by opening their own business such as a food truck and grocery stores 
while participants living in Copenhagen used informal networks to obtain employment.   
 
Conclusion 
The term refuge connotes things that we typically believe to be good, such as relief, 
safety, and betterment. In exploring how Syrian refugees experience of lived refuge in 
Denmark, this chapter has challenged this self-evidence. Syrian refugees’ experiences 
illustrate three main sets of dissonances between the idealized notions of refuge and its 
lived articulations. First, although the liberal conception of refuge promises freedom to 
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refugees fleeing violence and persecution, once in Denmark, Syrian refugees were hardly 
free to choose how and where to live. As a result they experienced refuge as a form of 
spatial dispersal that constrained their economic opportunities and produced feelings of 
isolation. Second, Syrian refugees frequently emphasized that although the ‘aid’ they 
received in order to meet basic needs was given (or at least rationalized) under the 
auspices of humanitarian objectives, it was hardly ‘free’. Not only was the access to this 
aid conditional on certain types of ‘good’ behavior on the part of refugees; Syrians’ 
efforts to ‘prove’ reasons for exceptions to this code of conduct effectively discredited 
them and rendered them objects of additional surveillance and suspicion. And as a result, 
receiving the so-called integration allowance rendered them in a perpetual state of anxiety 
with little to no sense of security. As Salma emphasized “this is not protection!”. Finally, 
although the (neo-)liberal promise of self-sufficiency and betterment through 
employment was held out as a prospect through various forms of job training and 
temporary internships ostensibly leading to stable work if refugees could demonstrate 
‘good’ behavior and certain skills, full-time work proved perpetually elusive. In short, 
through their accounts of lived refuge, my Syrian informants rendered the lofty claims 
embedded in the liberal promise of refuge as questionable, if not entirely empty. 
As I have shown the provision of refuge (re)produces particular conditions that 
are not visible outside of the experiences of refugees themselves. Attending to refugees’ 
lived experiences of these conditions and crucially their efforts to make sense of them, 
however, shows that these conditions are not accidents, unintended consequences, or 
shortcomings of idealized version of refuge. Rather, they represent the logical 
consequences of the government of refuge in its contemporary form. Its core practices 
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(dispersal, integration allowance, integration program, and job-training) are specifically 
applied to refugees because they are categorized by the state as “newly accepted 
refugees”, but not to Danish citizens or permanent residents. As such, I argue that the 
sovereign decision to grant a person refuge is not simply an event but an ongoing practice 
of subjection that establishes and consolidates a particular relationship that continues to 
structure the experience of lived refuge and reproduces experiences of fear, worry, 
anxiety, and injustice that structure, even define, refugees’ lives. Furthermore, I argue 
that the conditions, which characterize lived refuge, are actively administered in ways 
that (re)produce refugee subjectivities. Yet, Syrian refugees’ actively perform, negotiate, 






























WAR AND REFUGE: SYRIAN REFUGEES’ JOURNEY FOR SAFETY 
Introduction 
Within liberal narratives of war and refuge, the two remain rather separated. There is an 
assumption that war is “over there”, distinct from the space of refuge and that 
experiences of war do not exist within refuge. Similarly, when I began this dissertation 
research, war was not at the center of my conceptualization of refuge and refugee 
protection. Rather, I was thinking about war more in terms of that which had caused 
Syrians to flee their homes, cross international borders, and seek refuge in various 
countries across the world. I was expecting to hear how the Syrian Civil War and its 
violence and atrocities continued to haunt Syrians who had been able to escape Syria and 
obtain refuge elsewhere. And I did. But these were rarely stories of leaving war behind. 
Instead, as I show below, these stories emphasize the impossibility of separating life in 
exile from life under war, in refugee camps, and the cities in countries of first asylum 
where family members and friends continue to live.  
My informants’ accounts of their everyday lives in Denmark were laden with 
recurring references to a different kind of war, a war that was located, experienced, and 
fought in Denmark. My informants repeatedly referred to this war as ḥarb nafsīa (نفسية 
 ,”meaning “to fight ,(حرب) ḥarb is a noun and comes from the Arabic root ḥariba .(َحْرب
“to combat”, “to battle”, and “to wage war” (Cowan 1994, 195). As a noun, ḥarb can be 
translated into the English word “war”. While nafsīa comes from the Arabic root nafs 
 meaning “self”, “soul”, “spirit”, “mind”, “psyche”, and “human being”. Nafs can ,(نفس)
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be used to indicate a person’s own-self, which can be translated to the English word 
“self” or “soul”. Nafs can also be used to refer to a specific part of a person’s self that has 
a desire, anger, and passion, which some might call the ego in English (Cowan 1994, 
1155). Nafs is not part of the rūh, which is considered the inner or spiritual part of a 
person’s creation (Moid 2010). Rather, nafs is part of the physical human being, our 
physical self. Thus, nafs can refer to the human soul or the human person as a whole. 
There is no English term to which we can directly translate ḥarb nafsīa. Based on the 
meaning of the two words, one might assume that ḥarb nafsīa denotes an internal war, 
personal war against one's self and one’s desire, such as to overcome temptations, 
desires, and bad habits. Yet, in Arabic such war is known as jihad al-nāfs (Sharif 2018). 
In this context and the ways in which Syrian refugees used ḥarb nafsīa, I suggest that it 
refers to a war on and against the soul, the mind, and the existence of a person, a human 
being, and/or the Syrian self. As I explain further below, Syrian refugees usually used 
ḥarb nafsīa when they talked about how they felt that the Danish state was waging a war 
against them. ḥarb nafsīa, Syrian refugees explained, was a different kind of war than the 
war in Syria because it did not include physical violence (bombs, air strikes, etc.). Rather, 
ḥarb nafsīa was a war that was felt in the mind and experienced by Syrians as an attack 
on their soul and existence. Syrian refugees used the term to describe their personal and 
collective struggles as refugees in Denmark, a place marked by anti-immigrant discourses 
and state practices seeking to directly deter and limit refugee immigration. As such, 
Syrian refugees’ usage of the term ḥarb nafsīa (َحْرب نفسية) indicated the presence of war 
within the everyday lived realities of refuge. In the following, I will continue to rely on 
the Arabic term in order to preserve its meaning and complexity.  
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In this chapter, I argue that the complicated and overlapping existence of war 
within refuge necessitates rethinking a broader set of questions, including where war 
takes place and what counts as refuge. I attend to how war is at play in refugees’ 
journeys. The ‘refugee journey’ not only includes physical travel between sites and 
across geographic space but is also a form of narrative through which Syrian refugees 
reckon with their experiences of war and unfulfilled expectations of refuge. This 
approach is instructive in furthering geographic conceptualizations of war/not-war and 
their relations to forced migration and refuge in a number of ways. First, it continues to 
trouble the clear demarcation and associated binaries between war/peace, 
violence/security. Second, it calls attention to how refugees themselves draw on and 
mobilize geographical imaginations and knowledges of war, violence, and safety as they 
try to make new lives as ‘refugees’. Third, attending to these experiences not only 
enables us to challenge the idealized notion of refuge as a space beyond war and 
violence, but to also examine how spaces of war and refuge stretch and fold into one 
another, in topological sense of space (Allen 2011; Martin and Secor 2014).  
This chapter proceeds as follows: I first outline geographical literature on the 
migration journey and bring it into conversations with insights from critical refugee 
studies and debates within geography about the nature and location of war. Second, I give 
a brief description of the nature of Syrian refugees’ journeys from Syria to Denmark and 
describe the data that I am drawing on in this chapter. Third, I examine how Syrians 
experiences of refuge continue to be imbricated with references to war and violence. In 
the final section, I discuss how Syrians’ encounters with lived refuge and continued 
experiences of war trouble imaginations of refuge.  
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Refugee Migration: War and Refuge  
The refugee journey is often depicted as a linear transition from unsafe to safe space, 
including a timeline from ‘being’ a refugee/asylum seeker to holding a residence permit 
(temporary or permanent) to becoming a citizen. In such accounts, each phase allegedly 
brings the refugee closer to greater stability (Tang 2015). However, recent scholarship 
within critical refugee studies and geography have begun to unsettle such accounts by 
illustrating how the refugee journey – or journeys to be more accurate – are often multi-
directional and characterized by chaos, confusion, messiness, and fragmentation. 
Focusing on a range of different migrant groups, geographers have shown how migrants’ 
movement are produced, facilitated, slowed down, and blocked (Collyer 2007; Innes 
2016; Kaytaz 2016; Schapendonk et al. 2018), demonstrating the ways in which 
migration trajectories often do not follow “the conventional order of uprooting-
movement-regrounding” (Schapendonk and Steel 2014). These observations resonate 
with Loyd et al.'s (2018, 380) recent argument that “refugee migrations, rather than being 
a linear trajectory from unsafe to safe spaces, are embodied, nonlinear and spatially 
folded”. Through their focus on the role of PTSD in the administration of refugee 
resettlement, Loyd et al. (2018) have mapped the spatial as well as temporal intimate 
connectivities between geopolitical spaces of war and peace. These insights not only 
disrupt conventional geographical imaginations of (refugee) migration, but Loyd et al. 
also unsettle closely related assumptions that war is “over there” and peace is “here”.  
This resonates with recent research within critical refugee studies that has 
addressed the linkages between war, rescue, and refuge. Bringing together refugee studies 
and war studies, Yên Lê Espiritu (2014), for example, has exposed the geopolitical 
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conditions that produce mass displacement and shape refugee migration. Espiritu tells the 
story of Vietnamese refugees’ flight to the United States in 1975, illustrating not only 
how this group of refugees was itself a product of U.S. war but also how the United 
States’ rescue and liberation mission of Vietnamese refugees – a seemingly humanitarian 
operation – only became possible by U.S. military colonialism and destruction in 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Guam, and California. Additionally, these rescue operations 
enabled the United States to represent itself as a benevolent rescuer and savior of 
Vietnamese people, thereby helping to justify and legitimate the U.S. military 
intervention in Vietnam. Using the conjoined term “militarized refuge(es)”, Espiritu 
argues that refuge and refugees are “co-constitutive” and a product of militarism and 
colonialism. In this reading then, ‘refuge’ is inextricably linked to war and violence. 
Refuge is a product of colonial war and military violence rather than a response to it.  
In a similar vein, both Mimi Thi Nguyen (2012) and Eric Tang (2015) have 
argued that refugee resettlement might better be understood as a continuation of warfare, 
rather than an end to it. Focusing on Cambodian refugees who were resettled in New 
York in the wake of the U.S. war in Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge genocide, Tang 
documented how resettlement in the United States is marked by wretched housing 
conditions and evictions, punitive welfare programs, unabated in-work poverty, and 
criminalization of everyday life. Yet, Tang’s work is not merely another story of refugee 
suffering that highlights the failures and hardships entailed in resettlement. Instead, Tang 
situates these seemingly new forms of displacement, captivity, and state violence in 
resettlement as part of liberal warfare – i.e. “liberal war perpetrates violence that it claims 
is incidental to its exercise of power to free others from a named enemy who is in their 
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midst” (Nguyen 2012, 20). In this way, Tang illustrates how Cambodian refugees 
experience their resettlement to the United States not as a moment of transition to a better 
life or form of salvation but as a transfer from one site of captivity to the next.  
In further unsettling this war/refuge dichotomy, I draw on and contribute to debates 
within geography about the nature and location of war (Agnew 2009; Amoore 2009; 
Gregory 2011; Fluri 2014; Kobayashi 2009). Geographers have paid close attention to 
and also troubled the dichotomy between war and peace. Drawing on the work of 
feminist and peace scholars, Loyd (2009, 864) argues that “treating war as exceptional in 
relation to the liberal presumption of peace ignores the ‘normalcy of war’ (Cowen and 
Gilbert 2007, 6), within the ‘peacetime’ political-economic order”. Building on this 
impulse to de-exceptionalize war, Loyd suggests that we conceptualize wars as part of 
broader histories and geographies of colonialism, racial violence, imperialism, and 
capitalist exploitation. As part of these debates about where to draw the boundaries of 
war, geographers have attempted to re-map the locations of contemporary military 
violence. In trying to geographically situate the Global War on Terror, Derek Gregory 
(2011) uses the term “everywhere war” in order to suggest that conventional theorizations 
of war’s locations are less bounded and more diffuse. While emphasizing that the 
everywhere war always remains somewhere, Gregory argues that it has become 
increasingly difficult to map the boundaries of the modern warfare battlespace 
definitively, i.e. where it begins and ends. In response to these claims, Jennifer Fluri 
(2014) has argued that we need to be careful in potentially overdrawing these framings 
and their totalizing implications. Focusing on visual representations of aid, Fluri shows 
how the war is located ‘elsewhere’ precisely as part of reinforcing the idea that the 
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citizen-subject is secure within the US homeland. Yet, Fluri (2014, 810) argues if we pay 
attention to corporeal geopolitics, “the places inside and outside the nebulous battle space 
are more acutely illuminated”. In other words, rather than simply conceding to the 
apparent diffuseness that Gregory’s everywhere war terminology suggests, Fluri insists 
on the analytical and political imperatives of trying to grasp the specificity of its locations 
and materializations. Other feminist geographers have linked the violence that takes place 
‘at home’ together with global military conflicts, in order to actively deconstruct the 
‘artificial separation’ between the two (Brickell 2015; Cuomo 2013; Little 2019; Pain 
2014, 2015). In doing so, feminist geographers have traced and examined the geographic 
ties that bind spaces of war, violence, and harm together with spaces of peace, home, and 
health whilst insisting on grasping different forms in their specificities. Informed by the 
broader feminist engagement with theorizations of embodiment (Grosz 1994), this 
literature insists on foregrounding war and other forms of violence as corporeal 
experiences that enable particular situated vantage points from which to theorize power 
relations and geopolitics. 
  
Syrians’ Refugee Trajectories  
This chapter is based on data from both interviews and focus group conversations with 
Syrian refugees who have obtained refugee protection status in Denmark. As part of my 
interview guide, I routinely asked Syrians about their journeys to Denmark. The focus 
group discussions were designed to facilitate further collective discussion among Syrians 
about their journeys. In these focus groups I employed a range of activities, including 
looking at maps of Europe and the Middle East, writing down words that described their 
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journeys, and raising questions about where the journey starts and ends (geographically, 
temporally, emotionally, etc.). In these ways, I thereby sought to facilitate conversations 
among and with Syrian refugees about the multifaceted nature of their journeys and 
trajectories, rather than merely focusing on their experience of a specific place, regulatory 
practice or legal status in isolation from other considerations. Methodologically, I thus 
tried to follow a “trajectory approach” (Khosravi 2018; Schapendonk and Steel 2014; 
Schapendonk et al. 2018), which self-consciously situated the experiences of journeys 
and becomings from Syria to Denmark, including all of the ruptures, returns, slow downs, 
frictions, strategies, and dis-connections therein.  
The Syrian refugees, who I engaged with for this study, had been displaced from 
their cities and homes as a result of the Syrian Civil War. There is no single version that 
can capture my participants’ migration journey from Syria to Denmark. Rather, they all 
have their own individual journeys but of course with certain commonalities and overlaps 
in experiences and routes, such as displacement, crossing of the Aegean Sea or 
Mediterranean Sea, and applying for asylum in Denmark. Out of the 40 Syrians who 
participated in an interview, 29 Syrians traveled through informal channels and various 
means of transportation to Denmark where they claimed asylum and eleven Syrians 
arrived to Denmark through family reunification. Of the 21 Syrians who participated in 
the focus group, only two participants arrived to Denmark through family reunification. 
Out of the 19 focus group participants who travelled through informal channels, 16 
crossed either the Mediterranean Sea or the Aegean Sea, while the remaining three 
arrived through other means (air or land).  
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Syrian refugees’ travel trajectories were shaped by ad hoc decision making and 
limitations for planning. Being a forced migrant does not mean being entirely without 
agency in deciding the course of one’s journey nor does it mean being entirely in control 
of one’s ultimate destination and route thereto. While some of my informants had a clear 
idea about their desired final destinations, others made decisions about where to go next 
along the way with highly partial information and based on scarce financial resources. 
Indeed, these decisions were informed by a range of actors, including family members, 
friends, smugglers, and other migrants along the journey. For instance, George, a man in 
his late-20s from Homs, left Syria in 2013 after receiving a letter stating that he had been 
drafted to serve in the Syrian military. His parents advised that he flee to Turkey in order 
to avoid military service and return at a later date. When George left Syria he expected to 
soon be back home, noting: “I never imagined that I would leave Syria”. George’s plan 
was to stay in Turkey until his father was able to resolve the issue through informal 
connections. However, George’s father was unsuccessful in getting his call to serve 
revoked and after approximately six months, George decided to leave Turkey for an 
undetermined location in Europe. Similarly, Anwer, who was a former factory owner in 
his mid-40s from Aleppo, explained in a focus group discussion how he had never had a 
final destination in mind, even upon entering EU territory:  
When I arrived in Italy, I had no goal [final destination], which country to 
go to. What mattered is that I pass the most dangerous part of the journey 
[the sea]. In Italy, we heard a lot of people who wanted to go France, 
Germany, Denmark, or Sweden. I did not have any country in mind. Yet, 
in Milan, we [the four people Anwer was traveling with] made a collective 




In contrast to George and Anwer, Maya, who was 20 years old from Homs, had a clear 
plan about going to Sweden because her brother had successfully arrived their previously. 
Yet, Maya’s plan got interrupted when she was stopped by the Danish border control on a 
train in Denmark towards Sweden. Maya, therefore, decided to make an asylum claim in 
Denmark. These examples illustrate how migratory trajectories were shaped, facilitated, 
and interrupted by multiple competing contingencies, including desires and geographical 
imaginations, financial resources, threats and risks, information about possible 
destinations and routes, and encounters with actors including border guards, humanitarian 
actors, smugglers and other migrants en route. 
 
The Crossing 
During our interviews and focus group discussions, Syrian refugees would often make 
reference to their crossings of the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas as we talked about 
their journeys to Europe. While Syrians had moved across many dangerous places as part 
of these journeys, such as the Syrian-Turkish border and areas of Syria controlled by 
militant groups, they represented the crossings between Turkey and the European Union 
and between Egypt and the European Union as the most formidable. These sea crossings 
are, of course, widely known for being extremely dangerous and the sites of thousands of 
migrant deaths. Yet, this crossing also has intense symbolism as a key threshold 
separating the Middle East from Europe and as a signifier of separation between violence, 
war, and instability on one hand and peace, security and stability on the other.  
In emphasizing the specificity and particular perilousness of the sea crossings 
from the Middle East to Europe, many Syrians I spoke with referred to this journey as 
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“the journey of death” or “the trip of death”. For instance, Rami, who was in his mid-50s, 
from Qameshli, and had traveled from Syria together with his wife and eight children, 
described the sea crossing in the following way: “the trip was the most difficult [part of 
the journey to Denmark]. You see death”. Rami recounted how his and his family’s first 
attempt to cross the Aegean Sea had failed because the motor of the rubber boat carrying 
them continuously broke down, after which they decided to return to shore in Turkey. 
Yet, as they approached the shore, Rami recalled that the boat was hit by a large wave 
and some people on board the boat fell into the ocean. Recounting their second attempt 
the following day, Rami stated: “So the second trip, although it was during the day we 
were so afraid, fear kept in our hearts”. Rami and his family’s second attempt to cross the 
Aegean Sea was successful; they made it to Greece and continued their travel onward to 
Denmark, in hopes of reuniting with Rami’s sister and brother already there.  
In emphasizing just how dangerous this crossing was, Anis, a 28-year-old man 
from Homs who came to Denmark with his older brother, sister-in-law, and niece in 2011 
similarly recounted how he had lost several relatives in their attempt to cross the Sea:  
The crossing and the sea is very dangerous. One morning, I woke up and 
my phone was full of messages (Facebook, and WhatsApp). I knew that 
something was wrong. I opened Facebook (to find) that seventy people 
had died trying to cross the sea, thirteen of them was from my mother’s 
family! 
 
In a focus group discussion with Salam, Suzan, and Anwer, Salam stated: “seriously, it 
was a trip of death” as she and Anwer recounted their journey from Turkey to Italy. They 
were both in their mid-40s. Salam had worked as a secretary in Damascus where she had 
lived all her life, and Anwer was from Aleppo, where he owned a clothing factory. 
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Anwer had moved to Tartous due to the fighting in Aleppo, but he continued to be 
harassed by the Syrian regime’s security service and, after receiving a death threat, 
Anwer decided that it was time for him to leave Syria. Anwer and Salam did not know 
each other prior to their trip to Europe. They first met in Mersin, Turkey, the night before 
they were going to catch a ferry to Italy, a trip that was organized by a smuggler. Salam 
and Anwer described how they had quickly become friends and looked after one another 
during the five day trip from Turkey to Italy. During the focus group discussion Anwer 
and Salam took turns re-counting the horror of their journey together across the sea on a 
ferry that was overcrowded with people suffering from dehydration. Anwer recounted 
that as they arrived to the coast of Italy:  
I had a feeling… it was really beautiful. After we survived the trip of 
death [the journey from Turkey to Italy], I felt as if I was reborn”. Salam 
followed by saying: “when we arrived in Italy, everyone said: ‘Thank God 
we arrived’.  
 
In another focus group discussion, Maya described crossing the Aegean Sea between 
Turkey and Greece in a rubber boat together with approximately 40 other people. Maya 
recounted the relief she felt when the boat successfully reached the shore of a Greek 
island, saying: “We escaped the death! It was good that we managed to escape death”. 
After evocatively recalling the sheer terror of this journey, several of the Syrians I 
engaged with emphasized the sheer relief of simply having survived it. My informants 
recalled the survival of crossing as the definitive moment in their broader journeys of 
becoming refugees. The sea crossing loomed large even before undertaking it as a key 
site of danger but it was also a symbolic and geographic threshold between the Middle 
East and Europe. Syrians referenced “the journey of death” and “the trip of death” to 
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denote the dangers of this crossing and the high stakes it represented to gain access to 
refuge. However, even the successful crossing and its accordant associations with access 
to safety and protection from war severed Syrians from the war in Syria. Indeed, as I 
explore in the next section, in many respects the journey of becoming refugees is 




Many of the Syrian refugees I spoke with referenced the ways in which the war in Syria 
continued to mark their lives long after gaining refugee protection in Denmark. All my 
informants still had some family members and friends in Syria and in any case felt deeply 
emotionally connected to Syria, the place they were born and raised in and violently 
displaced from. As such, Syrian refugees continued to closely follow the news about the 
ongoing war and other political developments in Syria and regularly communicate with 
family members and friends still remaining there. For these reasons, leaving Syria to seek 
refuge in Europe did not mean simply leaving Syria behind entirely. For instance, in a 
focus group conversation Omar, a 50-year old man from Damascus, and Nizar, a 24-year 
old university student from Tartus, had the following exchange  
Omar: Yeah, it is true that I left Syria where the war is, but the war is still 
there [with me in Denmark]. As a Syrian person, I cannot get detached 
from my skin [my identity]. The [Syrian] war is not over for me. There are 
still people suffering, there are still people dying. There are people being 
bombarded. There are still people who are being arrested.  





In another focus group, Nasri, a businessman in his mid-40s from Damascus, echoed this 
sense of unshakable attachment to Syria, even as it continued to be ravaged by war and 
was geographically far off:   
We are speaking about a country in which we grew up, and lived and 
originated from - and our families. Nobody is going to be happy and 
nobody is going to have peace of mind [here in Denmark], as long as the 
children of your country are dying. 
 
Omar, Nazir, and Nasri thus all describe a common feeling among many of the Syrians 
who I engaged with for this project. While they were no longer living in Syria and no 
longer exposed to the physical danger of military operations such as bombings or the 
intimidation by Syrian state security forces or other militant groups, the war remained 
ever-present in their lives in Denmark. 
Other Syrians mentioned how Syria continued to be present in their daily lives as 
they maintained connections with family members and friends through social media and 
various mobile applications. In a focus group discussion, Hassan, Abu Imad, and Anis, 
three men who all had parents and siblings still in Syria, worried about their close 
relatives because of the ongoing war. Hassan, who was in his mid-thirties, unmarried, and 
had left his parents and two adult sisters behind in Syria, emphasized: 
I’m always thinking of my family. Sometimes, I cannot sleep and I worry 
a lot about them. I have secured myself, I have secured my life, but I keep 
thinking and worrying about my family.  
 
Abu Imad, who was from Afrin in Northern Syria where his parents were still living, 
jumped in:  
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You cannot forget your family. We pray that it [the war in Syria] calms 
down. When the internet connection breaks down in Syria, I cannot speak 
to my mother, I cannot speak with my father... 
 
In response to Hassan and Abu Imad’s comments, Anis who had arrived to Denmark in 
2011, recounted the Syrian regime’s military assault on several rebel-controlled 
neighborhoods in Homs in 2013:  
I was in Denmark and my family was in Syria, it was the worst day of my 
life, honestly. Back then, I was always following the news and the internet 
about the war. I would always make phone calls to my family. I lost many 
of my friends. Someone would call me or I would see it on the internet, 
photos on Facebook posts [when people died]. 
 
This conversation with Hassan, Abu Imad, and Anis thus illustrates how war remains 
present in Syrians’ everyday lives in exile.  
Similar to Anis, many of the Syrians who I talked to explained how they received 
updates about the war in Syria from online groups on Facebook or WhatsApp. As Syrian 
refugees’ worry about their family members’ safety, communicate with them, and receive 
updates about the war and its many victims, the Syrian Civil War becomes part of Syrian 
daily lives. Abu Nasir, a father of four children and in his mid-40’s, expressed it this way: 
Here [in Denmark] my children do not think about the war in Syria. But 
for me, I hear on Facebook, for instance, that my friend died! That my 
maternal aunt's son is gone, dead! My paternal aunt's son was put in 
prison! The war is in the minds and souls of Syrians – wherever you are, 
you cannot forget. 
 
So while the virtual space provided some comfort by enabling Syrians to stay connected 
with friends and loved ones in Syria, the access it provided also served as a reminder of 
the ongoing war faced by Syrians relayed in the form of texts and social media messages. 
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Abu Nasir’s comment “the war is in the minds and souls of Syrians” was echoed 
in other conversations I had with Syrians. For instance, in my interview with Nawal, a 
middle-age woman from Homs, Nawal spoke about how she was constantly thinking 
about her adult daughter who was still living in Syria. As Nawal explained:  
We left the war but it came with us. Our hearts and minds keep with the 
people in Syria. Me, for example, I have my daughter in Syria, I keep 
thinking about her. I wish that I did not have to eat, I wish I could send my 
money [integration allowance] to her and then my daughter who is here [in 
Denmark] could support me. I don’t like to eat when I know that my 
daughter [in Syria] is struggling. 
 
Thus, for many Syrians the war in Syria was very much still part of their everyday life, as 
they received updates through social media about the war and its victims, maintained 
contact with family member and friends who remained in Syria, worried about the lives 
of these same people, and mourned the loss of their homes, cities, friends, and family 
members.  
As Nasri’s words above ‘nobody is going to have a peace of mind, as long as the 
children of your country are dying’ illustrate, the feeling and experience of having peace 
cannot be obtained simply by being granted physical safety and legal refugee protection. 
Because the war in Syria remained ongoing, Nasri and others did not feel ‘at peace’ as 
they worried about the fate of their homeland, their neighbors, friends, and family 
members who remained there.   
This testimony resonates with feminist scholars’ well-established arguments 
concerning the need to attend to the complex geographic and emotional boundaries at 
work in relation to war in places far beyond the territory where it is physically fought and 
more specifically to attend to war not merely in terms of actual military violence waged 
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in battlefields but instead through the register of embodied experience (Enloe 2010; 
Sylvester 2014). Doing so allows us to address, among many other things, the ways in 
which violence exercised in various elsewheres continues to reverberate in the lives of 
those who would appear to be outside of its remit. Most relevant for the present chapter, 
however, are the ways in which references to war in Denmark were put to work in 
making sense of the policies and practices that structured and indeed saturated the 
experience of lived refuge there.  
 
War in Denmark: ḥarb nafsīa  
As the Syrians who I engaged with sought to make sense of their lived experiences in 
Denmark, they used the term ḥarb nafsīa.  Syrian refugees described how they had 
arrived in Denmark, obtained protection, and were protected from the overt violence they 
had experienced in Syria - to use Farah’s words: “We secured ourselves [in the sense] 
that we are not going to die”. But Farah and others also felt that it was as if the war had 
not ended but rather morphed into what they called the ḥarb nafsīa. For instance, Sara, 
who had successfully escaped the war in Syria, survived the treacherous journey across 
the Aegean Sea together with her three small children, her mother, and her brother, 
explained that she had not been able to free herself from the experience of war:  
I left the war (…) But I do not feel that I left the war! I left the war in 
Syria behind but I feel myself here living in ḥarb nafsīa with myself and 
with the others. There is a war [here]! 
 
Sara’s reflection and use of the term ḥarb nafsīa was echoed in the accounts of many of 
my other Syrian informants. Syrians’ narratives of ḥarb nafsīa in Denmark draw our 
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attention to “issues of war, race and violence, rather than to questions of identity, 
assimilation, and recuperation of history” (Nguyen 2012, 930). That is, rather than self-
pathologizing their struggles in Denmark as reflective of some individual failings to 
‘assimilate’ or leave their troubled pasts behind, many of my informants preempted such 
an interpretation and proposed an alternative political reading of their ongoing struggles 
for dignity and justice.   
Syrian refugees actively used the term ḥarb nafsīa both to describe the character 
of their everyday experiences as refugees in Denmark but also to make sense of these 
experiences of the acute violences stemming from the government of refuge. While Farah 
used the term ḥarb nafsīa to explain to me how the suspension of family reunification 
had intimate and violent consequences for her family as well as other Syrian families 
(explained in Chapter Three), Lama used the term to explain how she experienced the 
many demands associated with the integration program: “All this psychological pressure 
and stress they [the government] are doing – I call it ḥarb nafsīa” (described in Chapter 
Four). Likewise, Maya stated that: “they [Denmark] do not protect you. On the contrary, 
they exhaust your personality (put psychological burden on you). They make you hate 
your life and yourself!” The multiple references to ḥarb nafsīa, I suggest, illustrate how 
this war can be conceptualized as the cumulative effect of the state violence Syrian 
refugees were subject to in Denmark, including restricted immigration legislation, 
demands of integration, conditional social workfare programs, and anti-immigrant 
discourses. 
Several of my informants believed that ḥarb nafsīa was explicitly not an 
unintended consequence of some otherwise noble efforts to administer refuge. Rather, 
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Syrian refugees used this term deliberately to connote an active campaign they felt was 
being waged against refugees and particularly Syrian refugees. For instance, in the focus 
group conversation with Salam, Suzan, and Anwer – Salam emphasized that she believed 
that she and other Syrians had become the target of this war because they were refugees: 
“It is […] because you are a refugee”. Similarly, as Sami described his struggles to make 
sense of the law and legislative changes that the Danish government had instituted since 
his arrival to Denmark in 2015, he stated: “it is not from the Danish people, they are 
kind”. Sami shifted from speaking in the Syrian dialect to using Fus’ha (Standard Arabic, 
a more formal way of speaking) and stressed each word in a careful and deliberate 
manner, as he stated: “I am totally sure there is someone who wants to harm the Syrian 
people”. While Sami made it clear to me that the war was not caused by “the Danish 
people”, he hesitated to directly blame the Danish government for this war. Sami’s 
hesitation made sense because at the time of our conversation his family reunification 
application was pending and he was nervous about calling out the Danish state as he 
likely worried that it could hurt his case. Amira, however, was less reserved about who to 
blame: “they [the Danish government] waged a ḥarb nafsīa against us”.  
Indeed, it is easily conceivable that the onslaught of amendments to the Danish 
Immigration and Integration Acts was directly aimed at (Syrian) refugees. Since June 
2015, the Danish government enacted more than 100 amendments to the Danish 
Immigration Act and Integration Act. Some of these amendments received international 
notoriety because of their sheer cruelty and dehumanizing qualities, which fell in sharp 
contrast to Denmark’s erstwhile status as a kind of model social democracy known for its 
well-established welfare programs and high wages.  Conservative politicians argued that 
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these amendments were justified by making direct references to the Syrian Civil War and 
the arrival of Syrian refugees to Denmark. But such arguments appear problematic given 
that Syrian refugees made up less than half of the refugees who applied for asylum in 
Denmark in 2015, the year with the highest number of refugees seeking asylum during 
the so-called refugee crisis. Hence, the Danish state’s efforts to limit and deter refugee 
migration can indeed be thought as a war against refugee/migrants.  
The use of war metaphors to make sense of state practices targeting Syrian 
refugees in Denmark shows the importance of re-locating war beyond the boundaries of 
formal military institutions and associated forms of violence. While I am in no way 
suggesting that addressing such violence is necessarily problematic per se, Loyd (2009, 
866) points out that “[t]he reification of direct violence fails to capture military strategies 
that target infrastructures for living, avoids the contradictions of militarization, and 
obscures the structural violence engendered by privileging of militarized priorities”. 
Thus, Syrians’ references to ḥarb nafsīa in refuge, should not be understood as “war” 
encroaching onto an otherwise pristine zone of “peace” to follow Howell’s (2018) 
argument. Instead, violence should be situated as always already entangled with the 
practice of liberal refuge and the government of refuge with its constituent power 
relations and racialized subjectifying gazes. 
Amira was not alone in ascribing ḥarb nafsīa and the damage that it caused 
Syrians directly to the Danish government and its actions. For instance, in a focus group 
conversation with Ghazi, Bashir, and Yasin, the three men described how the media 
portrays refugees who the government represents as deserving of particular close scrutiny 
and suspicion:  
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Ghazi: When you see on TV, “laje'a”, “laje'a”, “laje'a”, “laje'a” (refugee) 
then even the Danish people started to be afraid of us. “These people 
[refugees] No! They are robbing us, they are so and so”. 
Bashir: …The government repeats: ‘refugee, refugee, refugee’. They 
[Danes] think: “so these refugees are scary!” (…) They hear what the 
government is saying and take it as the truth. They take what they say on 
TV as the truth. 
Yasin: They [the government] are making people fear us more! (…) I wish 
for once, that I could turn on the radio and not hear the word laje'a! I wish 
that they for once would leave us alone and speak about other issues. You 
have a thousand things to talk about – [but] you only talk about refugees! 
 
Through this conversation, Ghazi, Bashir, and Yasin described how the intense focus and 
repeated media coverage of refugee-related stories produced and created fear among 
“Danish people”, to use Ghazi’s words. Bashir and Yasin further stated that the Danish 
government was to be blamed for this because the Danish government’s very well-known 
anti-immigrant discourse, often framed as an explicit fight to limit and deter the number 
of refugees, was understood among Danes as the truth. Ghazi, Bashir, and Yasin all 
expressed a yearning to break free from the category of refugee that was being imposed 
upon them. Yet, Yasin’s words (“I wish for once, that I could turn on the radio and not 
hear the word laje'a (refugee)”) illustrated how the intense focus and repeated coverage of 
stories affected Yasin as well as other Syrians’ everyday lives. Yasin’s comment shows 
us how he felt targeted, caught, and contained by these portrayals. Ghazi, Bashir, and 
Yasin’s observation illustrates the “discursive violence” (Jones, et al. 1994: 394) that 
takes place through the media and government’s representation as refugees are portrayed 
in ways that counter how refugees see and define themselves.  
When Syrians talked about the experience of war in Denmark, they made clear 
distinctions between the war in Syria and ḥarb nafsīa in Denmark. They did so through 
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giving the two wars different names. While Syrians referred to the war in Denmark as 
ḥarb nafsīa, they referred to the war in Syria as the war of death. This is illustrated in 
Farah’s account of leaving Syria: “We managed to escape the war of death, the one that 
we would die in”. Syrians also distinguished between the two wars by making references 
to the instruments, the nature, and consequences of war, as well as geographical 
references to the physical location of war. For instance, Amira stated “there is no plane 
above us [that is dropping bombs]”. Likewise, in the focus group with Salam, Suzan and 
Anwer, Salam and Suzan had the following dialogue about ḥarb nafsīa:  
Salam: The war here [in Denmark] is for survival and existence. We came 
here to seek peace, we do not have it. We left the war [in Syria] with guns, 
rifles, and things like that but we came to another kind of war. A war for 
existence and a war of... 
Suzan: nafsīa? 
Salam: ḥarb nafsīa. (…) All the people who are fighting you, you feel that 
they are attacking you. 
 
Here Salam made it clear that ḥarb nafsīa was not the same as the war in Syria because 
the war in Syria was the war with military power (“with guns, rifles, and things like 
that”). Rather, ḥarb nafsīa is a war in the sense that Syrians feel that they are fighting for 
their very right to exist as dignified human beings with individual needs, desires, and 
aspirations not reducible to the roles imposed on them by the government of refuge. 
Drawing on these descriptions of ḥarb nafsīa, I argue that Syrians’ use of the term 
ḥarb nafsīa is a collective way of making sense of lived refuge. The collectiveness of this 
term became particularly apparent through focus group conversations. For instance, in 
response to Sara’s description of how she experienced war in Denmark, Salma affirmed 
Sara’s description stating: “yes, there are a lot of people who say that”. The 
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collectiveness also expressed itself in the ways my informants used the term in an attempt 
to illustrate how they had become a target, not individually, but collectively as a group 
defined as refugees. Furthermore, Syrian refugees’ efforts to make a clear distinction 
between the war in Syria and ḥarb nafsīa in Denmark, I argue, illustrates that the 
experience of war in Denmark cannot be reduced to the residual trauma – i.e. post-
traumatic stress caused by the Syrian Civil War – but instead is located as an outcome of 
Danish state violence.  
By re-framing the “violent conditions” (Laurie and Shaw 2018) they experienced in 
Denmark in the terms of war, Syrian refugees drew active parallels to the atrocities of the 
war in Syria. While qualifying that there was no overt military violence in Denmark 
(bombings, chemical attacks, etc.), Syrians represented their experience of refuge in 
Denmark as ḥarb nafsīa to draw attention to how the state practices they were subject to 
affect them, to use Maya’s words “they exhaust your personality”. Drawing parallels 
between the violence caused by war in Syria and the violence caused by the Danish 
government, Syrians further challenged the geographical representation of Denmark as 
being a safe haven beyond the remit of violence. In doing so, I suggest that Syrian 
refugees’ narratives of ḥarb nafsīa begin to disrupt prevailing geopolitical imaginations 
of Europe/Denmark and war. Indeed, through challenging these prevailing pictures of 
war/not-war I argue that Syrian refugees prompts us to question the very idea of state 
borders and geographical locations as defining spaces of refugee protection (or lack 
thereof). In other words, although Syrian refugees are ostensibly ‘safe’ in Denmark, they 




Promise of Refuge 
Syrian refugees often expressed to me how refuge in Denmark did not turn out to be what 
they had anticipated it to be. For instance, Anis, a 28-year-old man who came to 
Denmark with his older brother, sister-in-law, and niece in 2011, recounted what he and 
other Syrian refugees had imagined refuge in Europe to be, prior to their arrival there:  
Europe: the countries of freedom and the law. Europe helps, Europe is 
advanced and developed. We had this idea about Europe that it is a haven 
and that if we arrived there (in Europe) our life would be complete!  
 
Likewise, Reema explained:  
We came for the human rights, to a place where human rights are highly 
regarded. We assumed that Europe was a place of culture, education, and 
civilization, with people who know the human rights. [In Syria] we envied 
them [Europeans], their lifestyle and life standards. In Syria, this thing did 
not exist – human rights and respect for humans!  
 
Anis and Reema’s reflections illustrate how imaginations of Europe as an idealized place 
were central to their expectations of being able to exercise rights, freedoms, and dignity 
previously inaccessible to them in Syria. This assumption in turn shaped their 
expectations of a quick transition into a comfortable life once in Denmark. For instance, 
Farah noted: “I expected that we would come here [Denmark] and find safety, find peace 
of mind – find a home, settle down.”  
However, as the narratives about war mentioned above illustrate, Syrian refugees’ 
lives did not become complete when they obtained refuge in Denmark nor did they “find 
peace of mind” to use Farah’s words. Rather, the experiences of war continued to be 
present in their lives both in terms of the ongoing war in Syria and in Denmark. Yet, here 
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I am simply not concerned with the fact that these imaginations of refuge were false. 
Instead, I am interested in how the imagination of refuge as a space beyond war might 
have been key driver of Syrians’ desires to seek refuge in Europe. Here, Lauren Berlant’s 
(2011) concept of “cruel optimism” might be helpful in order to make sense of how 
attachments to this imagination worked as a force, a desire that could never be fulfilled.  
Through this concept of cruel optimism, Berlant seeks to address our (optimistic) 
attachments to a thing, an object, or a way of life, such as the ‘good life’, upward 
mobility, political and social equality. Berlant (2011, 2) further describes how this 
optimism and optimistic relations become cruel when:  
the object/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually makes it 
impossible to attain the expansive transformation for which a person or a 
people risks striving; and, doubly, it is cruel insofar as the very pleasure of 
being inside a relation have become sustaining regardless of the content of 
the relation, such that a person or a world finds itself bound to a situation 
of profound threat that is, at the same time, profoundly confirming. 
 
Thus, cruel optimism is a force that moves us closer to that which we desire yet this 
object becomes an obstacle for our (human) flourishment. The object actively impedes 
the aim that brought you to it. In this sense, refuge and the belief that upon leaving the 
site of the immediate war, one could be free and a enjoy life characterized by peace – and 
not war – can be understood as a promise and a fantasy that individuals including 
refugees can become attached to and which worked as an affective force. It is this 
promise that guarantees that Syrian refugees would escape war once they had made the 
dangerous across the sea and “find safety, find peace of mind” to use Farah’s words. This 
promise of refuge as a place of peace and safety beyond war and violence is a “magnetic 
attraction” (Berlant 2011, 48).  
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Yet, the promise of refuge as a place of peace and without war is cruel in the 
sense that it never came true. As Syrian refugees’ lived experiences of the ongoing Syrian 
Civil War and ḥarb nafsi’ya illustrate, it was impossible for Syrian refugees to experience 
a life in refuge that was not marked by war. Despite their best efforts, despite leaving 
their homelands and arriving at a place where they believed there would be peace, safety, 
and human dignity, they instead arrived to a land (Denmark) where the war at home 
followed them and where the war on their soul, existences, and sense of self was waged 
day in and day out by the Danish state that reluctantly had accepted them as refugees. 
Indeed, the promise that leaving the site of war would allow Syrians to be free of being in 
a relationship of violence to the Syrian state or any state could never become true because 
it is a fantasy and a false promise.  
Importantly, here I am interested in the moment when this false promise, the 
fantasy of what life in refuge is, comes undone, the moment or moments of undoing. 
Whereas Berlant’s core concern is why we stay attached to the good life fantasy even 
once its associated false promises start to reveal themselves (becoming undone), what is 
significant about Syrians’ disruptive encounters with Denmark is the ways in which they 
utterly shatter Syrians’ prior attachments to refuge as a place without war as a realistic 
expectation. In recounting their broader journey, my informants frequently emphasized 
that some of their initial feelings of relief upon their arrival to Europe soon gave way to 
other more disorienting emotions. Here, a number of Syrian refugees described feelings 
of being “shocked” or “surprised” as they encountered aspects of Europe and Denmark 
that were radically out of step with what they had anticipated. For instance, Sami, a 55-
year-old man who arrived to Denmark in the late fall of 2015, described his experience of 
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being shocked: “from the moment I entered Denmark, and still now, it has been a big 
shock, a constant shock”.  
Syrian refugees’ description of being shocked, surprised, and disappointed reveal 
this moment of the promise of refuge starting to fall apart. While Sami’s shock was 
associated with the Danish government’s response to the arrival of Syrian and other 
refugees, Najwa, a young woman in her mid-twenties, expressed how she was surprised 
about her inability to obtain basic human rights in refuge. Najwa further explained “it 
turned out that this vivid imagination is not… [the] reality”. Najwa’s realization of how 
the promise of refuge as a place where she could obtain and access her rights was just a 
“vivid imagination”, to use Najwa’s own words, manifested itself in feelings of 
disappointment. It illustrates the moment when the promise of refuge starts to fray and 
fall apart. It is this moment of falling apart –or to use Berlant’s terminology this impasse 
– that provides insights into how Syrian refugees began to reckon with and were 
prompted to fundamentally reconsider the basis of the optimisms that had compelled 
them to undertake the perilous journey there. As becomes very explicit through the 
references to ḥarb nafsīa, their emphasis was not merely in showing the promise of 
refuge to be a false one. It was instead to ascribe political responsibly for targeted 
violence against them as a choice rather than as a natural feature of the state per se. In 
this way, Syrian refugees began to reconsider their own geopolitical imagination of 





In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which war and refuge are connected, the 
terms of this connection and their limits. I have focused on Syrian refugees’ accounts of 
their journeys to Denmark as well as their experiences of war in Denmark, both the 
ongoing Syrian civil war and the psychological war. Through an analysis of Syrians’ 
accounts, I have illustrated how, although Syrians fled their home land in order to escape 
immediate threats to them and their families, they were never entirely able to leave the 
war behind. Indeed, Syrians found it impossible to make a clear separation between life 
under war and life in exile. Intimate connections and relations endured as Syrian refugees 
became spectators to the Syrian War from a distance, yet mediated through the eyes and 
visceral experiences of those left behind.  
Through these discussions about war, refuge, and exile, the term ḥarb nafsīa also 
emerged as Syrian refugees’ claimed that there was also war in Denmark, yet a different 
kind of war that was distinct from the war in Syria. I argue that Syrians’ various accounts 
of war complicate conventional geographical imaginations of where war is located and 
challenge us to re-think the spatial boundaries of war. Syrians’ corporal experiences and 
accounts of war(s) illustrate how war can be conceptualized as a multi-faceted and multi-
sited force. The ongoing Syrian Civil War is physically fought in Syria, the battlefield 
and the destructions caused by this war can be documented by mapping the physical 
damage of buildings, neighborhoods, and cities within the geographical territory of Syria. 
In this sense, the Syrian Civil War can be located geographically in one particular place 
(Gregory 2011; Fluri 2014). Yet, if we take the emotional, psychological register of the 
war into account – a different yet connected register – the Syrian Civil War is very much 
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part of Syrian refugees’ everyday lives in Denmark, through transnational connections 
and activities. The nature, consequences, and destruction of the war become visible and 
felt by Syrians in Denmark through virtual interactions with family members and friends 
who remain in Syria. As such, the lived experiences of Syrian Civil War cannot be 










































Majed: the word refugee used to feel like an insult for me. But now it is 
the opposite.  
Author: Why did it make you feel that way? 
Majed: because the way that people would say it, it was disrespecting. But 
I found the weakest point in it and I turned it around to be the strongest 
point. 
Author: What does the word refugee mean to you now? 
Majed: Now, it means hero! Because if you are a refugee or an asylum 
seeker, it means that you have been through a lot of things and it is not 
because you are weak or cannot hold on anymore. And as a refugee living 
here in Denmark among other people (non-refugees) you been through a 
lot of things that they never had to go through.  
 




How do we tell the story of the refugee? What stories can be told and what stories cannot 
or should not be told? And how do we tell stories about war, rescue, and refuge in ways 
that do not reduce refugees to mere victims, yet still emphasize the consequences and 
damage of war and violence? These are some of the questions that Yến Lê Espiritu 
(2014,171) raises in the end of her book Body Counts as she describes her long-term 
struggle of how to write the Vietnamese story of war and displacement. Espiritu’s 
questions and reflections resonate with my own experiences of writing about war and 
displacement. Since I first started to conduct research with forced migrants in Denmark in 
2012 for my Master’s thesis, I have grappled with similar questions concerning 
representation and paid close attention to the ways in which forced migrants appear in or 
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are sometimes entirely written out of geopolitical writing on borders, immigration 
enforcement, and migration management.  
In order to address this concern about how to tell the story of the Vietnamese 
refugees, Espiritu has proposed a re-conceptualization of “the refugee” “not as an object 
of rescue but as a site of social and political critique, whose emergence when traced, 
would make visible the processes of colonization, war, and displacement” (Espiritu 2014, 
174). This re-conceptualization allows us to re-center the geopolitical conditions that 
produce human displacement, rather than locating the “problem of refugees” within the 
bodies and minds of the refugee. As such, the refugee is not understood as “an object of 
study but as a source of knowledge” to use Espiritu’s words (2014, 171).  
In this research project, I have sought to follow this re-conceptualization by 
bringing it together with feminist geographers’ longstanding efforts to examine 
geopolitics from the perspective and actions of those who are often left out of 
conventional geopolitical stories, yet are very much caught up in and subject to national 
policies, state practices, and international relations (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 
2004; Koopman 2011). My research has been driven by the quest to bring forced 
migrants – their experiences, struggles, actions, and opinions – into the political 
geographical literature on displacement and geopolitics of migration. What do we learn 
about the geopolitics of migration if we start from the stories and experiences of forced 
migrants themselves, rather than from state authorities? How do we write these stories in 
ways that highlight the power relations and struggles at play therein? How do we 
represent forced migrants’ accounts and experiences not merely as effects of or responses 
to state practices, which seek to deter, manage, and control unwanted migrants? As the 
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previous chapters have illustrated, it is undeniable that forced migrants’ lives and 
experiences are influenced by state practices, at every turn. Yet, this does not mean that 
forced migrants are passive subjects. Rather, despite various constraints, forced migrants 
forge meanings, make lives, and push back against and rework relationships of power and 
identity. As Majed’s reflections on the word “refugee” illustrates, people like Majed who 
have been assigned the category “refugee” reflect on how this labeling and categorization 
makes them feel and also re-work what it means.   
In this concluding chapter, I provide a summery for my findings while I reflect on 
how this approach to studying the geopolitics of forced migration has informed my 
research and analysis. I then turn to the questions of what is at stake when we unsettle 
ideas and liberal promise of refuge and refugee protection in signatory states, which often 
are assumed to be already-given and unproblematic. While I do provide a simple and/or 
technical solution that can fix the problems related to refugee protection and the 
government of refuge, I reflect on the need to unsettle the liberal promise of refuge in 
order to make space for alternative visions to become thinkable. 
  
Lived Refuge 
In this dissertation, I have examined refuge as a lived reality rather than as a set of 
abstract principles, legal statutes, or norms. The empirical thrust of my research has 
therefore been to explore refuge as it is experienced and known by (Syrian) refugees 
themselves, to trace the fine grained texture of what I consider lived refuge. By 
foregrounding Syrian forced migrants’ encounters with Western states’ migration 
management practices, particularly those of Denmark, I have rendered these practices 
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legible in new ways that rethink their meaning and stakes, both analytically and 
politically. Undertaking analysis from these particular embodied and situated vantage 
points, my dissertation develops three core claims. 
First, it argues that in practice refuge and the exercise of state violence are deeply 
enmeshed through a dense and overlapping set of governmental practices. Refugees’ 
accounts of refuge in Denmark considerably complicate and critique the terms of 
standard liberal conceptions of refuge. However, Syrians’ accounts also present 
alternative renderings that help us to rearticulate what refuge is, does, and for whom. 
Indeed, I have suggested that grappling with the meanings of lived refuge helps to unpack 
how government of refuge constitutive of new categories and subject positions. A core 
argument of this dissertation is that the state’s decision to grant an individual refuge 
cannot simply be understood as an event but is rather an ongoing practice of subjection, 
which establishes and consolidates a particular relationship between the state and the 
refugee.  
Second, in unsettling the prevailing conceptions of what refuge is ontologically, 
this dissertation also seeks to critique and re-write geographical imaginations about 
where refuge is and how spaces of refuge are or are not connected to war. Here I argue 
that concern with experiences of lived refuge productively rearticulate the supposed 
dichotomy of war/not war and illustrates how Denmark is connected to the Syrian Civil 
War and the Middle East more broadly. Refuge, in sharp contradiction to how it is 
commonly understood, is irreducibly connected to war in ways that must be considered 
both temporally and spatially.  
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Third and finally, I argue that engagement with embodied experiences of refuge 
can help us to rethink key political questions about forced migration and its management 
– within states and across transnational space. Not only does this approach allow us to 
rethink sovereign decisions and practices, but also what counts as politics and geopolitics 
and how subjects and victims of dehumanizing structural violence speak back to power. 
While the concept or notion of lived refuge is an attempt to account for the government of 
refuge beyond the point of access and inclusion, it is also a concept for thinking about the 
individual and collective strategies and practices that forced migrants mobilize in the 
never-ending political struggle to live a meaningful life. Syrian refugees’ legal and 
political claims for the right to live together with their families as well as their informal 
strategies to obtain family reunification, attempts to call out the injustice of the 
integration allowance system and the job-training programs, strategies to find 
employment through informal networks, and reference to ḥarb nafsīa all represent 
moments of being political. These forms of political action concern survival, whether in 
terms of not being worn down by the government of refuge and of making do but also the 
making of homes and life. The ways in which (Syrian) refugees respond to government 
of refuge and make sense of refuge in Denmark reveals emergent forms of political 
subjectivity and agency that do not fit neatly with conventional and liberal models for 
political subjectivity, yet need to be considered part of the (geo)politics of forced 
migration.   
Through these three closely connected claims, I have unsettled but also begun to 
re-write an alternative account of refuge that might generate a different set of 
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expectations and political demands on Western states to respond to a condition of 
deepening planetary displacement.  
 
Unsettling Refuge  
What I have tried to illustrate in this dissertation is the need to unsettle the liberal promise 
of refuge as well as the value of doing so. Tracing refugees’ lives, experiences, and 
knowledges beyond the point of access to sovereign territory and refugee protection 
demonstrates that refuge in signatory countries is simply not the safe haven, which it is 
typically imagined to be. Instead, refuge is a place where familiar yet surprising 
experiences of war, violence, and displacement continue and are reconfigured. In doing 
so, this dissertation helps to expose the liberal myth of refuge by deconstructing the idea 
of signatory countries as the all-good saviors of helpless refugees (Hyndman and Giles 
2016), elevated above non-signatory countries (Coddington 2018), as well as the 
corollary that refugees should be forever thankful for their refugee protection (Nguyen 
2012). 
I of course recognize that a lot is at stake when being critical of refuge and 
refugee protection as it is provided by signatory states today. There is a tension between 
the need to unsettle refuge and a political struggle for displaced people’s access to spaces 
of safety and rights. To be clear, obtaining refugee protection and a residence permit in a 
signatory country is enormously important for refugees and a moral mandate for 
signatory states. As Ramsay (2019, 200) states refugee resettlement – I would add asylum 
and refugee protection in a country signatory to the 1951 Convention – “may provide the 
only possible means to alleviate situations of extreme physical insecurity in camps and 
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urban asylum”. Refuge in a signatory country, whether it is obtained through refugee 
resettlement or claiming asylum, can be a ‘privilege’ as this legal status affords refugees 
a range of rights and entitlements, including the right to work, social benefits, healthcare, 
and increased mobility that they simply would not otherwise have. The legal status given 
to officially recognized refugees, Nell Gabiam (2016, 145) emphasizes, “ensures that 
refugees have at least some of the rights associated with citizenship, and it can be a 
conduit to full, formal citizenship”. So to claim that refuge provided by signatory 
countries does not matter would be to dismiss the importance of (permanent) legal status 
for refugees and security provided by the state. As Hyndman and Giles (2016, 124) put it 
“the “right to have rights” is undeniably better than no right to have rights”. Refuge and 
refugee protection in signatory state thus remain fundamentally important, even if partial 
or imperfect. Thus, I do not advocate for abandoning the current international refugee 
regime altogether.  
However, I do not believe that the solution is to be found in the idea of 
substantive citizenship and the liberatory power of the law. It is not simply a matter of 
requiring that refugees obtain membership or citizenship so that they can be included and 
recognized as ‘human’ and the national order of things can be re-stored, as Long (2011) 
has suggested. As other scholars have argued, such a liberal emancipatory approach 
reproduces and expands the remit and authority of state sovereignty.  For instance, 
drawing on Marx’s critique of political emancipation, Neferti Tadiar (2012, 6) states that 
political emancipation of marginalized groups such as women and migrants “into the 
political category of the human serves only to naturalize and expand the authority and 
rule of Western liberal secular law, an expansion crucially supported in the contemporary 
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moment by “democratizing” wars of economic restructuring as well as militarist regime 
change”. As I have illustrated in this dissertation, Syrian refugees who obtain refugee 
protection in Denmark are legally included into Danish society through the Danish 
Immigration Act and their refugee protection status, which provides them certain rights 
and obligations. However, such inclusion also enables the Danish state to govern this 
population and normalize the violence embedded within and inherent to the government 
of refuge. Thus, politico-legal incorporation of refugees into the host society can expands 
the state’s power over this group. Thus, to solve the “problem of refugees” through 
citizenship is still part of a state-sponsored approach to managing people’s well-being. 
Jennifer Hyndman and Wenona Giles (2016, 126) encourage us to stop “seeing 
like a state in terms of solving the refugee problem”. In a similar vein,  Georgina Ramsay 
(2019, 201) has recently suggested that “perhaps it is the focus on the solution as a 
distinct and definable object that is the central impasse through which the problem of 
refugees continues to be reproduced, and which makes this supposed problem seem 
impossible to resolve”. Ramsay turns to the idea of “connectedness” (2019, 200) as an 
attempt relate the experiences of refugees with other marginalized groups in order to 
trace how displacement is produced and is an existential experience, rather than one 
defined by politico-legal dislocations. Ramsay (2019, 207) further states that “it is 
through attention to the possibility of connection, rather than the fortification and renewal 
of borders and boundaries of difference and otherness, that global systems of responding 
to forced migration may work towards shared, rather than incommensurable, futures”. 
Yet, Ramsay also recognizes that in order to enable connectedness require an “overhaul”, 
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as she calls it, not only of the international refugee regime, “but of the very organizing 
logics of neoliberal capitalist societal frameworks, themselves” (Ramsay 2019, 206). 
Building on Ramsay’s insights, I argue that there is a need to conceptualize refuge 
differently. Yet, while Ramsay calls for an overhaul of the current system, I argue that we 
need to build new institutions and ways of life rather than rehabilitate old ones. Rather 
than approaching refuge as either a means or an end – and idealized form to be aspired to 
– we should instead attend to the lived experiences of refuge. We cannot wait until the 
moment when sovereign states recognize refugees as political subjects and restore the 
citizen-state bond. People displaced by war and violence are always already in the 
process of making lives and might find refuge in places we do not recognize as such. 
Paying attention to this might enable us to see other possible forms of refuge and ways of 
life as well as the seeds of futures that seem currently deemed impractical and 
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